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Abstract 
Household food insecurity and malnutrition occur in South Africa at levels much 
higher than national economic data would suggest. Own production of food has been 
proposed as a solution to both hunger and poor nutrition, and is widely advocated. 
However, this policy glosses over the fact that there are a considerable number of 
food-insecure households that have the opportunity and means to produce their own 
food, but are not doing so. Mainstream economics’ strict assumptions about how 
individuals will react under a particular set of circumstances effectively denies the 
possibility that people have, and choose to exercise, agency in adopting alternative 
responses. The underlying aim of this thesis is to investigate manifestations of the 
disconnect between the assumed reality of mainstream development policy and 
practitioners, and the lived reality of target beneficiaries, and to propose an alternative 
explanation, based on a theory of meaningful action in everyday life. This thesis 
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investigates choice and decision-making in the everyday lives of two groups of 
community gardeners in the Gauteng Province of South Africa. It aims to provide 
some insights into apparently paradoxical behaviours – namely, that poor persons 
often make decisions that appear to be at odds both with the predictions of utility-
maximising models and the expectations of development practitioners and policies. 
This thesis asserts that even very materially poor people not only have much more 
agency than mainstream development discourses assume, but that they continually 
exercise that agency in resisting the stereotypes of poverty that development officials 
are so keen to reproduce. 
 
 
Key Words 
Food security, narrative identity, community gardens, South Africa, everyday life, 
development discourse, agency, Paul Ricoeur.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  iv 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that this thesis is my own, unaided work. It is submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not 
been submitted before for any degree or examination in any university. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  ___________________________ 
Tracy Margaret Ledger    Date 
 
 
  v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Firstly, to the community garden participants, who welcomed me into their lives and 
gifted me with one of the most extraordinary years of my life. Their determination to 
achieve liberation on their own terms, against the prejudice of South Africa’s 
development policies, is a daily manifestation of the call amandla awethu1.  
 
Thanks to my supervisors – Dr Hylton White and Dr Ivor Chipkin – both of them 
generous with their ideas and their time. Dr White was very patient with a student 
newly arrived in Anthropology. 
 
Thanks also to the library staff at the University who went out of their way to 
accommodate my numerous requests and provide assistance.  
 
Gratitude to the GDARD staff who kindly took time out of their schedules and drove 
me around, introduced me to all the gardeners, and gave me the official sanction 
without which I would never have had it so easy in my fieldwork.  
 
And to H, who supported and encouraged me, challenging my ideas and my 
preconceptions – always forcing me to think again, and to think better.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Power to Us – a South African liberation struggle rallying cry. 
  vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
  Page 
Abstract ii 
Declaration iv 
Acknowledgements v 
Table of Contents vi 
Chapter One. Rationality, Reality and Food 1 
 1.1. Introduction: the research problem 1 
 1.2. The paradox of own food production and hunger 7 
 1.3. Searching for a theoretical framework 14 
  1.3.1. This isn’t really about “status” consumption 17 
  1.3.2. This isn’t (only) about material culture 26 
 1.4. Finding a starting point: explanation, interpretation and 
hermeneutical phenomenology 
 
31 
 1.5. The ethnographic study 34 
 1.6. Outline of the thesis 37 
Chapter Two. Identity as performance: imagination, temporality and 
meaning-in-the-world 
 
40 
 2.1. Introduction: meaningful action as a text 40 
 2.2. Performance identity: an expanded Ricoeurian framework for the 
interpretation of meaningful action 
 
57 
  2.2.1. Mediating the Self: narrative as performance 57 
  2.2.2. Emplotment and the creative imagination: agency at 
work 
 
62 
  vii 
  2.2.3. Temporal coherence: performance, plot and temporality 66 
Chapter Three. The life of a community garden 72 
 3.1. A demographic overview 72 
 3.2. Food, diet and food security policy 74 
  3.2.1. The official picture 74 
  3.2.2. Daily diet 78 
  3.2.3. Food security initiatives in Gauteng 83 
 3.3. A brief history of the gardens 91 
  3.3.1. Motse 91 
  3.3.2. Tshimo 98 
 3.4. The daily life of the gardens 106 
Chapter Four. The big picture: power, authorship and plausibility 112 
 4.1. Introduction: conceptualizing identity as performance 112 
 4.2. Power and plausibility: who is permitted which performance? 117 
 4.3. Creativity and authorship: who scripts the performance? 131 
Chapter Five. The quest for temporal cohesion: experience, expectation and 
the space for agency 
 
147 
 5.1. Introduction: identity and temporality 147 
 5.2. Horizons of expectation: “We are moving forwards” 155 
 5.3. “No expectation without experience, no experience without 
expectation”: expanding expectation by expanding experience 
 
168 
 5.4. Something borrowed: remaking the space of experience 172 
Chapter Six. Who will you be today? Choosing and defining a character 181 
 6.1. Introduction 181 
  viii 
 6.2. Selecting and discarding characters: who you are not is as 
important as who you are 
 
186 
 6.3. Concordance from discordance: reconciling the seemingly 
irreconcilable 
 
197 
 6.4. The intricate Matrix of Work 206 
Chapter Seven. Why do you want such things? Mise-en-scène and the 
material world of performance 
 
216 
 7.1. Introduction 216 
 7.2. The mise-en-scène of the “proper” farm 223 
 7.3. Gardens and kitchens: the public and private spaces of identity 234 
 7.4. Moveable mise-en-scène: metaphors and creativity in meaning-
making 
 
239 
Chapter Eight. Dumelang! Development as acknowledgement 247 
 8.1. Introduction: plurivocity, power and narrative 247 
 8.2. Producing invisibility 254 
 8.3. I write what I like. Freedom, authorship and moving beyond 
development 
 
263 
Endings 270 
References 272 
 
 
  
  1 
CHAPTER ONE 
RATIONALITY, REALITY AND FOOD 
 
1.1. Introduction: The research problem 
 
“…development agents in general…when applying in the field…the technical methods 
acquired through training…are confronted with a shocking reality: the behaviours of 
the people with whom they enter into contact…do not coincide with their 
expectations.” 
(Oliver de Sardan, 2005, p68) 
 
“To observe that economics is based on a superficial view of individual and social 
behaviour does not seem to me to be much of an insight. I think it is exactly this 
superficiality that gives economics much of the power that it has: its ability to predict 
human behaviour without knowing very much about the make up and lives of the 
people whose behaviour we are trying to understand.” 
(Lucas, 1986, pS425) 
 
The discourses and practices of mainstream development are based on a number of a 
priori assumptions about the “objects of development” – what kind of persons they 
are, what their priorities are and (most pertinently) how they will respond under a 
particular set of circumstances (Crush (1995), p9). These, in turn, are based in large 
part on the utility-maximising behavioural assumptions that underpin “mainstream”2 
economic theory. Many of the disappointing outcomes of development initiatives may                                                         
2 Throughout this thesis I have used the term “mainstream economics” to refer to the dominant neo-
classical (neo-liberal) form of the discipline; the form most commonly taught at undergraduate level at 
universities and which constitutes “economics” as understood by most people. 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be ascribed to a disconnect between these assumptions and actual events; that is, 
between the assumed reality of development models and practitioners, and the lived 
reality of the target beneficiaries of those models and the resulting development 
interventions (Oliver de Sardan, 2005). However, this disconnect is seldom (if ever) 
articulated as such by development practitioners: instead the focus is more often on 
attempting to explain development failures in terms of the shortcomings of the target 
beneficiaries themselves – their ignorance, their lack of skills or assets, or their 
“culture” (Oliver de Sardan, ibid, and Ferguson, 1990).  
 
Bannerjee and Duflo’s 2006 influential study The Economic Lives of the Poor 
investigated the economic choices made by extremely poor3 households in 13 
countries. One of their main findings was that very poor people do not spend their 
income in line with expected behaviours. Most notably, they often allocated 
expenditure to items such as alcohol, tobacco and entertainment rather than to food, 
even though their household could be classified as food insecure. The report 
concluded that “it is hard to escape the conclusion that the poor do see themselves as 
having a significant amount of choice” and exercise that choice in ways not 
anticipated by mainstream economic models that emphasise utility maximisation 
(Bannerjee and Duflo, 2006, p6). However, Bannerjee and Duflo attributed these 
perceived anomalies in behaviours to the fact that the poor had only “very limited 
access to efficient markets and quality infrastructure” (ibid, p19). That is, they opted 
for the kind of preferred explanation that Oliver de Sardan (2005) and Ferguson 
(1990) describe, rather than to any erroneous a priori assumptions on their part about 
the motivations of the poor themselves.  
                                                        
3 Households where consumption per capita was less than $1.08 per day. 
  3 
 
Lawson (2003) criticizes mainstream economics for its almost exclusive focus on 
“mathematical-deductivist modeling” (p3) that by and large ignores the reality of 
what it purports to analyse.  Development policies based on this economics have a 
strong preference for simple explanations (Pottier, 1999) and policymakers often fail 
to take full account of the “plurality of experiences, strategies and outcomes” of target 
beneficiaries and communities, preferring to focus instead on simple narratives and 
explanations (ibid, p97). Development policy and strategy in South Africa (based on 
the behavioural assumptions of mainstream economics and thus constituting what I 
have referred to as “mainstream development”) reflects this preference. As one 
example, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (2008, p17) has explained the 
decline in household food production in food insecure rural areas (i.e a deviation from 
expected behaviour) in the following way: “There are a number of reasons for this 
including access to agricultural land and inputs, including labour, and biophysical 
factors. In addition a decrease in agricultural knowledge, inappropriate extension 
services, poor credit facilities, HIV and AIDS, climate change and increasing water 
pressures have exacerbated the situation. Perceptions about the value of engaging in 
agriculture have also shifted with the changes in culture and livelihoods that are partly 
synchronous with these constraints.”  
 
Noted deviations from the central mainstream economic assumption of utility-
maximising behaviour tend to be explained in terms of market imperfections or 
market failure (Ortiz, 2005) rather than in terms of the appropriateness of the 
underlying behavioural assumptions of these models.  Mainstream economics’ strict 
assumptions about how individuals will react under a particular set of circumstances 
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(such as changing prices or market incentives) effectively denies the possibility that 
people have, and choose to exercise, agency in adopting alternative responses. When 
the failure of development projects is ascribed to technical factors, or the ignorance or 
‘cultural’ shortcomings of the target beneficiaries, the effective result is to deny the 
possibility that the people in question may have consciously and with good reason 
chosen a different response or course of action to that envisaged or implied by the 
particular development intervention.  
 
This “agency-lite” conceptualisation is common in contemporary South African 
development discourse and practice, where “the poor4” are assumed to be a 
homogenous group of hapless victims, passively waiting for government or other 
development practitioners to provide them with the means of improving their material 
conditions, at which point they will respond as the underlying behavioural 
assumptions predict. This “ideal type” of poor is a person who is motivated largely by 
mainstream economic ideas of utility maximization; persons whose poverty virtually 
guarantees that they will be the compliant and grateful recipient of any and all 
opportunities to improve their material circumstances. The poorer the person in 
question the greater this expectation of a particular type of behaviour on the part of 
                                                        
4 For the purposes of this thesis the term “poor” is intended to indicate those persons living in households whose 
total  income  would  place  them  in  the  bottom  20%  of  South  Africa’s  population.  Household  Income  and 
Expenditure  Surveys  are  compiled  every  five  years  in  South  Africa,  with  the  2011  Survey  (StatsSA  2012a) 
indicating  that  this would correspond  to an annual per capita  income of R4,543 or  less. South Africa does not 
have an official poverty line, and in any event, I did not at any point directly question any of my informants as to 
their  incomes.  However,  inferences  could  be made  on  the  basis  of  the  incomes  generated  in  the  community 
gardens (which information I was given access to) as well as the likely value of social grants.  I  fully accept that 
“poverty” encompasses far more than just income and assets, and also that there is no homogenous group that 
may be labeled “the poor”. In fact, one of the basic propositions of this thesis is the flawed thinking behind that 
assumption. However, the research also asserts that notions of identity and of being a particular type of “person” 
are often much more important to the materially deprived than material gain, and thus it is consistent with this 
argument  to  determine  that  the  ethnography  focused  on  “poor”  people,  simply  because  it  is  their material 
poverty  that  development  discourse  and  practice  assumes  is  directly  and  positively  correlated with  a  lack  of 
agency. 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development practitioners and officials, and thus the greater the effective denial of 
that person’s agency to respond in a different manner.  
 
The underlying aim of this thesis is to investigate manifestations of Oliver de 
Sardan’s (2005) described disconnect between the assumed reality of mainstream 
development policy and practitioners, and the lived reality of target beneficiaries, and 
to propose an alternative explanation, based on a theory of meaningful action in 
everyday life. The research aims to fill a gap in the development debate in South 
Africa, in line with Bardhan and Ray’s (2006) observation that why people do not do 
something is as much in need of explanation as why they do do something. 
 
This thesis investigates choice and decision-making in the everyday lives of two 
groups of community gardeners in the Gauteng Province of South Africa. It aims to 
provide some insights into apparently paradoxical behaviours – namely, that poor 
persons often make decisions that appear to be at odds both with the predictions of 
utility-maximising models and the expectations of development practitioners and 
policies. The central focus of this thesis is meaningful action, which for this purpose I 
have defined as a unity of what is done, what is said, and what objects are used in the 
process; and which is (after Dowling, 2011) to be differentiated from “mere physical 
movement” (p4). Meaningful action is based on intent, motivation and the desire to 
achieve one or more goals (ibid).  
 
This thesis asserts that even very materially poor people not only have much more 
agency than mainstream development discourses and practices assume, but that they 
continually exercise that agency in resisting the stereotypes of poverty and being a 
  6 
poor person that development officials are so keen to reproduce. That is, they are 
exercising their agency for the purpose of asserting their right to be, and to be seen 
and recognized as, a particular type of person. More specifically, they are actively 
defending their right be the type of persons who have agency, who have real choices 
and who make real choices about their own lives. They are pushing against a 
characterization of the poor in contemporary South Africa that in many ways mirrors 
Steve Biko’s description of black South Africans under apartheid as “living in a 
society where they are being treated as perpetual under-16s” (Biko, 1978, p21). In this 
respect my research supports the assertion of Gibson (2011) that what the poor really 
want is not material items per se, but to have their humanity recognized, to be equal 
persons.  
 
In this thesis I have proposed a theoretical framework for the interpretation of 
meaningful action in everyday life based on motivations centred around identity - the 
desire to be a particular kind of person in post-apartheid South Africa. The empirical 
data to which this theoretical framework is applied is derived from an ethnographic 
study undertaken in two community gardens (both adjacent to informal settlements) in 
Gauteng Province, some sixty kilometres from Johannesburg, South Africa’s largest 
city. The thesis describes how even very poor persons exercise considerable agency in 
contesting and resisting the identities of “poor” and “hungry” imposed on them by 
government officials, development organisations and local businesses. In this way, 
they are demonstrating an ability “to remake the development options offered them” 
(Medina, 2004, pxii), in clear contrast to the assumptions of mainstream development 
models.  
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This research hopes to contribute to the debate around the need for a more democratic 
South African economy (a more “human economy”5), one where the rights of persons 
to define their own identities is fully recognized, no matter how poor they may be in 
material terms; and where the terms of their inclusion in the economy would be 
predicated on the recognition of them as “persons in full”, rather than agency-free 
passive recipients of largesse.  
 
1.2. The paradox of own food production and hunger 
 
“A common image of the extremely poor is that they do not get to make many real 
choices.” 
(Bannerjee and Duflo, 2006, p4) 
 
This thesis set out to investigate one particularly striking example in South Africa of 
the divergence between the expected (by development officials, mainstream economic 
theory and popular discourse) behaviour of poor people, and their actual behaviour: 
the fact that a significant percentage of food-insecure households do not engage in 
any own production of food, even when it appears that they have both the opportunity 
and the means to do so.  
 
Food insecurity and hunger are one of the most visible and least socially acceptable 
facets of poverty in South Africa, something about which “something must be done”. 
National food security refers to the ability of a country to produce and/or import 
sufficient food for the entire population, but national food security does not always 
                                                        
5 As this terms is used by, for example, Hart and Sharp (2014) and Hart, Laville and Cattani 2010 
  8 
translate into household food security. Access to food at a household level can be 
defined as the ability to obtain sufficient food of a particular quality and diversity so 
that all the household members are able to meet their particular nutritional 
requirements (Labadarios et al, 2011). Household food insecurity thus occurs when 
the resources of a household (cash, own production, transfers) are insufficient to 
obtain the required quantities of nutritional food (Hoddinott, 1999). 
 
Although South Africa is generally food secure on a national basis (i.e. enough food 
for everyone is produced and/or available through imports), there is considerable 
evidence that food insecurity at the household level occurs at relatively high rates 
(StatsSA, 2012a). Surveys show low scores for food diversity and variety in a 
significant number of households, with a corresponding impact on stunting in children 
(Labadarios et al, 2011).  
 
South Africa has a well-developed food distribution and retail sector. Access to food 
is thus determined primarily (almost exclusively) by affordability. Jacobs (2009) 
estimates that as many as 80% of South African households do not spend enough 
money to purchase a basic, but nutritionally adequate basket of food. The strong 
possibility that the majority of households cannot afford adequate nutrition was 
supported by research undertaken in 2012 by the Bureau for Food and Agricultural 
Policy (BFAP, 2012), which indicated that the cost of basic nutrition was beyond the 
reach of the majority of South African households. The effects of this are 
considerable: South Africa is rated as one of the top 20 countries in the world in terms 
of the negative effects on human wellbeing of under-nutrition (Altman et al, 2009), 
although it is considered a middle-income country. 
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In the context of South Africa’s relatively high food insecurity rates, poor nutrition 
levels and relatively high food prices, own production of food is often put forward as 
a viable mitigation strategy. The assumption is that nutrient intake and dietary 
diversity could be improved by own production of food to supplement what 
households can afford to purchase (Labadarios et al, 2011). The argument is 
appealingly simple: households that cannot afford to purchase sufficient food should 
be supported to produce their own. Even a small backyard garden (20m2 or so) can 
produce a relatively large amount of fresh vegetables. This point of view is widely 
endorsed – home and community gardening projects are supported across national, 
provincial and local government, and there are literally hundreds of non-governmental 
organisations operating and/or supporting own food production initiatives. 
 
Underpinning all these efforts is a set of assumptions about the rationality and 
priorities of hungry households, as well as how they will respond to a particular set of 
incentives. Basically, the general expectation is that these households (or at least an 
individual within these households) will always choose to engage in own production 
of food if they have access to the requisite assets, skills and inputs, and are physically 
capable of doing so. Supporting households in the establishment of food gardens is 
thus often seen as a good investment in creating a sustainable food security solution 
(De Klerk et al, 2004). Reflecting these views, the National Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) has included support for the 
establishment of subsistence/household agriculture in the national Food Security 
Policy (DAFF, 2002). DAFF’s Zero Hunger Programme also has a strong focus on 
increasing household food production, by providing inputs, training and access to land 
(DAFF, 2012). Most of the responsibility for implementing these programmes lies 
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with the various Provincial Departments of Agriculture (such as GDARD – the 
Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development), and these departments 
have annual targets with respect to the establishment of both homestead (i.e. 
backyard) and community vegetable gardens.  
 
What this approach has conveniently glossed over is the body of evidence indicating 
that in fact there are many food insecure households in South Africa that appear to 
have both the opportunity and the means to produce their own food, but are not doing 
so. Aliber (2009) reported that 39.5% of hungry metro (large urban area) households 
and 41.8% of hungry non-metro households lived in a “(d)welling/house or brick 
structure on a separate stand or yard or on a farm” and 36% of hungry non-metro 
households lived in a traditional dwelling (p28) which locations presumably offer at 
least the opportunity to engage in some kind of own food production.  However, 
fewer than 25% of households in South Africa are involved in agricultural activities 
of any kind, and almost 43% of rural households classified as having inadequate 
access to food do not participate in any kind of agricultural activity (StatsSA, 2012a, 
p26). The obvious question in response to this latter statistic is “why not”, since food 
insecurity levels are higher in rural than in urban areas and poor households in rural 
areas spend approximately 15% less per member on food than poor households in 
urban areas (Aliber, 2009), suggesting that significant value should accrue to 
supplemental own food production. It should also be noted that the low levels of 
participation of rural households in own food production in South Africa contrast 
sharply with participation rates in other Southern African countries (Baipethi and 
Jacobs, 2009).  
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Much of the research in this area simply reports this apparent anomaly without 
offering an explanation: Altman et al (2009) highlights the low levels of participation 
in own food production in light of food insecurity levels, but then concludes that this 
is a matter for further investigation. In many instances (see, for examples, Labadarios 
et al, 2011 and Mjonono, Ngidi and Hendriks, 2009) the focus of an investigation into 
whether or not encouraging own production of food is a useful strategy is almost 
exclusively on an analysis of the outcomes of own production of food, rather than 
attempting to explain why (or why not) the activity was undertaken in the first 
instance. That is, there is no acknowledgement that the behavioural assumptions that 
underpin the expectation that food-insecure people will produce their own food are 
themselves a legitimate target for investigation. Pottier (1999) asks the very important 
question, “to what extent do high-level policy formulations of food security reflect the 
complex real-life experiences and perceptions of the food-insecure?” (p11), but this 
question is largely ignored in South African literature on food security. 
 
Where explanations are offered for the low level of own production, the most 
common theory put forward is that people lack the skills and basic infrastructure 
required to grow their own food, and that once they receive the requisite training and 
inputs they will do so with enthusiasm. Baipethi and Jacobs (2009) maintain that 
“there is consensus that appropriate technologies requiring low inputs would 
significantly improve the take-up of subsistence production” (p22). That is, the low 
take-up of own production is a result of technical impediments. South African 
government food security initiatives support this interpretation and have a strong 
(almost exclusive) focus on training people and providing them with basic inputs 
(seeds, tools and access to water). This lack of skills/resources point of view seems 
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entirely plausible, and it also underpins the activities of a large number of NGOs 
whose focus is “teaching” poor people how to grow their own food.  
 
However, the empirical data doesn’t really fit this particular version of events. 
Ruysenaar (2012) reports that government sponsored community gardening projects 
in Gauteng have very high failure rates (i.e. the majority of beneficiaries desert the 
project within the first year of operation). This is despite the considerable investment 
made by the Province in terms of infrastructure such as fencing, boreholes, irrigation 
equipment and seedlings, and training programmes for participants.  My own 
discussions with GDARD officials who introduced me to the gardens where I 
conducted my ethnographic study confirmed the low success rates described by 
Ruysenaar (ibid). These discussions also suggested that homestead gardening 
initiatives have a similarly high failure rate, with the majority of those who undertake 
home gardening in any particular year as a result of the efforts of GDARD 
abandoning it in the following year. Informal conversations with a project leader in a 
Community Works Programme (CWP – a government-sponsored temporary work 
creation programme) in the same area as my ethnographic study reinforced this: she 
bemoaned the fact that they had in many instances “to beg and to plead” to get anyone 
to start a vegetable garden (to meet their own CWP-mandated targets) and that after 
all their (the CWP’s) hard work in this regard, the activity usually halted after a few 
months. Provincial officials are set annual targets on the establishment of gardens, 
rather than their long-term sustainability. I would suggest that the focus on 
establishment is further evidence of the underlying policy assumption that the food 
insecure will always opt to participate in own food production initiatives if they are 
given the “necessary” infrastructure and technical training.  
  13 
 
The high percentage of households who abandon their homestead gardens after the 
first year and the very high drop out rate of community gardening participants does 
not gel with the view of “rational” households whose priority should be securing 
sufficient food. As Banerjee and Duflo (2006) point out, the definition of “poor” 
almost always means a person who does not have enough to eat. However, the actual 
decisions and actions of a significant number of food insecure households differs 
considerably from what is assumed and predicted by policymakers and development 
analysts. Within the first few weeks of commencing my ethnographic research I had 
witnessed many examples of this apparently “sub-optimal” behaviour: As just two 
examples, participants in community gardens regularly preferred to purchase food that 
they could have had for free from their gardens, and casual labourers employed in the 
gardens generally refused to accept food as payment in kind, preferring instead a very 
small amount of cash (R506 or less a day), the value of which was considerably less 
than the food offered as an alternative.  
 
As my research unfolded, and I spent more time with the informants in the two 
gardens, so it became clear that their actions and choices around food production, 
provisioning and consumption could not conveniently be separated from wider 
contestations around identity and the right to be a particular kind of person. The own 
production of food “paradox” was merely one manifestation of Oliver de Sardan’s 
(2005) described disconnect between the assumed reality of policymakers and 
development plans, based on the universal rationality of mainstream economics, and 
the lived reality of the people in these communities. As a result, the scope of the 
                                                        
6 Approximately $5.20 at the 2013 average exchange rate 
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research expanded, from an initial (and still important) focus on own food production 
to the wider paradox of development itself: that as a rule (rather than as the exception) 
beneficiaries did not behave as expected by mainstream development or development 
officials. I observed a world of ideas, behaviours and choices around economic 
activities and material objects that mainstream economists would be quick to label 
“irrational” or “ignorant”, but since all of the people I spent time with appeared to be 
perfectly sane and usually well-informed about the likely outcomes of their choices, 
there had to be a better explanation for what I observed. This thesis is the result of my 
attempts to formulate just such a “better explanation”. 
 
1.3. Searching for a theoretical framework 
 
“Theories are abstractions of investigators’ meanings that allow the interpretation of 
social meanings in turn, whether those are actions, relations, or structures. Successful 
explanations are those that intertwine these meaning structures of investigators and 
actors in an effective way.” 
(Reed & Alexander, 2009, p21) 
 
“No, no! The adventures first, explanations take such a dreadful time.”  
(Lewis Carroll – Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland) 
 
Since I was quite clear that mainstream economics and development and their 
technical explanations for the observed paradox of own food production were in fact 
not adequate for my purposes, I had to find an alternative conceptual framework 
within which to make sense of the growing volume of findings from my fieldwork, 
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many of which were unexpected and contrary to my own initial assumptions. Very 
early on I realized that the way in which the participants in the community gardens 
viewed these gardens was very different from the views and motivations imputed by 
the officials who had facilitated their establishment. The participants did not see them 
primarily as a source of food, but rather as a source of employment, and often left 
produce to rot in the garden rather than take it home or distribute it to other 
households in their community, despite their and their neighbours’ visible poverty. As 
the ethnographic study progressed, I documented many other examples of actions and 
choices that appeared contrary to the utility maximizing predictions of mainstream 
development models. I started to see how complex the relationship between decision-
making and the desire to be seen as a particular type of person was. I realized that I 
required a theoretical framework that could provide an insight into the dynamic and 
inter-temporal relationship among identity, agency and action that I was observing.  
 
In this search for a theoretical framework with which to interpret my empirical 
findings (as opposed to simply stating them in a descriptive ethnography – what I 
would term an “ontological” approach) I have located myself in proximity to the same 
camp as authors such as Reed and Alexander (2009), who argue that the “empirical 
turn” in the social sciences has swung too far away from theory, and that as a result 
theoretical discourse has been sacrificed for ontology, with dismal implications for 
the social sciences: “The rationality of social science depends upon finishing with 
ontology, and recognizing that the truth claims of evidence are contingent upon the 
capacity of theories to interpret structures of extant, but invisible, social meanings” 
(ibid, p36). They assert that “(w)hen we do empirical research, we are in fact 
‘reading’, not ‘observing’” (p30) and that our ability to access the realities that are the 
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object of our enquiry, that is, to successfully interpret our data, is determined by how 
good our theories are. They differentiate between “weak” and “strong” hermeneutics, 
asserting that weak hermeneutics is essentially the capture of empirical data. Strong 
hermeneutics, in contrast, aims to uncover underlying meaning structures through the 
application of theory: these structures are not, therefore, discovered, rather they are 
interpreted. In this approach, it is theory – and the quality of our selected theoretical 
models – that allows us “to complete our specific interpretive tasks” (ibid, p36) which 
have only begun with the collection of empirical data.  
 
I have also located myself theoretically with Tony Lawson, who criticizes mainstream 
economics for its almost complete disregard of the ontological (Lawson, 2003). This 
does not mean, however, that Lawson (ibid) believes that mainstream economics has 
sacrificed ontology for theory, but rather that it has substituted a particular method 
(mathematical deductivism) for theorizing, which method pays little attention to 
social reality. His proposed alternative to mainstream economic thinking is what he 
describes as “ontological theorizing” (ibid, p1).  It is such ontological theorizing – by 
which I mean a robust theoretical approach that aims to provide insights into social 
meanings – that is the goal of this thesis.  
 
In this search for a strong theoretical approach to the analysis of my findings I 
considered and discarded a number of initially plausible methodological approaches. 
As my fieldwork progressed I became convinced that a more theoretically nuanced 
framework was required than was offered by these. What I was looking for was a 
framework that could provide an overarching approach towards both explanation and 
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interpretation7 (and, in fact, differentiate between the two); that could mediate 
between meaningful action and identity; that could incorporate and account for the 
complex layers of inter-temporal meaning making that I observed; and one that could 
take full cognisance of the wider relations of power that limited what decisions were 
actually available, and the likely outcomes of those decisions, while still 
acknowledging the central role of human agency.  
 
In the following section I have briefly recounted what this thesis is not about from a 
theoretical point of view, by way of an introduction to what it is about.  
 
1.3.1. This isn’t really about “status” consumption 
 
My initial point of reference was the status consumption literature, in which body of 
work I included the culturally biased transmission theories of Joe Henrich (Henrich 
2004, Henrich, 2002, Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). There is, some (very limited) 
South African research which suggests that the reasons why people do or do not 
engage in own production of food are in fact more complex than many researchers 
(and policy makers) assume, and have little to do with the technical factors outlined 
above. Moller (2005) investigated differences in inter-generational attitudes towards 
home gardening in the Eastern Cape town of Grahamstown. Her research identified 
very clear differences in ideas about gardening between younger and older people that 
may provide an insight into why hungry households do not produce their own food 
(although the object of her enquiry was the activity of gardening, rather than food 
production per se.) An important point made in the study was that many older                                                         
7 Using the terms as they are used by Paul Ricoeur (1991a) in his version of hermeneutical 
phenomenology, which I have discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
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gardeners derived self-described quality of life benefits from their gardens, in addition 
to edible produce. In contrast, the main reasons why younger people did not engage in 
home gardening were expressed as a dislike for dirty work, a fear of being ostracized 
by their peers if they participated in gardening, and a perception that food gardening 
was a survival strategy marking participants out as being particularly poor. For these 
individuals, reports Moller, purchased food was seen as a symbol of a certain status, 
more desirable than that accruing to own-produced food. Moller did not, however, 
investigate further why younger and older people had such different conceptions. 
 
Gross and Rosenberger‘s (2005) investigation into food insecurity in Oregon 
highlighted the “intersection of food and identity” (p1) in influencing the food choices 
that people made. Their research highlights some of the reasons why parents 
sometimes make “bad” nutritional choices for their children: parents were focused on 
giving their children what they wanted to eat, rather than what was nutritionally best 
for them. A lot of this was the result of not wanting their children to stand out as poor 
among their friends in terms of what they ate. This corroborates research showing that 
the choice of food can be used to signal image, prestige and membership of a 
particular group (such as McKenzie, 1974).  
 
Although these findings highlight that decisions around food provisioning and 
consumption may be influenced by factors other than the maximization of (purely 
economic) utility, they had little to say on why this might be the case (that is, why are 
perceptions of poverty and status so closely integrated with particular food 
provisioning strategies and not with others), or why this effect did not manifest in a 
consistent form (not every person in similar demographic circumstances was reported 
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to make the same food choices or have the same attitude towards gardening). This 
unevenness of outcomes was a constant observation in my fieldwork: even within 
households there appeared to be different attitudes towards food gardening and 
different food provisioning strategies and I was intrigued by why this should be the 
case.  
 
Initially, my investigation in this direction and my attempt to develop an analytical 
framework engaged with the literature on what could be categorized as “status 
consumption”, focused on consumer behaviour in developing countries and/or 
relatively poor communities in higher-income countries. This status consumption 
research focuses on the question of why relatively poor consumers routinely allocate 
their limited resources to relatively expensive “non-essential” goods (such as branded 
clothing or high-end electronics) rather than to the more basic necessities of life (such 
as food and education) that would appear to offer higher levels of economic utility, 
and thus be a more “rational” choice. Research on this topic cuts across several 
disciplines, including economics, anthropology and cognitive psychology. At first 
examination much of this work appeared to provide the analytical framework that 
could make sense of what I was observing: the status consumption literature is based 
on the underlying assertion that the act of consumption is not just a way of meeting 
material demands, but also (and importantly) a way of signaling something about 
ourselves to others, including our location in some kind of social hierarchy (Douglas 
and Isherwood, 1996). The idea that “consumption is a communicative act” (Van 
Kempen, 2005, p99) I found entirely plausible. However, from the point of view of 
my particular research questions and early empirical observations, there are several 
important (and interlinked) shortcomings with these status consumption theories as an 
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analytical framework for the findings presented in this thesis. The first was the (often 
implied) assumption that “status” consumption was associated only with a particular 
kind of object – in the language of Veblen (2003 [1889]), a “prestige” object. That is, 
objects determined to be mundane, basic or utilitarian (or all three) do not contain the 
prestige required to qualify as the target of status consumption. This assumption did 
not fit at all with the findings of my fieldwork, which suggested that complex notions 
of meaning and identity (including social differentiation) were in fact often associated 
with the most mundane and everyday of items: a bunch of spinach, an overall, the 
label on the side of a plastic crate. These objects could not be satisfactorily 
categorised as “status” items in terms of the status consumption literature, but they 
were undeniably important.  
 
The second (and related) area in which status consumption theories appeared to be 
inadequate for my purposes was the explanations advanced for why “status” 
consumption takes one form and not another; that is, why particular items are deemed 
to have status while others are not. These explanations were built on underlying (and 
in my assessment, erroneous) assumptions about what kind of objects could be 
considered as “status” items. In this school of thought, the explanation for why status 
consumption occurred in developing countries among poor populations is based on 
the assumption that the latter group wants to imitate the consumption patterns of rich 
Western countries, in order to compensate for some self-perceived relative inferiority 
(Van Kempen, 2005). While this may suffice as a description of observed consumer 
behaviour, it offers little in the way of interpretation of why and how status is 
associated with certain “Western” goods and not with others, or indeed why notions 
of inferiority are manifested in material ways. I would further suggest that on 
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occasion the definition of what is a “status” item and what is not is more a reflection 
of the author’s own point of view than that of the person under observation. For 
example, Van Kempen (ibid) asserts that expensive television sets and sound systems 
are examples of “status” consumption, but that the purchase (and consequent display 
in a dwelling) of an expensive stove reflects a desire for “high quality products” 
rather than status (p57). The implicit assumption is that spending on an expensive 
television is somehow frivolous, while spending on an expensive stove is not, even 
though the implications for household resources may be exactly the same, and a 
cheaper stove may have exactly the same utility as a more expensive one. It is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that this differentiation may reflect Van Kempen’s own ideas 
about “frivolous” versus “proper” consumption. This moral judgement is reflected in 
his assertion that status consumption “among the poor is based on deception” (Van 
Kempen, ibid, p1, my emphasis). 
 
In the same vein, but in a possibly more objectionable fashion, Charles, Hurst and 
Roussanov (2007) conducted an investigation into conspicuous consumption by 
different racial groups in the United States. They proceeded from the assumption that 
expenditure on “visible consumption” (p1) items such as expensive jewelry, clothing 
and cars was primarily driven by Veblen’s notions of status consumption, but added 
the conclusion that this type of expenditure was just as common among poor groups 
as wealthy ones. They asserted that Black and Hispanic households spent 
considerably more than their White income-equivalents on visible consumption items, 
and considerably less on more “productive” items such as education or the purchase 
of a home. They concluded that Black and Hispanic households had a higher 
propensity for “status” consumption, and that this allocation of household expenditure 
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explained differences in household wealth across racial groups, as well as education 
and health outcomes. That is, Black and Hispanic households were in fact responsible 
for long-term household wealth differentiations because their consumption decisions 
were often driven by a desire for status, whereas the consumption decisions of White 
households were more often driven by more “rational” notions of long-term wealth 
optimization. What this paper conveniently does is pre-judge the expenditure 
decisions of Black and Hispanic households by categorizing certain kinds of 
consumption as “visible” and thus “status” driven, and other kinds of consumption as 
“not visible” and thus not primarily “status” driven. The visible, status consumption 
items correspond to those preferred by Black and Hispanic households (jewellery, 
cars and the like) while the not visible and not status-driven items correspond to those 
preferred by White households (such as home improvements or the choice of school). 
Clearly home improvements or the choice of prestigious private school may be 
undertaken with as much status motivation as the purchase of a particular car, but 
Charles et al have not acknowledged this possibility. Their analysis and findings are 
congruent with a considerable body of work that is premised on the idea that poor 
people (particularly in developing countries) make irrational and/or uninformed 
consumption choices which are not in their best interests, and that there is an 
important role for development practitioners to educate them to behave in a certain 
way “for their own good”. Much economic and social development policy is based on 
this premise.  
 
Related to the problematic issue of how certain expenditure choices are classified as 
driven by “status” while others are not is the general inability of the status 
consumption literature to explain why these consumption patterns are not uniformly 
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distributed, even within family units. Van Kempen (2005) investigated consumption 
patterns in Bolivia’s two largest groups of indigenous origin. Both groups were 
subjected to social exclusion, and thus, on the theory of compensatory consumption 
outlined above, patterns of status expenditure on expensive Western goods could have 
been expected across both groups. However, this was not the case: one of these 
groups exhibited a high propensity to purchase western-type “status-intensive” (p48) 
expensive items. However, the other group did not, showing instead a strong 
preference for spending on “traditional” events and items (such as traditional 
clothing). Van Kempen (ibid) was unable to offer a comprehensive reason for these 
divergent consumption patterns, save to suggest that the latter indigenous group 
appeared to value their own culture more highly than western culture, while the 
former group did not, without explaining why this should be the case.  
 
As my fieldwork progressed I found that much of the status consumption literature 
did not reflect my findings in another important way: these “bad” status choices are 
generally not viewed as a legitimate exercise of agency, but rather as a result of 
ignorance or gullibility on the part of the poor (see, for example, Harsanyi, 1992). 
Until fairly recently status (conspicuous) consumption studies focused almost 
exclusively on wealthy societies and populations, which Van Kempen (2005) asserts 
was because of “(t)he view that the poor are exclusively preoccupied with basic needs 
satisfaction” which view did not admit the possibility of status consumption (p4). This 
view implies a certain a priori assessment of the agency of the poor, that is, they do 
not have or are unable to exercise legitimate agency. As a result, empirical evidence 
of apparent status consumption choices by the poor could not be accommodated in 
mainstream economic models of utility maximisation, and was thus usually assessed 
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as irrational, and in need of modification, in the best interests of those poor consumers 
themselves (ibid, p6).  
 
Harsanyi (1992) extends this argument by differentiating among “informed 
preferences” and “actual preferences”. In his analysis, the former set of preferences 
are those that a consumer would have if he or she had all the relevant information and 
used this to make the most optimal (i.e. utility-maximising) choices. However, in 
most instances a consumer’s actual preferences are different, because of incorrect or 
incomplete information. Harsanyi (ibid) refers to these as “mistaken preferences” (p6) 
with the implicit assumption that this sub-optimal behaviour could be corrected if the 
consumer had enough information or was able to use that information in the most 
‘effective’ manner. This view was not compatible with my findings, which 
demonstrated that materially-poor individuals generally had a clear grasp of the 
economic implications of their decision-making. In my assessment, their choices 
demonstrated a high degree of agency, not ignorance.  
 
Finally, I found it difficult to reconcile my field observations with the idea that the 
visible consumption of certain material objects could function as a comprehensive 
analogy for the complex processes of meaning making and identity management that I 
was observing; or that “status” was the main driver behind apparently “irrational” 
material choices of the poor; or even that those choices could somehow be considered 
“irrational”. Status consumption studies appeared to be making the mistake of 
confusing the material with materialism, overlooking the possibility that the desire to 
acquire certain material items should be understood as meaning making, not 
acquisitiveness (Wallendorf and Arnold, 1988).  
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My basic contention in this thesis is that the interpretation of a particular set of actions 
or consumptions choices is best approached from the starting point of a theory of how 
meaningful action is purposefully constituted and communicated, reflecting the 
agency of the actors and their construction of their own worlds of meaning and thus 
value. Individual examples of particular choices (such as the purchase of item A 
rather than B) may then be interpreted in terms of that overarching network of 
meaning, which includes far more parameters of identity than simply economic or 
social “status”. In contrast, much of the status consumption literature appears to work 
in the opposite direction: using limited examples of choice and economic action as 
“evidence” of a particular – and greatly limited - world of meanings and motivations.  
 
Henrich (2002) has proposed an alternative theory to what he terms the “standard 
model” (p256) of economic behaviour (and changes in that behaviour) in economic 
anthropology which attempts to explain why status consumption takes one form and 
not another. His contention (drawing heavily from empirical research in cognitive 
psychology) is that humans often selectively copy the behaviour of identified 
individuals, and that this “biased cultural transmission” (Henrich, ibid, p278) can 
result in action that is not underpinned by cost-benefit decision making of any kind. 
Within this theory, the concept of “prestige-biased cultural transmission” (ibid,) is 
based on findings from cognitive psychology showing that people are strongly biased 
towards copying the opinions, ideas and behaviours of those deemed to be particularly 
successful or prestigious. 
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An important point made by Henrich is that biased cultural transmission can 
sometimes result in maladaptive economic behaviour (“prestige-biased transmission 
can create errors” – ibid, p281), which could explain why individuals may adopt a 
course of action that is not in their “best” (in terms of utility maximization) interests.  
 
Although Henrich’s approach is undoubtedly more nuanced than many of the more 
basic utility-maximisation status consumption theories, his relative inability to explain 
the basis on which certain people are in fact deemed “prestigious” or “unprestigious”, 
or why there should be significant inconsistencies in how and when “prestige” is 
determined relevant to decision-making was problematic for my purposes. Certain of 
his assertions about how prestige is determined did not ring true with either my or 
others’ research findings. As an example, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) contended 
that older people are more likely to be deemed prestigious, whereas Moller’s (2005) 
research shows clearly that younger people do not accord elders emulation-worthy 
prestige in the area of home food production. This was reflected in my own findings.  
 
1.3.2. This isn’t (only) about material culture 
 
During the first few months of my fieldwork I was very much in favour of working 
within a material culture framework. Most of my initial observations and findings 
concerned the use (or conscious non-use) of material objects - the output from the 
gardens, overalls and other items of clothing, and the tools and inputs used for 
growing vegetables. The informants’ use of these items, together with the way in 
which they spoke about them, was often very carefully considered and clearly imbued 
with meaning. It thus appeared that these objects were doing “social work” 
  27 
(Woodward, 2007, p4) and that they performed an important role in the management 
of identities.  
 
The focus in material culture studies is on the material (how people use objects, and 
the role of objects in meaning making and transmission), rather than materialism, 
thereby avoiding the simplistic conclusions about motivations found in much of the 
status consumption literature. I was particularly interested in the ways in which 
objects were designated as central to “the construction, maintenance and 
transformation of social identities” (Miller and Tilley, 1996, p5). As Csikszentmihalyi 
and Rochberg-Halton (1981) put it “(m)eaning, not material possessions, is the 
ultimate goal in (persons’) lives” (p145) referring to the underlying driver of the 
acquisition and possession of the material.  
 
I cannot deny that material objects were important in meaning making in the lives of 
the informants in my study, but just as importantly, I witnessed many occasions were 
meaning making was unrelated to or only tangentially included material objects. I 
thus required a theoretical framework that could incorporate both the material and the 
non-material ways in which people imagined themselves, spoke about themselves and 
engaged in meaningful action.  
 
In addition I often found it difficult to anchor and/or fix the meanings associated with 
the everyday objects of everyday life that were the focus of this ethnographic study in 
a manner consistent with much of the material culture literature. The meanings 
attached to many objects were clearly fluid and malleable: in some contexts objects 
(such as a set of overalls) appeared to be heavily imbued with meaning, and in others 
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almost irrelevant, even when associated with the same person. It thus appeared to me 
that the larger context within which the object was used (or talked about) was often 
more important for meaning making than the object itself. In order to identify the 
location of meaning making - as the starting point for interpretation – I needed to 
address the tension between an object and the context in which it was used, rather 
than making assumptions about the location of meaning in an object.  
 
The theory of metaphor and, most particularly, the location of meaning in the 
metaphor is, I believe, important in this regard, and forms the basis of how I have 
conceived the relationship between object and context. Anthropologists such as 
Christopher Tilley (Tilley, 2002), working within the framework of “linguistic 
analogies” (ibid, p23) have proposed that objects may be understood as functioning as 
metaphors – that “the artefact, through its silent ‘speech’ and ‘written’ presence, 
speaks what cannot be spoken, writes what cannot be written, and articulates that 
which remains conceptually separated in social practice.” (ibid, p28). That is, Tilley 
asserts that metaphorical meaning is located in a material object, and that this is the 
source of their “communicative agency” (ibid, p25).  
 
On the basis of my readings of Paul Ricoeur’s theory of the metaphor (outlined in 
more detail below) and with reference to my own empirical findings, I have proposed 
that a metaphorical meaning associated with a particular object (which clearly exists) 
does not reside in the object itself, but in the context within which it is located, where 
“context” is defined as the world of meaning created and managed by the person in 
question. That is, the object has a metaphorical potential, but without inclusion in a 
particular context, that meaning is not realized. The analogy from Paul Ricoeur 
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(Ricoeur, 1976) is with words versus sentences and larger bodies of text, and the 
location of meaning. I have proposed that we may consider objects as “words” and the 
context within which the object is used as a “sentence”. Without the sentence there is 
no metaphor, although the “metaphorical twist” takes place at the level of the word 
(Ricoeur, 1981, p166).  “Metaphor has to do with the semantics of the sentence before 
it concerns the semantics of a word …. a metaphor only makes sense in an utterance” 
(Ricoeur, 1976, p49). One of the main proposals of this thesis is that it is the 
semantics of action (specifically the creative activity of emplotment) that determines 
the semantics of an object, rather than the other way around.   
 
The difference between the two approaches is, I believe, critical. Much of the material 
culture literature (as one notable example the work of Daniel Miller) emphasizes the 
agency of objects in creating meaning, while an approach based on the semantics of 
action emphasizes the agency of persons in creating meaning. It is in this second 
approach that I have located this thesis.  
 
Certain approaches to material culture (for example, Woodward, 2007, Alexander, 
2004, Pels et al, 2002 and Harré, 2002) have emphasised the importance of “human 
performance activity” (Pels et al, ibid, p9), that is, how meaningful action together 
with narratives attributes social meaning to objects. It is in the context of human 
action and/or the stories (narratives) about those human actions that objects acquire 
significance. “Material things have magic powers only in the contexts of the 
narratives in which they are embedded” (Harré, 2002, p25). Outside of this context 
they are simply “stuff” (ibid).  
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In addition, Harré (2002) offers the important insight that apparently identical objects 
can have very different meanings in different contexts. However, Harré differentiates 
between a “practical order” and the “expressive order “ (ibid, p32) in which things are 
located.  His insistence that the significance of material objects can only be 
understood in terms of both brings him very close to the conspicuous consumption 
theories of Veblen which, as discussed above, I am not convinced are sufficient to 
capture the detailed nuances of identity imagination, creation and management that I 
believe underpin the choice and use of objects. Perhaps more importantly, he is 
largely silent on a therorisation of how performance activity is imagined and enacted, 
prior to the selection and inclusion of particular material objects. In addition, and in 
contrast to Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity (Ricoeur, 1991b) human 
performance theorists pay little attention to the temporality of human performance, 
save to acknowledge an analogy with a scripted theatrical performance of a temporal 
logic – beginning, middle and end (Alexander, 2004). However, their definition of 
human performance has influenced my conceptualization of an expanded definition of 
Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity as my interpretive framework, as discussed 
in the next chapter.  
 
In summary, I observed that objects often played a central role in the imagination, 
creation and management of identities. Objects clearly mattered, both in terms of their 
physical presence and their imagined presence. However, I also observed that the 
consumption and use of material objects in this process was only one way, albeit an 
important one, in which meanings were imagined, constructed, restructured and 
communicated. My goal was a theoretical framework that could account for a 
particular material culture, but not be limited to a particular material culture.  
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1.4. Finding a starting point: explanation, interpretation and hermeneutical 
phenomenology 
 
“…the central problem of hermeneutics is that of interpretation..” 
(Ricoeur, 1981, p165) 
 
One of the over-arching goals of this thesis is to provide a strong theoretical account 
of my empirical observations. Much of my assessment of the shortcomings (for the 
purposes of this thesis) of the status consumption and material culture approaches 
discussed above is based on their comparative neglect of the theoretical. These 
approaches focus to a much greater (sometimes exclusive) extent on the ontological 
(i.e. the presentation of empirical data) than the theoretical. After Ricoeur (1991a) I 
would differentiate between “explanation” and “interpretation” and assert that the 
goal of the social sciences should be both. Interpretation requires the application of 
theory, rather than the explanation of the empirical (Reed and Alexander, 2009).  
 
The overarching theoretical approach employed in this thesis is the hermeneutical 
phenomenology of Paul Ricoeur, who proposed it as the most appropriate method for 
the study of human reality (Ricoeur, 1981). I have adopted Ricoeur’s hermeneutical 
phenomenology in preference to the “weak” and “strong” hermeneutics of Reed and 
Alexander (2009), primarily because of Ricoeur’s proposal of a dialectic relationship 
between explanation and understanding, which I believe is a more nuanced and useful 
approach for my purposes. Although Ricoeur’s primary focus was the interpretation 
of texts, he also proposed that hermeneutical phenomenology could be applied to the 
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social sciences generally and thus the interpretation of meaningful action (Ricoeur, 
1971), which is the focus of this thesis. There are a number of reasons why I have 
chosen this approach: Firstly, and in contrast to structuralists such as Claude Levi-
Strauss, Ricoeur accords a central role to human agency and acknowledges the 
importance of history in anthropological analysis: the dialectic of explanation and 
interpretation expounded by Ricoeur offers the prospect of a full account of human 
agency, while still avoiding a degeneration into pure subjectivity (Tilley, 1990). The 
centrality of agency aligns with my assertion that it is the right to be a particular type 
of person that is the central motivator of meaningful action. 
 
Secondly, Ricoeur differentiates between “explanation” and “interpretation”: with 
reference to the explanation and interpretation of a text (which is the foundation of 
his work), explanation is located “in the suspense of the text” (Ricoeur, 1991a, p113) 
and is made in terms of its internal structure. Interpretation, however, requires that we 
open the text to the world, that we incorporate the idea that language is more than just 
“a structured totality (and) cannot be reduced to the sentences whereof it is 
composed” (Ricoeur, 1981, p13). For Ricoeur, people speak, or write a text, with the 
purpose of saying something to someone (Tilley, 1990) and the process of 
interpretation intends to uncover that “something”. Thus, the process of explanation 
could be said to reveal the “semiological dimension” of the text, while interpretation 
reveals its “semantic dimension” (Ricoeur, 1991a, p119). Interpretation thus mediates 
“understanding” (Kaplan, 2003, p23).  
 
Importantly, Ricoeur proposes a dialectical rather than an oppositional relationship 
between them, in the form of the “hermeneutical arc” (Ricoeur, 1991a, p121). The 
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dialectic of explanation and interpretation implies that we may move along the 
hermeneutic arc from explanation to interpretation, but equally we may move along 
the arc from interpretation to explanation. This approach seems much more useful for 
the purposes of my research problem than the more usual opposition – that 
explanation is for the natural sciences, and interpretation for the social sciences 
(Ricoeur, 1991a) – which opposition I would suggest has undermined the ability of 
mainstream economics to account for behaviour that deviates from its utility-
maximising models.  
 
Ricoeur proposes that more than one interpretation of the same text may be 
considered valid by, firstly, differentiating between “the objective meaning” of a text 
and “the subjective intention of the author” (Ricoeur, 1971, p547), and secondly, 
accepting the possibility (even the likelihood) of more than one “objective” meaning. 
That is, what the text “means” may be very different from what the author intended, 
since the act of reading opens the text to the world, and in that world multiple 
interpretations may be made. The immanent plurivocity of text makes multiple 
interpretations almost unavoidable. The aim of interpretation, then, is not 
“verification” but rather “validation” – assessing which interpretation is “more 
probable than another” (ibid, p549).  
 
The details of the theoretical framework that I have selected for the interpretation of 
my empirical findings represents an articulation of Ricoeur’s theories of the 
interpretation of texts with an expanded version of his conceptualization of narrative 
identity. This is set out in Chapter 2.  
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1.5. The ethnographic study 
 
“..invariably my only real hypothesis is that I really have very little idea of what I am 
going to find when I go out to conduct fieldwork. This hypothesis has always proved 
correct. In going to live within another community I assume that the most important 
findings are going to be about things one didn’t even suspect existed before going to 
live there. If you didn’t know they existed, how could you have hypothesized about 
them?” 
 (Daniel Miller, 2010, p7) 
 
This thesis is based on fieldwork conducted mostly between February and November 
2013 (with some follow up visits during the period December 2013 to March 2014) 
and located in Gauteng Province, some 60 kilometres from Johannesburg. I selected 
the particular area because I had some prior experience working in the local 
municipality. I thus had some existing knowledge of the region’s demographic and 
economic structure, although I had not had any previous contact with any of the 
community garden projects or the project participants who feature in this thesis. My 
focus was community gardens rather than homestead gardens because I believed that 
access to one or two community gardens would be easier than trying to find and gain 
access to widely dispersed homestead gardens, while still giving me access to people 
who were engaged almost daily (to some extent) in the production of their own food. 
The main difference between community and homestead gardens is that the former 
have a greater (but by no means exclusive) focus on the sale rather than the 
consumption of food, and they also receive more investment from government, most 
notably in the form of a borehole, irrigation equipment and electricity connection.  
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In order to gain access to the community gardens in an officially approved manner I 
approached the Gauteng Department of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(GDARD), since they are responsible for the establishment and support of the 
community gardens in Gauteng. I was referred to the relevant local office, where I 
met with the officials responsible for food security projects (the Food Security 
Directorate (DFS) located within GDARD). The only structured interview that I 
undertook was during this initial meeting, and the purpose was to collect general 
background information about the establishment and profile of community garden 
projects. These officials very kindly took me to four of their existing projects, made 
introductions and assured the participants that I was there with their permission. My 
research objectives were clearly communicated to all of the participants during this 
first visit, and I answered a number of questions about the purpose of my attendance 
at the gardens on this and subsequent visits. After that initial visit I was on my own, 
only occasionally meeting with provincial ‘extension’ officers (i.e. those who oversee 
and give input to the projects) who were on regular site visits to the gardens.  
 
I wanted to focus on no more than two gardens, for practical purposes. One of the 
gardens I rejected immediately: it was in what I felt was a dangerous location, and I 
had a negative reception from many of the non-gardeners who were using part of the 
site for other purposes. A second garden was also rejected, but for “technical” rather 
than other reasons. This garden, located in a formal working class suburb, was a well-
established allotment-type garden, a very unusual structure in South Africa. However, 
it was not really a “community” garden, but rather a retirement activity for five 
pensioners who lived nearby. Although I was intrigued by the operating structure of 
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the garden, it did not fit my research requirements, and I only made an additional 
three visits. 
 
That left me with two community gardens – the first (Tshimo8) located in the grounds 
of a school just outside a small town (Steynsville), and bordered by an informal 
settlement on two sides; and the second adjacent to the informal settlement of Motse, 
in a semi-rural area about 15kms from a medium-sized town (Rooidal). For the first 
few months I divided my time between the two gardens, but for the last three months 
spent almost all my time at Motse. This was for practical reasons: the Tshimo garden 
was in steady decline when I first arrived and this was hastened by the sudden death 
of one of the most active participants in June 2013. By July of 2013 the project had all 
but closed down. This meant that on most days there was no one in the garden, which 
remained locked and untended.  
 
My main methods were participant observation and informal conversations. On my 
second visit to each garden (and the first on my own) I volunteered to work in the 
gardens, since it seemed to me that this would be the best way both to build 
relationships with the participants, and to gain some first-hand idea of what was 
involved in being a community garden participant. The participants were at first 
bemused, but needed all the free labour that they could get. I was quickly accepted as 
part of each group and was given my own set of overalls by Motse members after a 
few weeks. After a few months I was well integrated into the Motse group, being 
                                                        
8 I have changed the names of all the gardens, adjacent settlement, nearby towns, the garden 
participants and other persons, in order to protect their privacy. 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allocated work tasks by the Chairperson9 like every other member, and included in 
their group activities. In addition to working in the gardens, I assisted with finding 
suppliers and getting quotes, and I also made my car available for making deliveries, 
collecting supplies, etc. I worked in the gardens three or four days a week, arriving at 
8 in the morning when work started and leaving at around 2 in the afternoon, when 
work usually ended for the day. At the end of each day I wrote up my observations 
and recollections. I occasionally took notes if I had sat down with one or more of the 
gardeners to discuss something in particular, usually during a meal break. I used a 
voice recorder on only 5 occasions, with the permission of the participants, to record 
the proceedings of group meetings.  
 
Although I am not fluent in Tswana (the daily home language of all the participants), 
my basic Sesotho allowed me to follow the gist of most conversations and, save for 
the transcription of the voice recordings, I did not use a translator. Most of the Motse 
participants were fluent in English, one of the Tshimo participants was fluent in 
English and another in Afrikaans. 
 
1.6. Outline of the thesis 
 
This thesis consists of eight chapters, including this introduction. In Chapter Two I 
have described in more detail the theoretical framework that I have used to interpret 
my empirical findings. This is a theory of performance identity, based in large part on 
Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity, and incorporating many of his approaches 
towards the interpretation of narratives. Within this framework I have proposed that                                                         
9 Almost all government-sponsored community garden projects require that beneficiaries organize (and 
register) themselves as a cooperative, each of which has a number of designated officials, with the 
nominated Chairperson filling the senior “management” position.  
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contestations of identity may be conceptualized as contestations of authorship – who 
“scripts” the performance of the gardeners and thereby sets the limits to who they can 
plausibly be.  
 
Chapter Three serves as an introduction to the ethnographic study, describing in detail 
the two gardens where the bulk of my field work was carried out. This chapter 
provides an overview of the history and the daily life of the gardens and the people 
who work in them.  
 
Chapters Four to Seven contain the main body of the thesis. I have structured these 
chapters to coincide with the main components of my theoretical analytical 
framework of performance identity, working from the macro components of the 
framework down to the micro components. Thus, in Chapter Four I have discussed 
the broader social and political context within which the community gardeners find 
themselves and the limitations imposed by power and power relations on the 
performances that are actually “available” to them or expected from them. This 
chapter also covers the challenges of plausibility in performances, and the 
contestations around the authorship of performances in more detail.  
 
Chapter Five deals with the central issue of temporality in influencing meaningful 
action. I have discussed in detail the issue of temporality in identity; the central 
mediating role played by performances of identity in creating temporal coherence out 
of the temporal dissonance that is created at the intersection of the history and the 
expectations of the community gardeners. I discuss the challenge that temporal 
credibility poses to plausibility, and the use of creative emplotment, specifically with 
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respect to the remaking of experience, to develop and present temporally coherent 
performances of identity.  
 
Chapter Six considers the physical (material) environment within which performances 
of identity take place. I discuss the concept of the mise-en-scène that frames and 
provides the backdrop for the action, and the importance of this in managing both 
temporal coherence and the credibility of performances. I describe the great lengths 
that the gardeners go to in order to create a physical environment that mediates the 
understanding of who they have been, who they are and who they could be.  
 
Chapter Seven discusses the use of every day objects in supporting performance; the 
importance of seemingly mundane items in creating critical distinctions in 
personhood, and the many creative ways in which the gardeners use these objects to 
bring plausibility to their performances of identity.  
 
Chapter Eight is the summation of my main findings. In this chapter I have also 
considered what alternatives might be possible; how we might go about re-making 
how we think about food security in particular and “development” in general.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
IDENTITY AS PERFORMANCE: IMAGINATION, TEMPORALITY AND 
MEANING-IN-THE-WORLD 
 
2.1. Introduction: Meaningful Action as a Text 
“.. the world of fiction leads us to the heart of the real world of action” 
(Ricoeur, 1981, p296) 
 
After completing my fieldwork I was convinced that agency and identity – rather than 
the “technical” factors emphasized by mainstream development - were at the heart of 
what I had observed during my time in the gardens and the surrounding communities. 
Many meaningful actions appeared to be motivated in large part by the desire (i.e. to 
have as a key goal) to be a particular type of person, or to appear to be a particular 
type of person, which in most circumstances seemed to be a perfectly acceptable 
substitute for the former. For the analysis of my ethnographic findings I thus required 
an integrated framework, able to mediate between the ideational world within which 
identity was imagined and conceived, and the world of meaningful action, where 
identity was made “real”, and to provide insights into the agency that underpinned 
both. I also needed to account for the inter-temporal nature of identity that I had 
observed over and over again: a simultaneously present past, present and future that 
combined to underpin the intentions and motivations behind meaningful action, and to 
condition what could be imagined as future actions.  
 
As the possible basis for such a theoretical interpretive framework I have been drawn 
to approaches that apply text-based interpretation models to action, most notably 
  41 
those that interpret actions in a similar way to narratives – the stories that we write, 
that we read, and that we tell. It appeared to me that the way in which the community 
gardeners interacted with others, what they said, what they did and how they used 
material objects in these processes was most often neither random nor completely 
determined by external factors, but rather crafted in large part by themselves, 
analagous in many ways to the mindful construction of a written or recounted story. 
Paul Ricoeur proposed that meaningful action could be interpreted as a text (Ricoeur, 
1971), as a form of narrative. In my estimation this is an elegant notion, for several 
reasons:  
 
o A text is a “structured totality” whose meaning is more than the sum of its 
component sentences (Ricoeur, 1981, P13); it is a “meaningful whole” 
(Vlacos, 2014, p203) meant to be read and interpreted as a unity. We cannot 
access the whole meaning of an entire text by focusing only on one or two 
sentences. In contrast, mainstream economics (as a result of its preferred 
mathematical deductivist10 method) tends to focus on individual parts of a 
whole. This method, and the regularities of form that it requires, are dependent 
on what Lawson (2003, p5) refers to as “a closed system”. As a result, 
mainstream economics tends to analyse particular human actions, such as one 
consumption choice, on the basis of a limited and pre-defined set of variables 
– those that are amenable to mathematical deductivist modeling. Although 
mainstream economists may acknowledge that observed behaviours differs 
from predicted behaviours due to “variations in taste” (Michael and Becker, 
1973, p380), this entire world of variables is usually assumed as given                                                         
10 I am using here Lawson’s (2003) definition of deductivism to mean “a type of explanation in which 
regularities of the form ‘whenever event x then event y’… are a necessary condition.” (p5).  
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(Chibnik, 2011). That is, mainstream economics deals with its inability to 
satisfactorily explain deviations from predicted behaviour not by adopting an 
alternative approach, but simply by ignoring these deviations: 
 
Since economists have little to contribute ….. to the 
understanding of how preferences are formed, preferences are 
assumed not to change substantially over time, nor to be very 
different between wealthy or poor persons, or even between 
persons in different societies and cultures. (Becker, 1976, p5) 
 
That is, Becker is arguing that because economics is unable to explain 
something, it simply renders it irrelevant, thereby excluding it as a potential 
causal factor.  It is, I would argue, exactly this kind of a priori limitation that 
makes it almost impossible for mainstream development to consider multiple 
social realities, in which a wide variation of choices and actions may be 
considered equally “rational”.  
 
In contrast to the inflexible approach to verification of mainstream economics 
(which then finds itself unable to provide a coherent account of apparently 
“irrational” actions), Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is based on “the inherent 
plurivocity of meaningful action” (Standen, 2013, p56). Considering 
meaningful action as a coherent unity – like a text – for the purposes of 
interpretation would, I propose, provide greater insights into causality and 
motivation than selective isolation of its parts.  
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o The concept of narrative emplotment resonated with what I observed around 
the careful construction of identity and meaning in everyday life and around 
everyday objects, according a central role to imagination and thus agency in 
the interpretation of meaningful action. Although Paul Ricoeur seldom spoke 
directly of imagination per se, but rather of its manifestations (such as the 
construction of a metaphor) Richard Kearney asserts that imagination is 
central to “the interweaving of history and fiction” (Kearney 1996, p174) that 
underpins Ricoeur’s theory of human time.  
 
o A narrative text allows for the coexistence of multiple characters, not all of 
whom are required to be actual (living or dead) persons. The characters in 
narratives may be real or fictional (i.e. the product of imagination, either 
individual or collective), reflecting the way in which people present different 
versions of themselves in different actions in different contexts for different 
audiences. Not all of these versions are, strictly speaking, “real” persons 
(almost everyone of us has at one time or another presented ourselves as 
someone a little different from or more than ourselves), but in a narrative they 
are all equally real and equally present. Both real and fictional persons (as 
long as these latter resemble “real” people enough to make them recognisable) 
co-exist easily in a narrative work, and all may appear equally real to the 
reader.  
 
o Similarly, multiple temporalities coexist with relative ease within a narrative. 
Within any particular narrative past, present and future may easily be 
simultaneously present – as they clearly were in the lives of the participants in 
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the community gardens – and temporal coherence is maintained in the 
emplotment of the narrative whole (Hamilton, 2014).  
 
o Ricoeur’s theory of the metaphor in narratives – most particulary his ideas 
around where meaning is located in a metaphor – provides to my mind the 
basis for a theory of material culture that emphasizes the agency of persons 
rather then the agency of objects in creating meaning.  
 
This idea that models of text interpretation might fruitfully be applied to the analysis 
of meaningful action was certainly no special insight on my part: As Tilley (2002) 
points out, many anthropological studies “have exploited analogies with language to 
provide a fresh way of understanding what things mean” (p23). Clifford Geertz 
considered that “anthropological interpretation is constructing a reading of what 
happens” (Geertz, 1973, p18).  Geertz acknowledged Paul Ricouer as the source of 
his own “idea of the inscription of action” (Geertz, ibid, p19), which in turn forms the 
basis of his approach to ethnographic description – an attempt to “fix” the meaning of 
a particular social discourse in a thickly descriptive ethnographic text.  
 
I was specifically interested in interpretative theories that focus on text as a narrative, 
rather than on those based on Saussurian linguistics, such as the various structuralist 
approaches. Structuralists working in anthropology (probably most notably Lévi-
Strauss) have focused on the analogies between the structure of linguistics and the 
structure of culture, on the basis that both are systems of communication (Tilley, 
1990). Structural analysis is concerned with uncovering the “codes” that lie behind 
action or culture or material culture: “meaning” then is created through the location of 
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an action or an object in some already existing structure, rather than through the direct 
agency of the actor (ibid). I concur with Ricoeur (1991a) that structural analysis is 
best understood as a first (rather than the only) step towards the goal of interpretation: 
structuralism can explain the internal structure of a text or an action (or in Ricoeur’s 
particular example – a myth), but it cannot say anything about what it means, and to 
ignore what it means is to reduce it “to a necrology of the meaningless discourses of 
mankind” (Ricoeur, ibid, p121). I was much more interested in interpreting the 
“meaning-in-the-world” of what I was observing than in only explaining its 
underlying structure, although, in line with Ricoeur, I did not discount the latter as 
methodological step in the process of interpretation (ibid).  
 
Additionally, I was searching for a theoretical approach that emphasized agency, 
history and the multiplicity (and thus validity) of possible meanings to a far greater 
extent than I believe structuralism does. Paul Ricoeur was, once again, my starting 
point in this regard, not only because he emphasised agency and history in the 
interpretation of meaning, but because I wanted to work within his heremeneutical 
framework, which acknowledged the possibility of multiple interpretations of 
meaningful action – the essential “plurivocity” of action. This dialectic between 
explanation and understanding allows for the examination of meaningful action both 
in terms of its internal structure and in terms of what it “says” to a wider world – what 
it is “about”, what it “means”. Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation of action as text has 
been widely applied in the social sciences, probably most notably in anthropology by 
Clifford Geertz, whose interpretive work is located within a framework of culture as 
text (Geertz, 1973).  
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However, the relatively rigid requirements stipulated by Ricoeur in order to make an 
action like a text prior to its interpretation as a narrative (Ricoeur, 1971) were 
problematic in several ways for my particular purposes. Firstly, the focus of my 
research was the everyday, the seemingly mundane details of daily life – action that 
was deeply meaningful for the actors involved, but which Ricoeur’s criteria for the 
designation of an action as “meaningful” would probably have discarded as irrelevant 
and unimportant. Ricoeur was clear that his requirements for an action to be 
considered “meaningful” (and thus able to be analysed like a text) required it to have 
some kind of profound historical importance and relevance, to be an action that has 
“left its mark on its time” (Ricoeur, ibid, p540, emphasis in original).  
 
I also concurred with Moore (1990) that Ricoeur’s fixation requirement of detachment 
of actor and action (autonomisation) was highly problematic for the purpose of 
determining “meaning” in action, and in fact undermined Ricoeur’s own views on the 
centrality of agency in the determination of meaning. Where is the place for the 
recognition of agency in action when meaning is defined as something apart from the 
intentions and motivations of the actor? This tension between the importance of 
agency as a key part of Ricoeur’s philosophy and the negation of the agency of the 
actor in his interpretive method for action is never fully resolved: Only a few pages 
after specifying that the autonomization of action is a necessary requirement for the 
application of his model of text interpretation, Ricoeur (1971) states that “what can be 
(and must be) construed in human action is the motivational basis of this action” 
(p552, emphasis in original). That is, “I understand what you intended to do, if you 
are able to explain to me why you did such-and-such and action” (p551, emphasis in 
  47 
original), which approach places agency and the motivations of the actor front and 
centre in its understanding.  
 
Moore (1990) believes that Ricoeur is making “the very reasonable point” (p115) that 
the meaning of action cannot be limited only to what the actor intended; there must be 
a place for some kind of objective analysis of what it means to a party external to the 
action. In this I concur with Reed and Alexander (2009), that “(s)uccessful 
explanations are those that intertwine (the) meaning structures of investigators and 
actors in an effective way” (p21). However, that still leaves the question of the 
relative importance of the different loci of meaning: the main aim of this thesis is to 
interpret the meaning of various actions from the primary (though not sole) point of 
view of the actors in question. Although this process will unavoidably result in 
interpretations based on what the action meant to me (the investigator), nonetheless 
my goal (and hence a central motivating factor in the selection of a theoretical 
framework) is to allocate primacy to meanings as understood by the actors, rather 
than as understood by me, or another interpreter. In that way my goal is to “interpret” 
meaning, rather than to “discover” it (after Reed and Alexander, 2009). In this my 
views diverge somewhat from those of Geertz (1973), who differentiates between 
first, second and third order interpretations, and suggests that the focus of 
anthropological understanding are second and third order interpretations, rather than 
the motivations of the actors themselves (Geertz, ibid, p15). I would suggest that that 
this conclusion was inevitable in Geertz’s strict application of Ricoeur’s criteria for 
making action like a text, two of which are the fixation of action (detaching meaning 
from its event) and the autonomization of action (detachment from the actor(s)) 
(Ricoeur, 1971, p322). Although I would agree that many actions (and particularly 
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those that are connected to identity) are designed and undertaken for a particular 
audience, and thus that the audience’s interpretation is an important part of what the 
action “means”, (including what it means for the actor), it is also true that what an 
action means for the actor and how it is understood by the wider population is not 
always identical. Thus the possibility of the misinterpretations of the meaning of 
actions by development practitioners described by Oliver de Sardan (2005). I would 
suggest that this eventuality (misinterpretation of meaning) is more likely in the 
interpretation of everyday life and everyday actions, than in the deeply embedded 
cultural rituals that form the focus of so much anthropological analysis. Therefore, 
this kind of ethnographic study of the everyday requires a different idea of where 
meaning is located, affording primacy (though not exclusivity) to the actor.  
 
Ricoeur’s additional requirement (to make action like a text) of detachment of the 
action from the historical and social context in which it took place 
(decontextualisation) is also problematic for my purposes. It undermines my 
understanding of his (Ricoeur’s) own stipulation that interpretation requires that we 
recognize the “conventions” that give one particular meaning to an action rather than 
another (Standen, 2013, p106). These conventions are neither timeless nor universal – 
they are determined in a particular place at a particular time, in a particular context. I 
would propose that it is the decontextualisation of action in economics texts, for 
example, that results in so many misinterpretations of those actions.  
 
Additionally, the context within which a written text (a narrative, a story) was 
produced is almost always embedded in some way in the text, either through 
description, or the language and manners of the characters, or through metaphor, or 
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through the details of the plot, and is thus almost always “available” for interpretation 
within the text. Therefore, there can seldom be an absolute divorce between a text and 
context in which it was produced (as a rule writers do not write in perfect contextual 
vacuums), which context thus cannot be wholly ignored in its interpretation. 
 
In adopting the requirement of the decontextualisation of action, Ricoeur seems to 
have put himself in a similar place to the structuralists, whom he criticized as follows: 
“(We have) two possibilities. We can, as readers, remain in the suspense of the text, 
treating it as a worldless and authorless object; in this case we explain the text in 
terms of its internal relations, its structure. On the other hand, we can lift the suspense 
and fulfill the text in speech, restoring it to living communication; in this case we 
interpret the text.” (Ricoeur, 1991a, p113). The requirements of fixation, 
autonomisation and decontextualisation of action in order to make it like a text appear 
to me to run the real risk that action becomes exactly such a “worldless and authorless 
object”. Ricoeur referred to the “surplus of meaning” that remains after the 
completion of an objective analysis like structuralism (Ricoeur, 1976, p45), but 
stripping action out of context may leave a similar residue of meaning uninterpreted. 
Moore (1990) highlights the contradiction: according to her analysis Ricoeur has 
emphasized “the construction of meaning in context” (Moore, ibid, p115), but at the 
same time he also stipulates that meaning can only be accessed by divorcing text and 
context.  
 
Another important consequence of the proposed separation of action and context is 
the under-emphasis of power and relations of power in the production of meaning in 
the Ricoeurian action-like-text approach (Moore, 1990). In my fieldwork I realized 
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early on the importance of power, both in constraining what courses of action are 
actually available to the community gardeners, and in determining the range of 
outcomes from those actions. Power – political, social and economic – determines to a 
large extent what kinds of persons the gardeners can be, and what kinds of persons 
they can aspire to be. It was therefore essential that the theoretical framework used to 
interpret the empirical data take explicit and detailed account both of these power 
relations, and their impact on limiting and determining meaningful action.  
 
In summary then, while Ricoeur’s goal in making action like a text through fixation, 
autonomisation and decontextualisation (as described in Ricoeur, 1971) was to be 
able to access the meaning of the action, in certain important respects this has not 
been achieved: many of the factors central to interpreting the meaning of the action 
appear instead to be diminished through this process. I would assert that this is 
particularly the case with respect to everyday actions (as opposed to the big 
historically “relevant” actions considered meaningful by Ricoeur), where the actor’s 
motivations and the context within which the action takes place are central to 
interpreting meaning. The rigid a priori requirements of making an action like a text 
make the application of Ricoeur’s textual interpretive theories to everyday action 
unsatisfactory, although to my mind those theories themselves (of the interpretation of 
narratives) remained very relevant to my interpretive requirements. How, then, to 
proceeed? 
 
Standen (2013) suggests that in fact Ricoeur did not believe that the approach of 
action-as-text was the only way to understand meaningful action: just as he (Ricoeur) 
was clear that there was no one way in which to interpret a text, so he accepted that 
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there were multiple possible ways of interpreting action. Standen (ibid) asserts that 
“(i)t is up to us …… to be aware of and to judge what it is that “The Model of the 
Text” may help us see, and to an equal extent as to what it may leave obscure” (p58). 
For my purposes there were certainly aspects of Ricoeur’s theory of text interpretation 
that I wanted to retain (most particularly his approach towards the interpretation of 
narratives as narratives, and his views on the location of meaning in a text), but I 
wanted to avoid the a priori requirements of making “like a text” the action that I 
observed.  
 
Ricoeur did not propose an alternative way of interpreting action as a text. However, 
what he did have was a theory of how identity was closely related to narrativity; that 
our personal identity is essentially narrative, contained and expressed in the stories 
that we tell in order to make sense of the disorderly experience of our existence 
(Hamilton, 2014). Ricoeur (1991b) described our lives “as an activity and a passion in 
search of a narrative” (p29, emphasis in original). It is through the stories that people 
tell that “(they) come to imagine and know themselves” (Kearney, 1996, p182, 
emphasis in original).  
 
Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity has found considerable purchase across a range 
of disciplines, from anthropology to psychology. From the perspective of my research 
requirements it has a number of compelling features. Firstly, it places human agency 
at the centre of the creation and management of identity – in the creative emplotment 
of the narrative by the story teller. Secondly, it specifically incorporates notions of 
temporality and temporal coherence (Ezzy, 1998), which I believed were central to 
the meaning-making processes that I observed. Finally, Ricoeur’s view (after the 
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similar sentiment of Karl Marx) was that “we learn to become the narrator and hero 
of our own story, without actually becoming the author of our own life” (Ricoeur, 
1991b, p32, emphasis in original). That is, although we construct our narrative 
identities, we are not free to construct any narrative that we desire: “there is only a 
limited repertoire of available representations and stories” that we can make use of to 
construct our own personal narratives (Somers, 1994, p629). Power and power 
relations (together with social and cultural norms) are central in determining what 
narratives are available to whom at what time (ibid). That is, the concept of narrative 
identity specifically includes the limitations and constraints imposed on human action 
by the context (including power relations) within which it takes place, through the 
concept of authorship.  
 
Power is a central theme in this thesis, dealing as it does with contestations of identity 
– the struggle to be a particular kind of person; most specifically, a different kind of 
person than those presupposed (and thus effectively imposed) by mainstream 
development policy, through its discourses and how these portray (characterise) the 
poor and the food insecure. Conceptualising identity as a narrative identity effectively 
conceptualizes the struggle over identity as a struggle over authorship, since the very 
idea of a “narrative” presupposes an author. Thus the struggle to be a particular kind 
of person is manifested as opposition to a particular imposed narrative identity and 
the efforts to rewrite some of one’s own narrative; to appropriate a part of its 
authorship.  
 
In this thesis I have drawn parallels between Steve Biko’s understanding of Black 
Consciousness as “an inward-looking process” (Biko 1978, p29) and De Sousa 
  53 
Santos’ (2004) description of “the sociology of absences” that defines mainstream 
development (p238).  I have proposed that both may be considered as constituting a 
contestation of the authorship of identity. Biko considered liberation as primarily a 
“liberation movement of the mind” (Arnold, 1978, pxiv) and saw as a central goal of 
Black Consciousness changing the belief of Blacks that they were inherently inferior 
to Whites; which belief he ascribed to the fact that the intrinsic identity of Blacks was 
determined in “White” terms, against “White” benchmarks. I would suggest that 
much of this imposed identity was in fact a narrative identity (although Biko did not 
use this term). The fundamental inferiority of the mind that Blacks were made to 
believe under colonialism and apartheid was conveyed in large part through 
narratives – the ways in which Blacks were described in White popular discourse, in 
official policy documents, and in the stories that were told, not just by Whites, but 
also by Blacks. Thus, a liberation movement of the mind required that Blacks, not 
Whites, became the authors of new narratives of identity, narratives that would “show 
the black people the value of their own standards and outlook” (Biko ibid, p30). The 
narrative component of this conceptualization of liberation is, I would argue, 
underscored by Biko’s choice of “I write what like” as the title for a series of articles 
about his philosophy of Black Consciousness published in the monthly newsletter of 
the South African Student’s Association (SASO) in 1970 and 1971.  
 
De Sousa Santos (2004) describes how certain kinds of persons, and certain kinds of 
existence are “actively produced as non-existent” (p239), and thus as legitimate 
objects for the “fix” of development. This active production of absences takes place 
largely via the narratives of mainstream development – what is described and how it 
is described. For example, the failure of DAFF’s Zero Hunger Programme (DAFF, 
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2012) to consider that the decisions of households not to grow their own food may be 
a rational and legitimate choice. Instead, these households are portrayed as “lacking” 
something – assets, skills or commitment to producing their own food. This policy 
document also fails to articulate a link between household hunger, high food prices 
and the long-term rise in real profits of South African food processors and retailers. 
This effectively “erases” the possibility that corporate rent seeking may be a cause of 
household hunger, and thus precludes alternative food networks as a possible remedy 
to food insecurity. It is thus the hungry themselves who must be “developed” by being 
taught the value of good nutrition and how to grow vegetables.  
 
Thus, existence and non-existence is produced by a particular authorship of the 
narrative of household hunger; and the reversal of this (i.e. to make the absent 
present) requires an overthrow and replacement of author. De Sousa Santos (2004) 
echoes Ricoeur’s (1991a) proposition that interpretation requires that we open up a 
world in his conceptualisation of resistance (to non-existence) as an “enlargement of 
the world ….. of credible experience” (De Sousa Santos, ibid, p239).  
 
During the course of the ethnographic study that is the basis of this thesis I was 
constantly confronted by the key role of narratives in the management of identity: the 
stories that the community gardeners and other informants told me, told each other 
and told third parties (such as government officials) were in many instances conscious 
and mindful constructions. Their purpose appeared to be to present a particular 
version of themselves (past, present and/or future) to others, to make sense of their or 
others’ experiences, and/or to explain planned future actions. At the same time, 
however, meaning-making functions were not limited to narrative: it was not only 
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what people said that mediated and organized their sense of self, but also what they 
did (including their thoughtful use of material objects) – their meaningful actions. A 
comprehensive “reading” of their narrative identities could not, in my assessment, be 
complete without incorporating these actions and the objects that they utilised – what 
people did, and what they chose to do it with (or, just as importantly, without) as well 
as what they said. This is one of the fundamental basics of conducting ethnographic 
research:  that what people say or do should be considered together with what they do 
or say in order to obtain greater insight into the meaning-making process at work.  
 
Despite its appeal to me, to the best of my knowledge Ricoeur’s theory of narrative 
identity has only been applied to the interpretation of spoken narratives – i.e. the 
stories that people tell – rather than to meaningful action, and it is meaningful action 
that is the subject of this thesis. I was interested in much more than just what people 
said; I was also interested in what they did, and what objects they used (or didn’t use) 
in that process. In fact, I did not believe that these things (speaking and doing) could 
be neatly separated from each other in any endeavour to interpret meaning in 
everyday life. My working definition of “meaningful action” for the purpose of this 
thesis includes actions and objects together with what is said. After all, sometimes 
“actions speak louder than words”. 
 
I would suggest that excluding what people do and the objects that they utilize in that 
process from a definition of “narrative” in the sense of “narrative identity” is in fact at 
odds with how Ricoeur himself conceptualized a written narrative: almost all written 
narratives combine what characters say, what they do, and a range of objects that they 
do it with in order to tell a story. In addition, it was clear to me that the community 
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gardeners had a narrative intention underpinning their meaningful actions and their 
corresponding use of objects. That is, they intended these actions and objects to tell a 
particular story about who they were (or had been) and who they wanted to be.  
 
On this basis – the interconnectedness of saying and doing, together with the narrative 
intention of the gardeners - it did not seem to me to be a very big step to expand the 
usual definition of “narrative” used in most applications of Ricoeur’s theory of 
narrative identity to incorporate action and objects into something closer to 
Alexander’s (2004), Harré’s (2002) and Goffman’s (1959) ideas of “performance”, 
which includes both action and speaking (story telling), and that provides the context 
within which objects acquire meaning. I have, therefore, proposed a theory of 
“performance identity” which is an expanded version of Ricoeur’s theory of narrative 
identity articulated with his approach towards the interpretation of narrative as 
narrative. Ricoeur’s theories of the structure of a narrative and the underlying creative 
process in its production are thus central features of the interpretive method applied to 
performance identity (i.e. a synthesis of action, spoken stories and the use of objects) 
in this thesis.  
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2.2. Performance Identity: an expanded Ricoeurian framework for the 
interpretation of meaningful action 
 
2.2.1. Mediating the Self: Narrative as Performance 
 
“It's like everyone tells a story about themselves inside their own head. Always. All 
the time. That story makes you what you are. We build ourselves out of that story.”  
(Patrick Rothfuss – The Name of the Wind) 
 
Ricouer’s conceptualization of identity is based on a dialectic between idem – self-
sameness over time, and ipse – selfhood, the ability to change; an understanding that 
the relationship between the two (i.e. maintaining an identity while still adapting to 
change) is mediated by narrative; and that personal identity is therefore a narrative 
identity (Ricoeur, 1991b).  Central to this Ricoeurian narrative identity, and its 
construction, is Aristotle’s theory of emplotment, which “constitutes the creative 
centre of the narrative” (ibid, p24).  
 
Ricoeur (1991b) describes our lives “as an activity and a passion in search of a 
narrative” (p29, emphasis in original). This conceptualization of narrative identity is 
closely bound to Ricoeur’s philosophy of action, which he, in turn, based on the 
Aristotelian idea that narrative was a form of imitation of action. Ricoeur proposed 
that the ways in which we understood ourselves and others were based on “an 
irreducible narrativity.” (Dowling, 2011, p5). Ricoeur’s self is a self that is 
fundamentally social (Ezzy, 1998), incorporating the concept of “mutual recognition” 
(Laitinen, 2011, p37, my emphasis), and the notion of a narrative reflects this: we tell 
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stories about ourselves to someone. (I would propose, as discussed in more detail 
further on in this thesis, that we do in fact construct narratives and performances that 
are intended solely for ourselves, to make sense of our lives to ourselves, and these 
are not always intended to be publicly heard or seen. However, I would also state that 
in most cases our narratives (and particularly our performances) are constructed in a 
social world, with the clear intention of having an audience.)  
 
The stories that we construct and then tell about ourselves, our histories, our planned 
futures, and our relationships with others are the tools that we use to make sense of 
our lives – to manage our sense of who we are, who we have been and who we could 
be. The central characteristic of narrative identity is thus mediation (Laitinen, 2002) – 
to make sense of the contradictions in our lives and our sense of self, and Laitinen 
(ibid, p57 -58) identifies eight such mediating roles for these narratives:  
 
(i) Mediation between concordance and discordance: configuring the 
heterogeneous parts of our lives into a unified whole. 
(ii) Mediation between simultaneously living our lives and narrating it, 
between being both actor and narrator. 
(iii) Mediation between tradition and innovation: what traditions do our 
narratives build on versus what our creative innovation makes new? 
(iv) Mediation between fact and fiction: Ricoeur emphasized that not all of 
what we consider as historical “fact” is actually “true”, but he was equally 
clear that “fiction and (the) representation of reality do not exclude one 
another….. fictional narrative is … mimetic” (Ricoeur ,1981, p291).  
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(v) Mediation between positive and normative, between objective fact and 
subjective judgment. 
(vi) Mediation between idem – self-sameness over time, and ipse – selfhood, 
the ability to change (Ricoeur, 1991b). 
(vii) Mediation between a cogito conceptualized as all-important, and one that 
is meaningless. 
(viii) Mediation between the person’s concurrent role as narrator and writer – 
she constructs the story (within limits, as discussed below) and she tells it 
(Ricoeur, 1991b).   
 
To this list I would add a ninth: Mediation among past, present and future, that is, 
mediation of temporality. Laitinen (2002) has included temporal mediation under 
“concordance and discordance”, but I would concur with Hamilton (2014) that 
narratives are essentially temporal: they anchor us in our pasts, help us to decipher the 
present, and assist us in imagining ourselves in the future. My observations in the 
field underpinned the centrality of temporal mediation in identity – the almost-
constant efforts to make sense of the past and to connect that to a concurrently 
different, but same, present, and a shifting, uncertain future.  
 
In contrast to the requirement of the decontextualistion of action in his theory of 
action-as-text discussed above, Ricoeur emphasised the importance of the particular 
social and historical context in determining the details of a particular narrative 
identity. We continually “update” our narrative identity – in order to preserve our 
sense of “self-sameness” over time - by reinterpreting both the past and the future: 
“The story of a life continues to be refigured by all the truthful or fictive stories a 
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subject tells about himself or herself.” (Ricoeur, 1988, p246). We do this updating 
with (subjective) reference to the world around us (Ezzy, 1998). Narrative identity 
(and associated meaning making) may thus be conceptualized as embedded in its 
context, which context is social, spatial and temporal.  
 
I have proposed in this thesis that the notion of “performance” may be used to expand 
and build on Ricoeur’s interlinked theories of narrative and narrative identity, to 
provide a more comprehensive theory for the analysis of meaningful action and 
associated material culture. Alexander (2004) asserts that the study of culture has 
been “polarized” (p527) between structuralist approaches based on linguistics, and 
those that treat meaning as practice. He proposes the concept of “social action as 
cultural performance” (p529) as a bridge between the two, and draws analogies 
between social performances and theatrical performances. He defines cultural 
performance as “the social process by which actors, individually or in concert, display 
for others the meaning of their social situation” (ibid). Goffman’s (1959) framework 
that he developed to analyse this aspect of social life was similarly based on a 
theatrical performance. He proceeded from the starting point that most individuals 
wish to be thought of in a certain way, in order to manage the way in which they are 
treated by others.  
 
It is through social performance that identity is created and managed (Woodward, 
2007). The concept of “performance” thus includes both what people say (the spoken 
“script”), and characters and action (the directing “script”), and is specifically 
intended to say something about something to someone (just as Ricoeur defined a 
discourse as something more than just the structure of a language – Ricoeur, 1971)  
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Harré (2002), further emphasises the role of material objects in social performance, 
which approach I have utilized in part in this thesis as a useful way of incorporating 
objects into the analysis of the meaning making processes that underpin action.  
 
Making “performance”, rather than just narrative, the object of interpretation in order 
to gain insight into meaningful action, and the ways in which identity is mediated by 
such meaningful action, is, I believe, very useful, since it incorporates both actions 
and objects into “story telling”. However, in my assessment both Harré (2002) and 
Alexander (2004) have rather under-theorised temporality: Alexander’s (ibid) notion 
of temporal sequence (i.e. beginning, middle and end) in a theatrical performance 
does not adequately address the complexity of a simultaneously present past, present 
and future that is so crucial to meaning making and identity. Ricoeur’s 
conceptualistion of historical time, together with a reading of Reinhart Koselleck’s 
theories of time action, make, in my view, a much better interpretive approach for 
theorizing both the temporality of identity, and the centrality of temporality in 
identity.  
 
I am also not as ready as Alexander (2004) appears to be to dismiss theories of action 
as text. Much of Ricoeur’s theory of the interpretation of narratives (in particular his 
theory of metaphor and his analysis of creative emplotment) is, I would assert, very 
useful in accounting for agency and imagination in the creation and management of 
identity. For these reasons (i.e. theoretical robustness and comprehensiveness), I have 
mostly drawn analogies between performances of identity and Ricoeur’s theory of the 
construction of narratives rather than with the construction of theatrical performances, 
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as proposed by Alexander (ibid). In conceptualizing the idea of “performance 
identity” as an expanded version of Ricoeur’s narrative identity (rather than as a type 
of theatrical performance) I would propose that I am able to incorporate all the 
mediating roles of that narrative identity to my analysis of the relationship between 
meaning and action. The ways in which Riceour proposes we understand both the 
structure of a narrative (plot and temporal coherence) and the creative process 
(imagination) underlying its production are thus central features of the interpretive 
method applied to performance identity in this thesis. From this point forward I will 
refer to this expanded Ricoeurian narrative identity as “performance identity”.  
 
2.2.2. Emplotment and the creative imagination: agency at work 
 
“Are we not ready to recognize in the power of the imagination …. the capacity for 
letting new worlds shape our understanding of ourselves?” 
(Ricoeur, 1981, p181) 
 
My conceptualization of a “performance identity” specifically incorporates Ricoeur’s 
theory of creative emplotment in narrative. Thus performances of identity are seen 
neither as completely random nor as unplanned.  People construct and situate 
themselves in these performances just as the author of a narrative would (Somers, 
1994). It is the plot of the performance that organizes a range of (often seemingly 
unconnected) actions, persons and objects into a coherent and sensible whole, thereby 
imposing the semantic order of causality – this happened because that happened 
(Dowling, 2011). In this way the plot of the performance of identity is the key 
mediator between the concordant and the discordant, to make sense of a life. Ricoeur 
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“borrowed” Aristotle’s concept of emplotment (muthos) as the basis of a theory of the 
creative emplotment “of lived temporal experience” that is depicted within a narrative 
(Ricoeur, 1984, p31). The plot is “the semantic innovation” at the heart of the 
narrative, and is the product of the human imagination (ibid, pix), “an accounting 
(however fantastic or implicit) of why a narrative has the story line it does’ (Somers, 
1994, p616).  
 
Aristotle proposed that a work of fiction is mimesis praxeos, the “imitation of an 
action” (Dowling, 2011, p1).  It is not, however, a perfectly accurate representation of 
an observed action or set of actions, but rather a creative imitation (Ricoeur, 1984). 
Ricoeur builds on Aristotle’s definition using what he termed “threefold mimesis” 
(ibid p52) - mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3, although all three are conceptualized 
as interlinked parts of one process. Mimesis2 (“configuration”) concerns emplotment, 
and is positioned between mimesis1 (“prefiguration”) and mimesis3 (“refiguration”) 
(ibid, p53). Mimesis1 is the “pre-understanding” (Moore, 1990, p103) that is 
necessary before emplotment can take place. Developing a plot for a performance that 
will be intelligible both to ourselves and others “presupposes a familiarity” (Ricoeur, 
1984, p55) with a range of actions, cultural conventions, actors, likely consequences, 
causality, and so on. A performance is (almost always) intended ‘for others ‘ 
(Alexander, 2004, p529). Mimesis1 (prefiguration) thus informs the “intelligibility” of 
the plot and is what should ensure that the performance will be interpreted by the 
audience in one particular way rather than another, by situating the plot in a pre-
existing meaning structure that is common to narrator and audience: “every narrative 
presupposes a familiarity with (particular) terms” (Ricoeur, 1984, p55). Further, 
“human action can be narrated …… because it is always already articulated by signs, 
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rules, and norms” (ibid, p57). With respect to the meaningful action of performance 
identity mimesis1 may thus be considered analogous to the underlying meaning 
structure that makes one particular action have the meaning A, rather than the 
meaning B (Kaplan, 2012). A performance is intelligible when the meaning structure 
is the same both for the actor who constructs the performance and the audience who 
observes it.  
 
I have argued in this thesis that at least some misinterpretations of motivation and 
action (resulting in Oliver De Sardan’s (2005) described mismatch between what 
development practitioners expect and what actually takes place) may be attributed to a 
divergence in the content of mimesis1 between the actor and part of her audience. 
That is, there is no universal “familiarity”, no “one” pre-existing meaning structure 
(the prefiguration of mimesis1) common to the target beneficiaries of development 
initiatives such as community gardens, and the development practitioners (or 
commentators) who observe their performance. In this instance, the actor has 
constructed a plot utilizing a particular prefiguration of action that diverges from that 
held by the audience. Thus the very real possibility that the entire plot of the 
performance will be misunderstood.  
 
Mimesis3 “marks the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer 
or reader” (Ricoeur, 1984, p71). Mimesis3 is thus the point at which the performance 
occurs, where the plot becomes performance, where it becomes real, and where it is 
interpreted and becomes part of the world. Between mimesis1 and mimesis3 lies 
mimesis2 – emplotment, which “constitutes the creative centre of the narrative” 
(Ricoeur 1991b, p24) and is the “organizing theme” for a particular performance 
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(Ezzy, 1998, p254). The plot links the theme or the point of the performance with the 
characters, with what they say, and with what they do (Ricoeur, 1984). The key point 
here is creativity: the plots of our performances are much more than just replications 
of prior or other performances, they are imagined – “mimesis2 opens the kingdom of 
the as if” (Ricoeur, ibid, p64, emphasis in original). The source of this creativity is the 
human imagination – “the productive imagination” (ibid, p68). This imagination 
allows us to consider the possible outcomes of different actions – “if I do this in this 
way, then this is the likely outcome” – and allocates order to a group of seemingly 
disconnected events and characters. Narrative identity is thus neither given nor static; 
rather it is fluid, malleable and shifting: “we never cease to reinterpret the narrative 
identity that constitutes us” (Ricoeur 1991b, p32). The twin concepts of a creative 
imagination and a productive imagination are intertwined with, and are the products 
of, human agency. Without agency we would not have the ability to reinterpret 
ourselves; we would not be able to select among the imagined outcomes of different 
actions; and thus we would not make choices. Of course this agency is not 
unbounded, as discussed below, but it is present and centre in the concept of creative 
emplotment.  
 
Imagination also determines what we believe is possible (Kaplan, 2012) and thus also 
has a temporal dimension – I imagine a future outcome of my actions while in the 
present. Without this inter-temporal experimentation there can be no action (Vlacos, 
2014).  
 
This is not to say that our creative imagination can create any plot: Not only are we 
limited by what narratives are actually available to us (as mediated by the context of 
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power and power relations), but a plot is also configured “by the interplay of 
innovation and sedimentation” (Ricoeur, 1984, p68). The actor may exercise 
innovation in certain aspects of the performance, but if the entire performance is an 
innovation (that is, if it has no reference at all to what has gone before) it will not be 
intelligible. There are thus certain “rules” for the composition of narrative (and thus 
performance) that limit the extent of innovation and experimentation that can take 
place in the process of emplotment (Ricoeur, 1991). Thus all “new” narratives must 
have reference to existing narratives in order to be intelligible.  
 
2.2.3. Temporal coherence: performance, plot and temporality 
 
The past is never dead, it is not even past.  
William Faulkner 
 
Ezzy (1998, p239) points out that disciplines like sociology (and, I would add, 
anthropology) generally locate self-identity in relationships, rather than in time. 
Hamilton (2013) asserts that the real value of Ricoeur’s philosophy for the study of 
identity is its focus on the fundamental temporality of identity. Ricoeur’s 
conceptualization of narrative identity is founded on his attempts to answer St 
Augustine’s question “What, then, is time?” (Ricoeur, 1984, pxi). Ricoeur proposed 
that eternal time only becomes “human time” when “it is organized after the manner 
of a narrative”, and that, correspondingly, a narrative may only be considered 
meaningful “to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience” 
(Ricoeur 1984, p3). Ricoeur’s narrative identity (and thus my conceptualization of 
“performance identity”) is a temporal identity – locating the self in a performance that 
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makes sense of and gives order to the simultaneously present past, present present and 
present future (memory, attention and expectation) described by St Augustine 
(Ricoeur, 1984).  
 
The dynamic nature of Ricoeur’s narrative identity forms, in turn, the basis of a 
temporal theory of action: action takes place in the present, but it is imagined and 
constructed with constant reference to both our experience of the past and our 
expectations of the future. The ongoing reworking of our narrative identities is 
necessitated by the constantly shifting relationship between the past, the present and 
the future: our experiences change and our expectations of the future change, and thus 
our chosen actions (and the pool of possibilities that they are selected from) change. 
In order to preserve a sense of continuity (Ricoeur’s “concordance”) we need to keep 
adjusting our understanding of the past and our imagination of the future to make the 
present intelligible (Ezzy, 1998). The important point here is that our past is not 
“given”; it is not a series of immutable chronological facts. Instead, what we consider 
as “the past” is a complex mix of what we actually remember (including what we 
don’t remember), how we remember it, what we imagine we remember, collective 
(social) memory, and the memories of others (our parents, our friends, the books we 
read, etc.) In this way, much of our past may be said to be as much the product of 
imagination as our anticipated future.  
 
Meaningful action may thus be described as taking place at the intersection of what 
Koselleck (2004) termed “the space of experience” and “the horizon of expectation” 
(p256). The space of experience conditions our “historical self-understanding” (Tribe, 
2004, pxix) – how we understand ourselves in relation to past events, and in terms of 
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those past events. Experience is the past made present., viewed through a range of 
different filters. Expectation is some imagined future made present. The word 
“horizon” (rather than the “space” of expectation of Ricoeur) is intended to convey 
the idea of a line “behind which a new space of experience will open, but which 
cannot yet be seen” (Koselleck, 2004, p260). We continually reconfigure both our 
experiences and our expectations, based on a range of new inputs, new events or new 
memories, either personal, or of others or of the collective.  
 
A central part of Koselleck’s theory of time is that neither expectation nor experience 
exist independently - “No expectation without experience; no experience without 
expectation” (Koselleck, 2004, p257). Meaningful action presupposes an (imagined) 
expectation of something in the future (i.e. this will happen if that happens – if I do 
that); but we cannot imagine ourselves participating in some future event if we have 
no reference point at all for it in our experience (keeping in mind the definition of 
“experience” above, which includes much more than just direct personal experience).  
At the same time, our expectations for the future condition how we understand (and 
reinterpret) our past – our experience (Pickering, 2004).  Koselleck (2004) cautions 
that experience and expectation “are not to be statically related to each other” (p262) 
in a simplistic manner. That is, a person’s experience conditions their expectations, 
rather than sets clear limits and forms to those expectations. However, the relationship 
between experience and expectation, and most particularly the way in which this 
relationship conditions present action, becomes most relevant in times of great social 
change or upheaval.  
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One of the key proposals made by Koselleck (2004) is that the relationship between 
past and future has been fundamentally altered by modernity; that is, we no longer 
expect that the past will be a reliable guide to the future. Instead, modernity could be 
said to be characterized by a growing gap between the past and the future, which gap 
is generally in benefit of the future – we expect the future to be considerably better 
than the past, and as a result we make greater demands on that future (ibid, p3). At the 
same time, experience is further and further “detached” from a rapidly expanding 
horizon of expectation and is no longer a reliable guide for the future (Pickering, 
2004,p286). That is, we do not only expect that the future will be better than the past, 
but also that it will be fundamentally different (Koselleck, 2004).  
 
The idea of a better future, together with the detachment of that future from a 
“primitive” or “backward” past, is also the dominant theme in mainstream 
development theory, which is based on an underlying idea of linear “progress” 
towards some better future depicted by development policies and practitioners. This 
conceptualization of development is closely intertwined with modernity (Kippler, 
2010) and articulates clear ideas about what is considered “developed” and what is 
considered “undeveloped” or “underdeveloped” through its discourse (Crush, 1995). 
These themes are echoed in the discourse of development in South Africa, which has 
an over-arching goal of creating “a better life” for black South Africans, which life is 
not only imagined as fundamentally better than, but also fundamentally different from 
life under apartheid. In fact, it is better because it is different. We could, therefore, 
say that development policy in South Africa is characterized by the desire to create a 
significant detachment between experience and expectation. The referred-to 
experience and expectation tend to be defined in overwhelmingly materialistic terms 
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in the mainstream development discourse – such as asset ownership (from land 
dispossession to land ownership); employment (from farm labourer to farmer); 
income (from poverty to prosperity); and standard of living (from shack dweller to 
home owner); and so on. What is missing in this materialistic conceptualization of 
past, present and future is how (or even if) this chasm between experience and 
expectation (which is essentially a temporal dissonance) impacts on an identity that is 
fundamentally temporal in nature: How do we reconfigure our identities in the face of 
such an enormous shift between who we were (which includes who we could have 
been) and who we now can be (which must be related in some way to who we were)? 
And how does that shifting relationship between present past, present present and 
present future influence our actions and choices in the present present? These 
questions refer in turn back to Gibson’s (2011) assertion that what is at stake for the 
poor in South Africa is not their material circumstances, but the kind of persons they 
want to be.  
 
The notion of meaningful action as mediated by past and future in the context of a 
fundamental divergence between experience and expectation in post-1994 South 
Africa is a central theme in this thesis: the community gardeners (and in particular the 
younger gardeners) find themselves at a complex temporal intersection: a past where 
possible identities (that is, the repertoire of “available” performances) was greatly 
circumscribed by the conditions of apartheid, and a “New” South African future 
where this repertoire is supposed to be greatly expanded by “freedom”, but where the 
ability to construct new performance plots for this expanded future is constrained by 
(actual and imagined) experiences of the past. In addition, the actual repertoire of 
available performances is bounded significantly by the reality of economics, politics 
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and power. Performance identity is our attempt to create temporal coherence in the 
“now” in terms of both experience and expectation. When the gap between these two 
appears as great as it does for the members of the community gardens, productive 
imagination and creative emplotment face a considerable challenge in mediating 
performance identity.  
 
Additionally, because my notion of performance identity is essentially temporal in 
nature – i.e. in constant search of temporal coherence – the struggle over the 
authorship of that identity is also temporal: performance identity requires temporal 
coherence, but whose version of past, present and future holds sway? As Biko put it 
(Biko, 1978, p29) – “the colonialists were not satisfied merely with holding a people 
in their grip and emptying the Native’s brain of all form and content, they turned to 
the past of the oppressed people and distorted, disfigured and destroyed it. ….. No 
wonder the African child learns to hate his heritage in his days at school (and) to find 
solace only in close identification with white society.” 
 
This thesis proposes that it is the desire to achieve temporal coherence in the face of 
this profound detachment between experience and expectation that is at the heart of 
motivating actions and choices that development practitioners are so quick to label as 
“irrational” or “ignorant” or “misinformed”. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE LIFE OF A COMMUNITY GARDEN 
 
“Here is the miracle. The experience as experienced, as lived, remains private, but its 
sense, its meaning, becomes public. Communication in this way is the overcoming of 
the radical non-communicability of the lived experience as lived.” 
(Ricoeur, 1976, p16) 
 
3.1 A demographic overview 
Gauteng Province is a place of enormous demographic range: Joburg Metro11 (the 
municipality that contains both Johannesburg and Sandton) is one of the largest and 
wealthiest in Africa. It is home to the national Stock Exchange, huge international 
banking and financial services corporations, lush suburbs and expensive shopping 
malls. It is also home to vast informal settlements characterised by high levels of 
poverty and household hunger. This pattern is replicated across the province, in the 
smaller metro areas of Tshwane and Ekurhuleni.  Urbanisation is progressing rapidly, 
particularly in the Joburg and Tshwane metros. However, there are also parts of the 
province that are far less developed and more rural in nature. It is in one of these areas 
that the community gardens that are the focus of this study are located.  The area is 
predominantly semi-rural in nature, with human settlements and economic 
development concentrated in one relatively prosperous large town (some 30 
kilometres from the gardens) and a number of smaller towns within 15 kilometres of 
the gardens. There are many informal settlements in the area, some located adjacent to 
the towns, while others are relatively isolated from the towns, usually standing on                                                         
11 The term “metro” is used to designate a Category A local municipality –  the largest urban areas in 
South Africa  
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either side of a secondary road. There is a lot of commercial farming activity in the 
area where I conducted my fieldwork. Around Motse there is a relatively high density 
of medium and large farmers growing a range of vegetables, destined mainly for 
wholesale fresh produce markets or formal retailers. Closer to the town of Steynsville 
(where the Tshimo garden is located) there is a shift towards dryland crops such as 
maize and cattle.  
 
Poverty and unemployment rates in the study area12 (as determined by the 2011 
National Census) are relatively high, although by no means the highest in South 
Africa: The (narrowly defined13) unemployment rate was at a little over 26% in 2011 
(StatsSA, 2012a). Around 72% of households in the study area in 2011 had an annual 
household income of R76,40014 or less (http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=964).  
 
Every day that I worked in the community gardens I traveled less than 50 kilometres 
from my home in suburban Johannesburg, but in many ways I may as well have been 
traveling ten times that distance, so great was the contrast between where I lived and 
the location of the gardens. Much of this difference was initially experienced as 
pleasant: I found it extremely enjoyable on many days to drive against the rush of 
commuters, away from the city out into the countryside. The summer in which I 
started my fieldwork had been characterized by good rain, and everywhere was lush 
and green. My father’s family had been farmers, and I had spent most of my holidays 
on their dairy farm. I enjoyed getting out of town so much on a sunny morning that I 
felt almost guilty. This was, after all, supposed to be work.  
                                                         
12 The District Municipality in which the gardens are located 
13 Excluding discouraged job seekers 
14 About $11,500 at the 2011 exchange rate 
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It did not, however, take much to dispel the idea of a rural idyll: Most of the 
locations15 (informal settlements) that I visited while working with the two 
cooperatives were grim places indeed, with very little in the way of basic 
infrastructure, such as electricity, running water or even toilets in some cases. The 
towns of Steynsville (small) and Rooidal (medium-sized) where I spent some time 
(Rooidal as the place where the Motse group had a formal retail client and Steynsville 
because I drove through it to reach the Tshimo garden) are largely grimy and 
occasionally dilapidated places, slowly falling apart under the twin pressures of 
government neglect and a fading local economy. There is little sign of any progress 
since 1994 in the lives of most of the people who live in and around these towns. A 
community garden project often represents a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to better a 
life.  
 
3.2. Food, diet and food security policy  
3.2.1. The official picture 
Household income data for the area in which the gardens are located seem to suggest 
that food insecurity rates would be high, although it is difficult accurately to estimate 
food insecurity levels, not least because of the lack of consistent definitions and data 
at a national level (Altman et al, 2009). There is also a difference between outright 
hunger (which appears to have declined in South Africa since 2002 – ibid) and under-
nutrition, which remains a serious issue, but is often difficult to identify and to 
quantify.  
 
                                                        
15 I have used the terms “location” to refer to an informal settlement from this point onward, since it is 
the term that the gardeners themselves used to refer to where they lived as well as the other informal 
settlements that we visited.  
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The most important factor determining whether or not a person is food insecure is 
how much money they have (Jacobs, 2009). That is, food insecurity in South Africa is 
not primarily a production issue (the country produces and/or imports enough food), 
but rather an access issue. Access is determined by the retail price of food relative to 
income; and the retail price of food in South Africa is determined to a very 
considerable degree by the significant market power enjoyed by both processors and 
retailers (Van der heijden and Vink, 2012). This market power can be seen in the 
simultaneous coexistence of high profitability of food retailers and processors  and 
high levels of food insecurity, together with a steadily increasing gap between the 
farm gate price of food and the retail price of food (NAMC 2014, 2103 and 2012).  
 
Therefore, household income can provide an idea of how much (nutritional) food 
households can actually afford to purchase. Even the poorest households do not direct 
all their income to food expenditure, given the high cash demands of living in a 
modern economy. Estimates are that the poorest households in South Africa spend 
between 37% (Aliber, 2009) and 57% (Martins, 2005) of their income on food, while 
StatsSA estimates an average South African household expenditure on food and non-
alcoholic beverages of around just under 13% (StatsSA, 2012a).  
 
Recent research by the Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (BFAP, 2012) 
suggested that a fairly modest, but still nutritionally balanced and calories-sufficient 
basket of food (based on October 2012 prices) would cost R7,074 per month for a 
family of 2 adults and 2 children – almost R85,000 per annum. A less nutritionally 
balanced basket, and containing only about 60% of daily calorie requirements, would 
cost R2,308 per month for the same family size, which is around R27,700 per annum.  
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The table below indicates a range of estimated possible annual household expenditure 
on food in the area where the two gardens are located, for 2012. In order to be able to 
compare with the BFAP data, I adjusted the 201116 figure of household income 
(R76,400) by the 5.75% rate of consumer inflation recorded for 2012 (SARB, 2014), 
to get the rough estimate that 72% of households in the study area had a household 
income of R80,793 or less in 2012. I then applied each of the three estimates of the 
percentage of household expenditure allocated to food set out above, and using 
household income (i.e. R80,793) as a proxy for expenditure (which is most likely an 
over-estimation). 
 
Table 1: Possible shares of annual household expenditure allocated to food (2012 
estimate) – percentage of household income (poorest 72% of households) 
% of household expenditure 
allocated to food 
13% 37% 57% 
Annual food expenditure R10,503 R29,893 R46,052 
Source: Census 2011, SARB (2014) and own calculations.  
 
The average household size in the study area was 3 persons in 2011 (StatsSA, 2012b). 
If we adjust the BFAP (2012) food cost figures above for a 3-person household, we 
can derive estimates of “required” annual household food expenditure of R63,700 for 
the nutritional and calorie-sufficient basket, and R20,772 for the less adequate basket. 
This is, of course, a rough estimate, since the mix of adults and children will vary by 
household, and thus impact on the child-adult food basket mix and cost. However,                                                         
16 Census data is only collected every five years, and other official statistical publications of household 
income do not disaggregate to the municipal level.  
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what we can see from these estimates is that there is a high possibility that a 
significant number of households in the study area are not spending enough money on 
food to consume a nutritionally and calorie adequate basket of food (even when we 
have used a proxy for household consumption expenditure that probably over-
estimates actual spending). These conclusions support research by Jacobs (2009) that 
suggested that only 20% of South African households spend enough on food to 
purchase a basic, but nutritionally balanced basket. (It is also sobering to note that the 
annual income of the Motse gardeners from their garden – and they were doing much 
better financially than their colleagues in the Tshimo project - was no more than about 
R10,000.) It is thus plausible that there are high levels of food insecurity and/or 
under-nutrition in the area, and, therefore, a good argument could be made for 
government interventions in this respect.  
 
Food security initiatives in Gauteng Province currently fall under their Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (GDARD). One of the outputs of the 
Department’s 2010 – 2014 strategic plan is “improved access to affordable and 
diverse food” (GDARD, 2009, p2). Reflecting the contents of national food security 
plans (such as DAFF’s Zero Hunger Programme), the Department’s strategic plan 
indicates a very limited comprehension of the drivers of food insecurity: an 
assumption is made that increased agricultural production will reduce food insecurity, 
an assumption that fails to recognize the market realities (such as the widening farm – 
gate retail price gap) that make food unaffordable.  
 
GDARD’s policy is based on a limited assessment of why people are food insecure 
(they cannot afford to buy food because they are poor) which almost completely 
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excludes the reasons why food prices are so high in the first place (which would focus 
policy on reducing food costs, and increasing access by increasing affordability). 
Thus the main target of food security policy in the province is increased production of 
food by the food insecure themselves. In terms of how the Department plans to 
achieve it’s goal of “improved access to affordable and diverse food”, the key strategy 
is “(t)o provide support to ensure that household producing part of their own food 
(sic)” (GDARD, 2009, p27). This strategy reflects the first of the four pillars that 
make up DAFF’s Zero Hunger Programme – “improving food production capacity of 
households and poor resource (sic) farmers” (DAFF, 2012, p10). 
 
This approach effectively shifts the responsibility for better food access onto the poor, 
rather than the market structures that have made food unaffordable. The 
overwhelming focus by GDARD (once again reflecting national policy and the 
strategies of other provinces) in this regard is vegetable growing. That is, there are 
almost no initiatives that consider the own production of other kinds of food, such as 
meat (like chickens) or eggs or dairy products (although these are supported as purely 
“commercial” ventures). All of the GDARD officials that I discussed food security 
with were quite clear on the idea that production of vegetables was the key to better 
food security, holding fresh vegetables up as some kind of magic solution to dietary 
constraints and nutritional shortcomings, effectively ignoring the impact of shortages 
of other food groups, such as protein, on overall nutrition and wellbeing.  
 
3.2.2. Daily diet  
Although I certainly cannot argue against the merits of fresh vegetables in a diet, the 
vegetable-as-cure-all for food insecurity did not reflect the reality of the diets of the 
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people I spent time with. The main staple of their diets is carbohydrates – maize 
(“mielie”) meal, bread and sugar. Vetkoek (deep fried balls of dough similar to 
doughnuts) – either home made or purchased from informal traders – are also a 
popular foodstuff, often eaten for breakfast. Meat is a favoured food item, but its cost 
means that it cannot be consumed each day, and most people eat cheap cuts of 
chicken or beef offal when they do eat meat. Live chickens are very popular when 
they can be afforded. They are seen as superior in quality to the pre-packed or frozen 
(IQF) chicken available in formal retail outlets, and per kilogram offer relatively good 
value since the entire chicken can be consumed. There is a strong preference for white 
chickens – often the culls or the regular take-off of the local intensive egg business – 
which are judged to have “softer meat” than the hardscrabble chickens seen around 
the informal settlements. I did not conduct a taste comparison, but the conclusion 
seems reasonable: a 10-week old well-fed caged cull would almost certainly have 
softer meat than a 16-week old highly active less well-fed “location chicken”. More 
expensive food items such as live chickens tend to be on sale at the end of the month, 
as well as on “social grant17 day”, when large numbers of informal traders collect at 
grant payment points.  
 
Food is sourced from a combination of formal retail outlets (which have a heavy 
presence in every town), and local small supermarkets and spaza18 shops. Lillian at 
Motse described to me how each month she would do a bulk shop at a large 
supermarket in Rooidal, which has month-end packages of maize meal, cooking oil,                                                         
17 Social grants such as pensions, disability payments and child-care grants are paid once a month, but 
on different dates in different places. Most small towns have one payment point, with larger towns 
having more than one. There are additional payment points in rural and semi-rural areas. This affords a 
range of opportunities for traders within a particular month to access potential consumers. 
18 Spaza shops are generally small (sometimes no more than a few square metres) located in the 
locations, usually adjacent to the shop owner’s house. They sell basic foodstuffs, often in very small 
sizes or quantities, and sweets and snacks.  
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flour, sugar and tea at special prices. Additional daily food requirements are usually 
purchased from smaller shops and traders within or adjacent to the community, even 
though the goods tend to be higher priced, because this saves the high cost of 
traveling by taxi to town. Across the main road from Motse is “The China Shop19”, a 
fairly large, old and very dirty, dark shop owned (or at least managed) by two 
apparently recent immigrants from China, who speak little English and make no 
attempt to hide their disdain for their mostly poor, black customers. The China Shop 
sells a wide range of items, from basic household goods to vegetables, cold drinks and 
sweets. Tomatoes cost around R10 for five, much the same as onions. Milk is 
purchased in long-life tetrapaks (no electricity means no fridges) for around R18 per 
litre. There are a number of shops within Motse itself, although I only visited one – a 
small spaza shop in the corner of the yard of one of the houses a few hundred metres 
from the garden. This shop sells mostly small impulse/luxury goods – such as sweets 
and chips - and small packages of basic items such as maize meal, sugar, candles, 
tinned goods, etc. Many of the inhabtants of Motse did not have the relative luxury of 
month-end bulk shopping like Lillian, and could only afford the smaller packs of 
staple items, despite the effective higher price. Tomatoes and onions generally cost 
R1 each at the spaza. In Steynsville there is a large Spar and Shoprite20, with the latter 
being favoured for bulk month-end purchases. In Steynsville the impact of distance 
and the cost of travel is clear: prices at spaza shops for items such as onions and 
tomatoes may be up to 50 per cent higher at the end of the location furthest from town 
and the main road. Elderly people cannot walk far, and taxi costs are high in relation 
to R1 on the price of a tomato. Since almost no one has electricity, storage of fresh 
produce is virtually impossible.                                                          
19 The name it is known by in the Motse location 
20 Shoprite is the largest food retailer in South Africa, and Spar is the third-largest 
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Apart from convenience, the main advantage of the spaza shops is that they may 
extend credit until month end if they know that you have an income of sorts.  
Pensioners tend to be the favoured recipients of credit. I also saw a number of bicycle 
traders, who fill up a basket with basics like tomatoes, onions and small foodstuffs 
and travel around the settlement of Motse selling door to door. I did not see them in 
any of the other settlements I visited, but that may just have been because I did not 
spend enough time there. They too fill the gap created by the cost of transport and the 
inability to store fresh produce.  
 
Vegetables are not the main ingredient in meals for most people: onions, tomatoes 
and spinach are generally cooked up together to form a flavouring sauce or small side 
dish to accompany maize meal or bread with the occasional meat. Items such as 
pumpkin and sweet potatoes were described to me as “food for grannies” by several 
members of the Motse Cooperative21 (“Co-op”) and not viewed with any enthusiasm. 
Sugar is consumed in considerable quantities, in very sweet tea (often made without 
milk because of its high cost) and cheap cold drinks. The Motse Co-op members all 
had a strong preference for sweets and cakes when they were available. They were 
strongly aware of the high-energy properties of sugar – Kabelo repeatedly told me 
(and whoever was listening) that “sugar gives you go” and accredited his energetic 
behaviour to his high consumption of sugar. Banerjee and Duflo (2006) noted that as 
soon as extremely poor people had a bit more money to spend on food they spent it on 
better tasting food, rather than more or nutritionally better food. Sweet, sugary foods 
                                                        21 The group farming the Motse community garden 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are a “treat”, a small affordable luxury in a life that is a daily battle to make tiny 
means match very modest ends. 
 
There is also, I would assert, a more practical reason for these dietary choices. This 
carbohydrate-heavy diet may look unhealthy and sorely in need of amendment, but 
under the circumstances of daily life in the informal settlements of Gauteng it is in 
fact a very rational choice from a limited list of options. Life in these communities, 
even for the majority who have no steady employment, is labour intensive. None of 
the houses in Motse have electricity, and nor do they have a source of running water 
in their house or yard. Most people do not have a car. Even the relatively simple task 
of washing clothes requires hard physical work: a wheelbarrow must be pushed 
among the badly rutted streets to reach one of the working taps, and then around 100 
kilograms of water must be pushed back home, where the clothes are washed by hand. 
Nearby retail outlets are reached on foot, as are social security payment points, bus 
stops and minibus taxi stops (the minibus taxis do not venture far into the locations 
because of the roads). Children walk long distances to school, and many of those 
people who do work on the surrounding farms normally walk most or all of the 
distance there. In addition, most of the work that is available to the people who live in 
these locations is of the hard labour variety – unskilled agricultural work, the various 
government employment projects, such as the Community Works Programme (CWP) 
and various projects around maintaining public spaces and fixing roads. All of this 
physical work requires calories; and in a context where the average household has 
nowhere near enough money to purchase a nutritious basket of calorie-sufficient food, 
cheap carbohydrates (the classic example is a loaf of bread and 2 litres of sweet fizzy 
cold drink for a labourer’s lunch) are the only real option. A plate of vegetables for 
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your main meal might tick all the nutrient boxes, but you would be fainting and dizzy 
from lack of calories before you had gotten halfway through your day. Working in a 
community garden is, as I was to discover, hard, sometimes very hard work. The 
calories required to work in a community garden are usually nowhere near the 
calories that can be provided by eating your own produce.  
 
This basic calories in/calories out requirement in a world of expensive food seems to 
have entirely escaped policymakers, from GDRAD to DAFF, via the various entities 
responsible for health and social services, who cling steadfastly to the idea that the 
observed poor diets of bread and sugar are the result of nutritional ignorance, and 
require the application of a large amount of nutritional “education”, as if the only 
reason why people choose this diet is because they are too dim to know any better. 
Although a more varied and nutritionally balanced diet would obviously have 
benefits, there seems to be little appreciation within mainstream development policy 
(or in fact the many NGOs who busy themselves with nutritional education and food 
gardens) for the reality that underpins diet and dietary choices in communities like 
Motse.  
 
3.2.3. Food security initiatives in Gauteng 
It is the Directorate of Food Security (DFS) within GDARD that is responsible for 
implementing the Province’s policy with respect to food security. DFS has three main 
programmes – homestead/backyard gardens, community farming projects (mostly 
community gardens, rather than “farms”) and school gardens (where the main aim is 
to supplement the range and quantity of the meals under the national school feeding 
scheme). In that part of Gauteng where I undertook my fieldwork there are four DFS 
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teams. Each team contains a team leader and 3 officials (i.e. a total of 12 officials who 
are responsible for meeting targets around the establishment of gardens.) There are 
very detailed annual targets for the establishment of both homestead and school 
gardens.  
 
These targets seem to have been set in a fairy mechanical way (rather than in response 
to any clearly defined demand or need), and they appeared to me to be quite 
ambitious. It was explained to me by the local (i.e. in the study area) DFS office that 
their share of Gauteng’s 11,000 target for homestead gardens (for the 2013 year) was 
3,688. This worked out at around 300 new gardens per official for that particular year, 
which I considered a hefty target to meet. Officials attempt to meet these targets by 
convening information days and actively promoting homestead gardens in the 
communities within their areas. The “establishment” of a homestead garden means 
the handing over of a “starter pack” containing basic garden equipment (a spade, a 
fork, a watering can and similar items), compost and packets of seeds; and imparting 
some basic information about cultivation.  
 
Although the official that I interviewed told me that there is some kind of process to 
determine whether the recipients of these inputs are “suitable” candidates he also 
acknowledged that the homestead gardens are “not sustainable”. Despite the 
likelihood of relatively high food insecurity rates in the study area, it appears that as 
many as two thirds of recipients of the homestead garden starter packs do not produce 
food in the next year, and many sell off the tools that they received from GDARD. 
The official had little in the way of explanations for this: presumably lack of skills is 
no longer an issue since the participants had already produced for one season. He 
  85 
offered a lack of money to buy seeds as a possible reason, but when pressed conceded 
that the cost of the subsidized seeds was probably no more than about R25 per 
homestead garden per year. Finally he just shrugged and left it at “they are not really 
committed”. Since officials are incentivised on the establishment of gardens, not their 
continued existence, there seems little motivation to dig deeper than that. As far as I 
could establish, the DFS has not conducted any surveys of the impact of these 
homestead gardens on household food security.  
 
In terms of school gardens, each region’s (2013) target was 46, which worked out at 
about 4 per official. The school gardens are set up in the grounds of the school in 
question, and are worked with the support of groups like the CWP, although the 
school is expected to take the lead with respect to managing the garden. The DFS 
provides starter packs and training similar to that given to homestead gardens. The 
schools all have a water supply, which is used for the garden. The results of these 
projects are also mixed, with higher failure rates than might be expected. The official 
I interviewed stated his opinion that when gardens were established in response to 
requests from the schools themselves they tended to have a much higher success rates 
than in cases where officials had been the drivers (presumably to meet their targets). 
In these latter cases the schools often took the (not entirely unreasonable) view that 
“the garden belongs to the Department” and refused to make the necessary time and 
effort commitments.  
 
In contrast to the detailed targets for homestead and school gardens, there is a more 
flexible approach towards the establishment of community gardens, mostly because 
the establishment of these is (supposedly) initiated by groups who approach the DFS 
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for assistance with starting a garden, whereas homestead and school gardens are 
driven to a greater degree by the Directorate themselves. That is the theory anyway. 
The reality is that officials do have an incentive (in the form of their performance 
bonus) to show that community projects have been established in their areas. 
According to the members of the Tshimo Co-op, they were encouraged by provincial 
officials to form a cooperative with certain of their classmates at a GDARD-
sponsored plant propagation course at a local community college and to “request” 
GDARD to assist them with the establishment of the garden. All three of the Tshimo 
Co-op members who told me this story looked back with a certain amount of 
bitterness at the marketing story of the DFS official, who assured them that 
agricultural cooperatives were not only an excellent way to secure government money 
in the form of grants, but that the agricultural sector was a lucrative one. “After all”, 
he told them “people always have to eat so you will always have customers and make 
good money”. The reality turned out to be quite different.   
 
At the time of my interviews with DFS officials (January/February 2013) there were 
“around” 8 community garden projects in the study area. In this context a 
“community garden” generally means a garden that is operated by and for the benefit 
of a local (officially registered) cooperative whose members appear to fulfill some 
kind of poverty and unemployment criteria (these gardens are intended for “the 
poorest of the poor” – Ruysenaar, 2012, p1). Most of South Africa’s official poverty-
alleviation “development” programmes can only be accessed by registered 
cooperatives, and not by individuals. There was one garden that got support from DFS 
which I visited that was an allotment arrangement (i.e. portions allocated to 
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individuals), but this was a long-existing garden, and I have little doubt that such a 
structure would now be acceptable now under DFS’s community garden programme.  
 
As discussed above, the DFS may sometimes be quite involved in the establishment 
of the cooperative. In other circumstances (such as in the case of the Motse garden) 
they will insist on a change and/or expansion of an existing cooperative’s membership 
to meet mandated targets around the percentage of women or youth members. The 
result of this may well be that a significant number of beneficiary cooperatives are 
“engineered” groups, rather than groups who have come together on their own 
initiative. My experience in the two gardens was that there were many tensions within 
the cooperatives – some relatively minor, some fatal – that could be traced back to 
forced membership requirements imposed by the DFS.  
 
The DFS team leader I interviewed was fairly candid about the relatively high drop 
out rate of cooperative members and the subsequent deterioration of the gardens (as 
documented by Ruysenaar (2012) in the Germiston area of eastern Gauteng). Many 
projects do not make it past the first 18 months with either their membership or their 
gardens intact. When questioned he ascribed this to “conflicts between community 
(i.e. cooperative) members”, which conflicts seemed to be mostly around the 
relatively small amounts of cash earned by the cooperatives. He reported high levels 
of distrust among members around money, which seemed justified by the number of 
occasions on which members had in fact made off with or stolen cash from the 
projects. Another common area of conflict was whether or not the garden produce 
should be allocated to cooperative members (i.e. food in lieu of an income) or sold to 
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generate cash. Most cooperatives did not have the internal cohesion (or external 
support) to manage these issues.  
 
There is much more involvement and investment from GDARD in respect of 
community gardens than either homestead or school gardens. Firstly, the DFS is 
usually heavily involved in finding a site for the garden. This is far from 
straightforward: the site needs to be in a position where it can be secured (theft – of 
produce, tools and other equipment – is a constant reality); it needs to be reasonably 
close by and accessible for the cooperative members (so a portion of some outlying 
farm is not an option); it needs to pass some kind of (admittedly very basic) suitability 
assessment in terms of soil and water; and it needs to be able to be reasonably easily 
connected to Eskom22 (or occasionally a municipal power supplier). As a result, many 
community gardens tend to be located in the grounds of schools that have the space, 
or on municipal or other government-owned land. (One of the gardens that I visited 
on my initial trip was located on land owned by Eskom, under heavy voltage 
powerlines.)  
 
The question of who has or who “should” have access to these pockets of land is a 
matter of some considerable contestation, particularly once some improvements (such 
as fencing and an electricity connection) have been made. Various political groups 
within the local community may all stake a claim to the site or a portion thereof, 
making the tenure of some of the community gardeners precarious. The Tshimo Co- 
                                                        
22 The state-owned power utility 
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op in particular faced regular threats from the local ward councilor23 that she would 
have them removed to install another cooperative chaired by her husband. Although it 
was difficult for me to determine how serious her threat was it certainly did not do 
much for Tshimo Co-op morale, and the DFS officials seemed to me to be very 
reluctant to get involved in the power struggles of local politics. (In contrast, the 
Motse project had enjoyed some initial support from a previous local councilor who 
remained popular and influential in the area, and did not face the same pressure in the 
early years of their garden. Their plans to extend the project, however, into 
neighbouring municipal land do not seem likely to go as smoothly, in part because of 
the success of their enterprise and related local opinions that it is now someone’s 
else’s turn to benefit.) 
 
For community gardens DFS also makes more infrastructure and support available 
than for either homestead or school gardens, although most of this support tends to 
take place in the establishment and early phase of the gardens. The DFS generally 
provides the following: 
 
o Fencing (at least 1.5m high chicken wire on metal poles) and a lockable gate;  
o An electricity connection (mostly directly to Eskom). The projects need 
electricity to run the borehole and the pressure pumps that support the 
irrigation. DFS pays for the initial installation, but thereafter the cooperative is 
responsible for paying the bills. Basic security lighting is usually supplied as 
well, attached to the office/store.                                                          
23 An elected member of the Council running the local municipality. Requests for assistance from the 
municipality (such as use of a tractor, or additional inputs for the garden) would usually need to be 
chanelled through this local councilor, giving that person considerable discretion and power over who 
gets access to resources.  
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o A borehole and associated irrigation equipment. DFS will sink a borehole, 
supply a borehole pump, one (or more often) two 10,000 litre tanks, a pressure 
pump and heavy-duty hoses and sprayers.  
o One (or in the case of the Motse Cooperative – two) metal shipping containers 
that have been converted - by the addition of a steel door and a barred window 
– into an office/storeroom/store/packing space. The containers are unbearably 
hot in the summer and consequently a poor place to store produce for any 
length of time, but they are relatively easy to secure, no small thing in an 
environment where almost anything will be stolen if left unattended for long 
enough.  
o Basic farming equipment – overalls, gumboots, wheelbarrows, watering cans, 
spades, forks, and the like, together with initial inputs such as compost and 
seeds (for a relatively small range of products – spinach, cabbage, tomatoes, 
onions and green beans are the most common). 
o Some training, which focuses on the basics of production and record keeping, 
but is usually silent on the details of business management and accounting, 
and marketing.  
o Ongoing “monitoring” and “support”, which I saw to mean in practice 
irregular visits from extension officers and a range of responses to requests for 
assistance. Once the gardens were “established” and the initial flurry of 
activity over, most of the officials moved on to concentrating on achieving 
their remaining garden establishment targets, and were seldom seen in the 
gardens. As a rule the cooperative members were apprehensive about asking 
for things from the extension officers, even when those things were essential 
to the survival of the project, such as a broken borehole pump. I have 
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discussed in more detail further on in this thesis the intricate power relations 
between beneficiaries and government officials.  
 
The land allocated to a cooperative is seldom in a state ready for the production of 
vegetables. In the case of the Tshimo Co-op the land (in the corner of the school 
grounds) was virgin veld, and in the case of Motse it was the rubbish dump for the 
adjacent informal settlement. If they are lucky the cooperative will be allocated a 
municipal tractor to assist in clearing the land, but more often it must be done 
manually by the members; a long, hard and difficult job.  
 
3.3. A brief history of the gardens 
 
3.3.1. Motse  
I ended up spending most of my time in two gardens – Motse and Tshimo, and the 
majority of that in the former. Motse was by far the most successful of the DFS-
supported community gardens in my study area, and had a relatively long history, 
during which the core membership of the cooperative had held together remarkably 
well. All of the members of the Motse Co-op live in the adjacent (across a narrow dirt 
road) informal settlement of Motse, which was established around 1998. The initial 
group that created the settlement came from nearby farms, which were laying off 
workers in response to consolidation and mechanization (a story repeated all around 
South Africa). Newer arrivals are from all over South and Southern Africa. According 
to the Motse Co-op members there are around 5,000 people living in the location. 
There is no electricity, no running water (taps) in individual properties (there are 
community taps), and the sum total of government services on each stand is an 
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outside concrete toilet (newer houses have plastic toilets). There is no refuse 
collection, and the roads are narrow and badly rutted. In the older part of Motse 
(alongside which the garden project is located) residents have planted trees and made 
basic (ornamental) gardens, which has softened the outline of the place a little, but not 
by much. Motse is relatively well located: it is in a space bounded on one side by a 
main road to Rooidal, and on a side 90 degrees to that by a main road to Pretoria. 
Minibus taxis are relatively easily accessible and there is a large primary school some 
5 kilometres away. Most of the residents that I spoke to seemed resigned to the fact 
that they would never receive basic services such as brick houses or electricity from 
government, and that they had to make their own way. The members of the 
cooperative shunned politics, saying that voting for someone had never made any 
difference in their lives, and to the best of my knowledge not one member voted in the 
2014 national elections.  
 
The initial core of the Motse cooperative was four young (under 30) men – Samuel, 
his close friend Lesego, Lesego’s cousin Kabelo (who joined the cooperative in 2010 
– before that date he was in school) and a fourth young man whose name was never 
told to me, who had died in 2010. All four of them faced problems similar to tens if 
not hundreds of thousands of young black men in South Africa: although all with a 
good basic education (Samuel, Lesego and Kabelo all speak very good English, 
Samuel is a keen reader of novels, Kabelo earns extra income for the Co-op writing 
CVs on the group’s computer, and Lesego is very good at maths) none of them had 
completed matric24 or continued to higher education because of the pressure to 
contribute to the income of their households. Both Lesego and Kabelo had grown up 
                                                        
24 The last year of secondary school 
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on a large ornamental tree farm were their parents worked, and which had reportedly 
closed down in about 2006. After that the families had moved to Motse. Samuel’s 
father works as a labourer at a nearby Rainbow chicken farm, and both Samuel and 
Kabelo had previously worked as temporary labour on the same farm.  
 
The cooperative was originally established in the realization by the members that 
there were few prospects for gaining full-time employment and that they would have 
to make their own opportunities. The site where the Motse Co-op is currently located 
was formerly the rubbish and general dumping ground for Motse. The initial 
cooperative was formed to undertake recycling, with a previous councilor assisting 
with access to the dumpsite. However, discussions with local and provincial officials 
with respect to supporting the cooperative resulted in a change of direction – towards 
food gardening. The Co-op members were told that food production would be a better 
choice than recycling. This was probably good advice since recycling on a scale that 
would have been possible on the dumpsite would most likely have resulted in very 
little income, and once the site was depleted it was very unlikely that the regular 
discarded rubbish of Motse would have been sufficient to keep the cooperative going.  
 
The cooperative was promised some basic support in the form of the normal starter 
pack: seeds, implements, basic training, a fence and a borehole, but there were a 
number of conditions attached to this. Firstly, there was no suitable site available for 
the cooperative to produce food, and DFS did not have the money to make one 
available through purchase or lease, and so they remained at the dump (which was 
shortly to be abandoned as the council had decided that rubbish could no longer be 
left so close to the location, and a new dumpsite was established further away). This 
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they would have to clear themselves. Secondly, they were required to make their 
cooperative more gender balanced before they could access even that small amount of 
government support. As a result, four women were invited into the cooperative: 
Grace, who is Lesego’s mother and worked in the ornamental tree nursery for many 
years; Mpho, Samuel’s sister; Bontle, family friend and former girlfriend of Samuel; 
and Lillian, neighbour of Bontle and someone who had worked for a time in the 
wholesale nursery business. Shortly after this expansion of the cooperative the 
unnamed friend died, and his mother Rebecca was invited to take his place. Rebecca 
is elderly and not able to do much hard physical labour, but the cooperative members 
always make allowances for her and never mention her relatively small physical 
commitment to the project, even though they are constantly short of labour and a 
younger, fitter person would add much more value. It is clear that, as the mother of 
their friend, she is accorded a special place and entitled to exactly the same benefits as 
the other members.  
 
The Motse Co-op then embarked on clearing the dumpsite, which by all accounts was 
a pretty unpleasant job. They also report getting laughed at by many of their 
neighbours, who would walk by and ask “what are you doing in the rubbish?” They 
seem not to have been deterred, and in hindsight believe that this was a necessary 
process to somehow “prove” that they were “worthy” of support from DFS. By the 
summer of 2010 (i.e. the last quarter of the year) they had a vegetable garden of 
approximately 200m2 up and running. The main crop was spinach, supplemented by 
tomatoes, onions and cabbages. The garden provided some food for the members, 
plus people from Motse would purchase food directly from the garden, which is in a 
very good position from that point of view. It should not be assumed, however, that 
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this selling earned significant amounts. According to the Co-op members they seldom 
earned more than about R150 each in a month in this phase of the garden (and their 
primary goal was to earn money, rather than to produce food for themselves). A large 
bunch of spinach sells for R525, and one would have to sell 240 bunches in a month to 
earn even that meagre amount for 8 cooperative members. In my assessment, one of 
the reasons the Motse Co-op was able to hold together during a time of hard and 
unpleasant labour, accompanied by community derision, followed by very little return 
for their hard labour was because of their close family and friendship ties which 
predated the formation of the cooperative. I would suggest that these relationships 
provided the “space” for the mutual support and encouragement that was so evidently 
missing in the Tshimo Co-op. When I asked about the fact that the Coop had seemed 
to hold together so much better than so many others, Lillian said to me that it was 
because “we all know each other and we know how to solve conflicts”.  
 
It was clear to me that the Motse Co-op members had a clear sense both of belonging 
to something important and of common purpose. This was underpinned by a series of 
narratives, which had in common – i.e. as a unifying plot line - the portrayal of the 
cooperative members as having both a clear goal and the agency to determine their 
own futures. Samuel, the chairperson, seemed to have both a keen awareness of the 
temptation to leave the Co-op and a strong sense of the need for constant motivation 
of the group. He told me that he is an enthusiastic reader, and tries to memorise what 
he considers to be inspirational lines. He is a constant source of quotes like “how will 
you get something if you sit in a corner?” and “the future of this life is in our hands”. 
A variation on these heroic narratives was what I have termed “deserving” narratives: 
                                                        
25 About 55 US cents at that time 
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There was a strong sense within the group that nothing worthwhile or permanent 
could be achieved without hard work and a degree of “suffering”. In a conversation 
while washing and packing spinach, Bontle talked about how Jesus suffered and how 
their (the Co-op’s) struggles seemed “right” in that context. There was general 
agreement with her sentiments. The Co-op members often talked derisively of people 
who want to make “easy” money, using the term “easy come, easy go” to signal their 
belief that money that was not worked for was not appreciated and therefore seldom 
held on to. They felt that their deprivations had entitled them to the little that they 
had, and that they would not be tempted into wasting it. In these “deserving” 
narratives the Motse members had earned the right to material rewards through their 
own hard work.  
 
These heroic and deserving narratives were balanced by narratives of failure and 
disgrace when someone hinted that they might want to leave the project: Samuel told 
me that in those cases wavering members would be warned by the other members of 
the likely negative result of their decision: “If you leave the project you will be a 
failure, you might become a thief, you will become unemployed and then you will 
have to ask us for a job and we will turn you away”. Leaving the garden was thus 
strongly associated with excommunication from the group, and the consequent loss of 
control over your own destiny.  
 
After the production of their first crops on the rehabilitated dump the Motse Co-op 
managed to get some additional money from the local municipality that went into a 
better fence and more inputs. From then onwards the Motse story is one of 
comparative success. In 2011 the cooperative won first prize in a provincial food 
  97 
garden competition. Not only did this get them R35,000 in prize money, it also got 
them attention from the right sort of people – in this case the National Development 
Agency (NDA). In 2012 they received a multi-year R1.5 million grant from the NDA 
to fund an expansion from food garden to small farming enterprise. The money was 
allocated (over a 3-year period, subject to meeting targets in each year) to the 
purchase of growing tunnels, an expanded irrigation system, more and better 
equipment, intensive training in hydroponics and (in the third year) the purchase of a 
vehicle. The grant also included a monthly stipend of R800 per member per month for 
the first 6 months of funding, but the “stipend” was continued after that period out of 
retained income (from the 2011 competition win and another in 2013) and profits 
from the sale of produce (although it must be said that most of their profits were kept 
for future investment).  
 
When I arrived at the cooperative in early 2013 it was a busy and happy place – the 
first three tunnels had been erected some months before, and they had had a good first 
tomato crop from these, much of which they had been able to sell to a local Spar retail 
outlet at a reasonable price. The Motse Co-op members felt justified – their had work 
and sacrifice had paid off just as they had hoped and believed, and told themselves 
and each other it would. Working alongside Bontle one beautiful sunny day a few 
months after I had started working at Motse she said to me “We are so lucky, Tracy, 
can you believe that we are so lucky?” On that day, Bontle was the blessed heroine of 
her own narrative.  
 
That would all change.  
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3.3.2. Tshimo 
The project at Tshimo is a different story, both in terms of its history and its likely 
prospects during my time there. In many ways it is an excellent example of the 
negative impact of poorly conceived development policies on the lives of the poor in 
contemporary South Africa. The garden is located in the grounds of a primary school 
just at the edge of the rundown, decrepit small town of Steynsville, whose main road 
sees a constant stream of heavy trucks. The town and its surrounding informal 
settlements are so far removed from the nearby luxury hotels and spas they may as 
well be in a different country. The school is located on a large piece of land: the 
garden occupies a space that looked to me to be about 7,000 m2 and there is an 
additional piece of open ground within the school perimeter about one and a half 
times that size. The school’s boundary fence is bordered on two right-angled sides by 
an informal settlement, and it is in this corner that the garden is located.  
 
Who exactly has the “right” to garden on this piece of land is a constant issue of 
contention. The land “belongs” to the school, and the school caretaker (Beki) takes a 
very proprietary stance towards the garden: on my first unaccompanied visit he is 
extremely annoyed to find that I have been given permission to visit the garden 
without his approval. I make an effort to be nice, and we get along fine after that, but 
he never changes his stance that he is the one who should approve the use of the land. 
He expresses on several occasions his displeasure that the Tshimo Co-op has been 
“given” the land (although they have no legal title to it) and in fact allocates a portion 
of the garden to the local CWP work group early in 2013 for their own use, 
completely ignoring the objections of the Tshimo Co-op members. The headmaster of 
the school is a very pleasant and competent woman, but she has plenty of other 
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concerns and seems to have handed over responsibility for the garden to Beki. The 
provincial extension officers by and large don’t seem interested in getting involved in 
these disputes between Beki and the gardeners.  
 
The garden is bordered on two sides by the informal settlement (where all of the 
cooperative members I meet live) and on the other two by the school. The parts of the 
settlement that are adjacent to the garden are relatively new (reportedly not more than 
three years) and it is dusty and hot in the first few months that I am at the garden. 
There is plenty of rubbish lying around, scratched over by groups of skinny chickens 
and skinnier dogs. (These dogs, no matter how thin, never try and catch a chicken. 
Those who show any inclination to do so are quickly disciplined, and if they continue, 
just as quickly dispatched.) I meet three members of the cooperative on my first visit, 
and never any of the others: Jacob is a young man in his early twenties, fluent in 
English and very chatty and likeable during my first few visits. Sarah is a Tswana 
woman in her late forties who has had limited formal education, but speaks a little 
English and a bit more Afrikaans. She comes across at first as forbidding, unfriendly 
even as she watches me with folded arms and narrowed eyes, but I soon realize that 
her surface attitude covers an intelligent and compassionate woman who has learnt 
the hard way that life is mostly a series of disappointments and that starting off by 
expecting the worst is the best way of dealing with that. She has a sharp sarcastic 
tongue for all government officials, and her ward councilor in particular.  
 
The third member is a small older woman (in her early fifties) called Elizabeth. She 
says that she came to this area from the Northern Cape (somewhere near Kuruman) 
some time in the 1980s to look for work, and she resembles the small (she is no more 
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than 1.50m in height) and wiry San people. She has very little formal education (she 
is, I learn later, attending night classes at the school with the aim of getting a Grade 4 
certificate) and has spent all her life in extreme poverty, moving from temporary job 
to part-time job in between long periods of unemployment. She is, nonetheless, a very 
friendly and energetic woman, seemingly determined to believe that things can 
change for the better if only she works hard enough. She seems to have learnt to have 
very few expectations of life, and even the smallest positive outcome in the garden is 
received by her with enthusiasm. Sarah and Jacob seem to think that she is a little 
crazy, with Sarah in particular doing a lot of eye-rolling and head shaking when 
Elizabeth gets started on a particular topic, but I like Elizabeth a lot. There will be 
many days when we are the only two working in the garden and, despite the fact that 
we share very few words in the same language (she understands a little Afrikaans) we 
work well together.  
 
About one third of the area of the Tshimo garden has been cleared of veld, a very hard 
task involving digging up the established wild grass with picks and shovels, and then 
removing rocks and stones by wheelbarrow. This work continues intermittently 
throughout my time in the garden as the Tshimo Co-op struggles to increase the size 
of the garden and hopefully the income that can be earned. There is, however, already 
too much work (planting, watering, weeding) for three people.  
 
The beds in the garden are all neatly laid out, with a small plastic plaque at each end 
saying what has been planted and when. The planting method here (and the outside 
garden at Motse) reflects a fairly old-fashioned idea of what a vegetable garden 
should look like: Long straight (we spend a lot of time making them straight) lines of 
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produce in uni-crop beds. My suggestions of a more agro-ecological approach – 
densely inter-planted beds that require less water and are more bug resistant – are 
given a frosty reception: that is not “proper” farming, Jacob tells me.   
 
There is the ubiquitous container, in which are housed a number of implements and 
wheelbarrows, a pile of bags of compost, a dusty pile of papers representing the Co-
op’s attempts at record keeping, a heap of butternuts, harvested a few weeks 
previously, but seemingly with no destination, and a small pile of rapidly ripening 
tomatoes. There is also a kettle, but most of the time no one has money for tea, milk 
or sugar and so it is generally unused. There is a borehole, a pressure pump, two 
10,000 litre plastic tanks and a heavy duty irrigation system, but the borehole isn’t 
working properly when I first visit, and the water supply is intermittent. (A few weeks 
later it will disappear entirely). This is reportedly the second borehole that has been 
sunk for the garden in a space of a few months. The garden is fenced and locked, with 
Co-op members taking turns to keep the keys, apparently based on who is coming to 
work and who isn’t. Jacob is the chairperson of the cooperative.  
 
The history of the garden and the Tshimo Co-op is never entirely clear to me, and 
there are many versions of the story that I hear. This clearly echoes Ricoeur’s (1984) 
assertion that history and fiction are not so easily distinguished, and that what we 
would consider “history” is never a series of empirically verifiable facts. We 
constantly remake our personal history – our “space of experience” (Koselleck, 2004) 
in light of our changing expectations.  
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I got the impression that because the project was a bit of a disappointment to almost 
everyone involved (even Elizabeth), the retelling of the history of the garden had 
becomes a way of trying to understand what went wrong and assigning some 
responsibilities for that. In these narratives the Tshimo Co-op members tried to make 
sense of their disappointments and frustrations, and the growing realisation that they 
had little control over what was supposed to be “their” opportunity for something 
better. These were stories of taking every opportunity that presented itself, some small 
victories and many bigger disappointments. There were a number of clear villains. 
That is not to say that the Tshimo members have no agency, that they are just helpless 
victims of circumstances beyond their control. The telling of your own version of a 
series of events is itself an act of agency, a reworking of “history”. The Tshimo 
members seemed to relish the telling of these stories, particularly Sarah, who ended 
one story with an emphatic “and that is what Sarah has to say!” and made sure I noted 
it. I don’t think that they had many opportunities to vent their frustrations or even to 
have their version of events heard. In addition, the Tshimo members almost always 
told a version of events that portrayed themselves as hard workers who had achieved 
something through their own efforts (even if that was now slipping away).  
 
This is the main gist of the story: There were originally seven cooperative members. 
Six of them (including all three of the current members that I worked with) met while 
attending a “plant production” course at the local FET college26. This was a free 
course, advertised in the community. There they met Charles (who turned out later to 
be the husband of the local ward councilor, and is a minor villain in the story, while 
                                                        26 These “Further Education and Training” (FET) colleges offer both paid courses towards national 
qualifications, and free ad hoc courses, such as this one. They operate under the national Department of 
Higher Education.  
  103 
she is a major villain.) Charles seems to have discussed with them the benefits of 
being an agricultural cooperative in terms of accessing government funds, and he is 
the one who introduced the group to a DFS official. This official reportedly echoed 
Charles’ positive view, telling them about the benefits of agriculture (the same 
“people have to eat so you will always make money out of growing and selling food” 
story). It seems that Charles was at that time working in some capacity at the Tshimo 
school, and it was he who took the DFS official to the site and set in motion the 
process for the cooperative to be allocated the site.  
 
Sarah paints a picture of extremely hard work to clear the site and prepare the garden 
in early 2012, followed by some early success: 
“then Shadrack (the DFS official) said he wants us to work, that’s 
when we worked and worked, they even sponsored us with seedlings 
and we planted and planted and worked. That’s when we were able 
to plant and sell, ……. we were moving forward” 
 
Shortly thereafter, as Sarah tells the story, the relative success of the garden (they had 
a ready base of customers in the school teachers and the community alongside, and 
with 7 members they could send two or more people off to sell while the others 
worked in the garden) started to cause problems. In her account Charles now insisted 
that the other six cooperative members leave the site so that he could bring in “his 
own people”. He insisted that the site in some way ‘belonged’ to him and that he 
could thus determine who should have access and who could be excluded. The 
headmistress of the school came to the existing cooperative members’ defence: 
 
  104 
Then the principal said no it’s not possible for him to make the 
people working here leave their job and go look for people that are 
working for whites, that are (already) getting money 
 
Charles then left the Tshimo Co-op in a huff, apparently finding work as a truck 
driver. Shortly thereafter two other members left, one because she got a job, but one 
simply “went home” (they are still hoping she might return). A third member went off 
a few months later to take up a construction piece job27, but says that he will return 
when the work is done (I never see him come back). It is not entirely clear why the 
members did not stay in the project, but my best guess would be that Charles’ exit 
coincided both with the cessation of the monthly stipend payments, which are usually 
only made for the first six months of the project, and the end of the summer growing 
season (the first two members left around September 2012, at which time there would 
have been no stipend and no produce for a few months).  
 
Things do not look so bright anymore: as Sarah puts it – “so it’s just the three of us in 
the project, we working, just the three of us, struggling, we can’t do anything”. At that 
point in the conversation Jacob tells her to “shut up”. I later realize that he is still 
trying to impress me at this early stage with how well the project is doing under his 
leadership.  
 
Despite his withdrawal from the cooperative, the influence of Charles and his 
councilor wife are still felt. When I visited the project the fourth or fifth time time I 
saw that a portion of the land was being used by Community Works Programme 
                                                        
27 i.e temporary work 
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(CWP) members to grow vegetables for themselves, reportedly on the initiative of 
Charles, supported by the school’s Beki. Although the Tshimo Co-op could certainly 
spare the land, they felt very bitter about it, telling me repeatedly that this was their 
land, for their project. There was, however, little that they could do about it. The slow 
demise of the project and the fact that only three people were left had reduced the 
school principal’s support. The Tshimo members took some small revenge on the 
CWP’s “invasion” of their garden, stubbornly refusing to hand over a key to the gate, 
which only they could unlock and often left the CWP people waiting hours for their 
arrival. They also refused to allow them to use their borehole water: as David put it 
“at least they are not using this water”. This did backfire a little when the Co-op’s 
borehole pump stopped working and they needed the CWP members’ help with 
getting water from a school tap (which assistance was given unhesitatingly).  
 
Beki himself was responsible for some thoughtlessness towards the Co-op members, 
particularly when it was just Sarah and Elizabeth left in the garden. The group had a 
small planting (about 12 bushes) of chili peppers which were doing very well. (These 
are relatively expensive plants and not that easy to grow from seed.) They sold the 
chilies and also took them home. One day I arrived at the project to see that the chili 
bushes had been moved, and that they all looked much the worse for wear. Why, I 
asked, had they moved the bushes when they were doing so well? Beki said we must, 
they replied, he says that they look untidy over there. They all died. Nothing else 
epitomized for me quite so well how marginalized Sarah and Elizabeth were.  
 
All three Tshimo Co-op members felt that they were being victimised by the local 
ward councilor who seems to maintain that the garden “belongs” to Charles, and that 
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this, together with her position as ward councilor, should mean that she gets to decide 
who has access to it, and thus to whom she will allocate political favours. Her 
signature is necessary on requests by the Co-op for municipal assistance with things 
like a tractor to come and help with clearing the land. She consistently refused to 
authorize these requests, and the DFS officials could or would not intervene.  
 
On my first visit to the Tshimo garden the DFS official simply told me that the other 
project beneficiaries had left, without elaborating on why or what he intended to do 
about it. He seemed resigned to the fact that the project was faltering a bit, saying in 
respect of the three remaining members – “at least they have somewhere to go every 
day.” The disconnect between his idea of the garden as some kind of makeshift daily 
destination to fill up the hours, and the hopes of having a viable business that the three 
remaining Co-op members still hung onto with varying degrees of optimism (but with 
which they had undoubtedly started the project) was breathtaking. As the months 
passed by and the project fell into greater and greater difficulties the indifference of 
DFS officials towards the Tshimo garden only increased.  
 
3.4. The daily life of the gardens 
Both of the gardens followed (in principle) the same basic routine: work starts at 8 in 
the morning, there is a break for lunch from 11 to 12 (during which the Motse 
members went home, but the Tshimo members did not, mostly because it was further 
to walk), and work usually wraps up at about 2, when it is too hot in the summer to 
continue, and there is less to be done in winter. Work is from Monday to Friday, 
although it may be necessary for someone to work on the weekend if it is very hot and 
the plants need water or, in the case of the Motse Co-op, because in the growing 
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season the tomato tunnels need to be opened every morning and closed every 
afternoon, and the plants need to watered through the hydroponic system at regular 
intervals during the day.  
 
Someone (not always the chairperson) is allocated the key and is responsible for being 
on time (not always the case) and unlocking the garden in the morning.  The 
allocation and distribution of work is an interesting group dynamic. Each group has a 
chairperson, a treasurer and a secretary, and in Motse there was additionally a “project 
manager” in the form of first Lillian and then Grace, while Kabelo was designated as 
being in charge of marketing. However, there is no real way to compel members of 
the cooperative to actually arrive at work every day, or to perform designated tasks 
(they are not “employees” in the normal sense of the word). Instead, getting the work 
done depends on a complex and subtle combination of incentive and punishment (or 
the threat thereof) carefully balanced by all the cooperative members and overseen by 
a good chairperson (like Samuel). If members routinely fail to pitch up for work the 
remaining members may vote them out of the project, but, as I later saw, this is an 
absolute last resort. The cooperative needs the labour of each member; they are 
reluctant to involve new members, who are not only untried, but are also seen as now 
unfairly sharing the hard work over several years of the other members; and members 
dropping out is viewed very unfavourably by both existing and potential funders. This 
creates a lot of maneuverability for cooperative members. For the first few months 
that I spent at Motse Bontle was seldom there, staying home to take care of her 
mother who had had a stroke. The other members grumbled a bit, but they understood 
her situation. Cooperative members in both gardens routinely took days off for family 
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commitments such as funerals or occasionally just because they did not feel like 
coming to work.  
 
Work duties at Motse were allocated through a combination of group consensus and 
Samuel’s decisions. There were a large number of regular tasks that needed 
completion at the garden – the feeding, watering and pruning of the tomatoes in the 
tunnels; harvesting (one day a week); deliveries to customers (particularly a nearby 
Spar); routine maintenance of the tunnels; and the ongoing cultivation of the 
“outside” garden (i.e. outside the tunnels). Even with all the Motse members present 
there was a lot of work to be done. The tunnels are extremely hot and unpleasant 
places to work in the middle of summer. At the end of each tomato-growing season 
the growing bags (2,700 in total in the year I spent there) need to be removed, cleaned 
and refilled with clean sawdust. They were then replanted with spinach for the winter 
months, before the entire process was repeated for summer tomatoes. The tomatoes 
are grown hydroponically, and so must be fed a precise chemical mix several times 
each day.  
 
Once I was established as a worker at the Motse garden I was either allocated tasks by 
Samuel, or sometimes if he wasn’t there I simply found myself something useful to 
do, like the endless tomato pruning. I often acted as driver for deliveries, since the 
cooperative did not have a vehicle and it is relatively expensive to transport 10 boxes 
of tomatoes by minibus taxi: you need two seats there and back for the sellers, and 
two seats there for the tomatoes. On the days when produce would go out for sale to 
neighbouring informal settlements (something that was now possible with my car) the 
entire group would pick, wash and pack the produce before we set out in groups of 
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two (all selling always takes place with a minimum of two people so that there is 
oversight of the cash. The same process is followed with bank deposits of cash, and 
any cash payments.) 
 
Work at Tshimo was nowhere near as organized: for a start, after a brief flurry of 
activity during the first three weeks I spent at the garden Jacob more or less 
disappeared, making only sporadic reappearances during the remainder of my time 
there. Although he was the chairperson he took no lead at all in managing what went 
on at the garden, and my view is that he got the job under pressure from DFS as the 
most literate remaining member. The other two Tshimo members were a little like the 
survivors of some natural disaster, doggedly continuing at their tasks on the basis that 
at some point things must improve. Elizabeth had many moments of enthusiasm, most 
particularly with showing me how to work in the garden, but Sarah did not. Some 
days only one of the two would arrive, and then decide for themselves what they 
would do. Even when they were the only person there, neither Sarah nor Elizabeth 
worked any less hard or attempted to cut their day short. Maybe it was because I was 
there, but I don’t think so. 
 
I started working at Tshimo on my second visit, offering to assist a rather startled 
Jacob with weeding. From then on I joined in whatever work was going on, taking 
direction from whoever was there. Prior to starting the fieldwork I had been a very 
enthusiastic home vegetable gardener, enjoying my time in my garden, and 
recommending the activity to whoever would listen. Just a few weeks in the Tshimo 
garden changed my shuttered suburban view of the delights of vegetable gardening 
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forever. It is horrible, hard thankless work. Anybody who extols the benefits of this 
kind of vegetable gardening has probably never done it.   
 
Soon after I started working at the garden the (new) borehole pump stopped working. 
The people who had installed it had not thought it necessary to explain to either Sarah 
or Elizabeth how it actually worked – they were simply instructed to flick a switch on 
when they arrived for work, and to flick it off when they left. They were very 
reluctant to “bother” the DFS officials with their problems, but even after making a 
few calls on my encouragement it was still two weeks before it was fixed. In the 
interim it was extremely hot, and the garden needed to be watered. So we walked a 
500 metre round trip with watering cans to the nearest school tap for three hours each 
day.  
 
Nor was there much reward for all this hard work. Neither Sarah nor Elizabeth had a 
plan for how to sell the relatively small amount of vegetables that they produced (and 
when I arrived at the project in February 2013 most of the summer crop of tomatoes 
was coming to an end and the spinach plants were near the end of their season). Some 
of the teachers would occasionally buy bunches of spinach or the last of the tomatoes, 
as would people from the neighbouring informal settlement, but my best guess is that 
neither woman earned more than about R4028 a week from this. Elizabeth took every 
opportunity to try and eke out some extra income from the garden. She had planted 
mielies that summer, and one day asked me to help her with the dried cobs. We 
stripped off the leaves and then stripped the cobs with our hands. Elizabeth joked that 
                                                        
28 Around $4 at the 2013 exchange rate 
  111 
she is “die kooperasie”29.  Four mielie cobs make about 1 cup of dried mielies, which 
Elizabeth sells door-to-door for R5. Anybody who thinks it is romantic and wonderful 
to produce your own food should spend a few days with someone like Elizabeth, to 
see the almost unimaginable grind to earn even a pittance. I used to be one of those 
people.  
                                                        
29 A “kooperasie” (Afrikaans) is a big agricultural cooperative, normally having many very large grain 
silos 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE BIG PICTURE: POWER, AUTHORSHIP AND PLAUSIBILITY 
 
4.1. Introduction: conceptualising identity as performance 
 
I have proposed that a performance of identity may be considered as a type of social 
performance, in the way that this latter term is used by theorists such as Woodward 
(2007) and Alexander (2004). Woodward (2007) describes a social performance as 
something “whereby people go about actively constructing and communicating 
meaning” (p152). Social life is made up of these performances and stories (narratives) 
about these performances (ibid, p153).  Alexander (2004) defines a social 
performance as “the social process by which actors, individually or in concert, display 
for others the meaning of the social situation” (p529). Harré (2002) suggests that “the 
major mode of symbolic interaction for modern people…..(involves) the performance 
of meaningful actions” (p23).  
 
Goffman’s (1959) book The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life has a number of 
features that I found particularly useful in developing my framework of performance 
identity. Firstly, his framework is intended specifically to deal with the analysis of 
everyday life, which is the focus of this thesis. Secondly, there are a number of ways 
in which Goffman’s conceptualization of action as analogous to a theatrical 
performance reflects the analogies that Ricoeur drew between real life and a narrative, 
forming the basis of his (Ricoeur’s) theory of narrative identity. It must, however, be 
emphasised that there is (at least) one important way in which Goffman’s and 
Ricoeur’s approaches to the analysis of social behaviour are very different: Goffman 
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stated clearly that he was not concerned with “the specific content of any activity 
presented by the individual participant, or the role it plays in the interdependent 
activities of an on-going social system, (but) only with the participant’s dramaturgical 
problems of presenting the activity before us” (1959, p8). That is, Goffman was not 
concerned with the motivations behind the construction of a social performance, but 
rather with the details of how it was done. In this way his approach would be 
considered in a Ricoeurian framework as a first (albeit necessary) explanatory step in 
the process of interpretation, similar to the way in which Ricoeur understood the role 
of structuralism in such a process (Ricoeur, 1991a).  
 
Goffman proceeded from the starting point that most individuals wish to be thought of 
in a certain way, in order to manage the way in which they are treated by others. The 
framework that he developed to analyse this aspect of social life was based on a 
theatrical performance. Although he acknowledged that the former was real and the 
latter “make-believe” (similarly to the way in which Ricoeur stressed that real life was 
not the same as a fictional narrative), he felt justified in the use of this approach 
because it reflects the conscious way in which an individual crafts a desired  
“impression” (Goffman, 1959, p2) to be communicated to others. This impression 
might not always reflect the absolute truth of that individual’s personal circumstances 
or social position (this latter was of particular interest to Goffman), and similarly an 
individual’s expression of himself might be misunderstood. The goal of constructing a 
particular performance is to maximize the likelihood that the desired impression is 
created, and limit the potential for misunderstandings; that the audience to the 
performance “believe(s) that the character they see actually possesses the attributes he 
appears to possess” (ibid, p10).  
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Goffman asks to what extent the person who is constructing the performance 
“believes” that the character presented is actually real. This is an important issue, one 
that I do not believe has been satisfactorily dealt with by much of the status 
consumption literature (as discussed in Chapter One above). I would argue that it is 
neither easy nor accurate to simply divide between “truth” and “deception” and to 
allocate the latter term to any social performance where the aim is to present a 
particular persona who is different from absolute reality (such as the goal of 
presenting oneself as a person who is not as poor or as food insecure as you actually 
are). Is this really “deception”; is there really only one “true” version of a person? 
Goffman (ibid) argues that there is rather a continuum between the person who 
genuinely believes that he is the persona he has created, and the cynic who pretends to 
be someone he is not in order to gain some kind of advantage over others. He makes 
the important point that the person we would like to be is as much a part of our “true” 
selves as who we actually are. Ricoeur’s (1981) notion that various and inter-temporal 
“versions” of ourselves may all be simultaneously “true” provides (to my mind) a 
more complex and elegant account of the blurring of truth and fiction in performances 
of identity, but Goffman’s point emphasizes that the conscious “production” of 
ourselves as particular characters involves much more than simply the cynical, status-
driven desire to deceive others.  
 
Alexander (2004) uses a model of “cultural performance” to analyse socially 
meaningful action. Like Goffman’s, his approach emphasizes the importance of the 
plausibility of the performance - that the audience finds the characters credible and 
the actors believable. He postulates that the more complex and fragmented a society, 
the greater the challenge of plausibility, due to the “de-fusion” of the elements of 
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these social performances. I would agree with this point in general: it goes some way 
towards explaining the difficulties that the poor in post-1994 South Africa have in 
constructing social performances that “resonate” with the audience of development 
practitioners, economic theorists and government officials. However, I would also 
argue for a greater role to be allocated to power and power relations in determining 
what kinds of performances from whom are deemed more or less plausible by 
particular audiences. It is, I would argue, power that is the critical component in 
mimesis1 – the “prefiguration” that determines whether or not a particular 
performance, delivered by a particular person, is believable or not. 
 
In this thesis I have built on the foundation of these conceptualisations of social 
performance as a theatrical performance (particularly Goffman’s (1959) analysis of 
everyday life as a performance) as a useful way of commencing an explanation of the 
mechanics of a performance of identity, mostly through the use of the notions of 
actors and audiences, “mis-en-scene” and physical “props”. However, I have found 
that these approaches are not entirely adequate for the satisfactory interpretation of 
the performances that I observed during my fieldwork, in two important areas: firstly, 
with respect to the notion of temporality – and here I specifically mean the role of the 
performance in generating temporal coherence (as opposed to simply being 
constructed in a temporally coherent manner as described by Xu (2012) and Harré 
(2002)); and the mutual relationship between agency and creativity in crafting these 
performances.  As a result I have incorporated the basic ideas of social performance 
as a theatrical performance with two parts of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy: his theory of 
narrative identity (which provides a powerful account of how narratives – and thus 
performances – of identity are essentially about the mediation of temporality 
  116 
(Hamilton, 2013), and his theory of the text as a narrative.  In this latter respect I have 
focused most particularly on Ricoeur’s ideas around creative emplotment (which, I 
have proposed, forms the basis of a more satisfactory account of agency; the dialectic 
between observing tradition and innovating in the development of a new 
performance); and metaphor, which provides an elegant theory of the loci of meaning 
in a performance that includes material objects.  
 
In the next two sections of this chapter I have focused on some of the macro 
contextual factors that shape, limit and influence the construction of the performances 
of identity of the community gardeners in Motse and Tshimo, and thus determine the 
extent of their actual agency in the creation and management of their performances of 
identity. These twin issues – which performances are permitted and/or expected from 
which kinds of persons, and the authorship of performances – reflect the relations of 
power within which the gardeners are located, and thus incorporate the notion of 
power as a central feature of my analytical framework. Performance plausibility and 
authorship are the main battlegrounds of agency for the community gardeners; where 
they must struggle daily against historically imposed conceptualisations of 
personhood, the modern prejudices of development officials, and the realities of 
poverty and small-scale agriculture in South Africa.  
 
It is against the background of these macro constraining factors that individual 
performances are crafted, although each person takes a different approach towards the 
practical construction of his/her performance, reflecting the multiple voices that co-
exist within an apparently homogenous group. 
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4.2. Power and plausibility: who is permitted which performances? 
 
Central to a successful performance of identity is plausibility. Even if we proceed 
from the basis (as proposed by Goffman, 1959) that the purpose of a performance is 
to project to an audience a person who is much more who we would like to be than 
who we actually are, and thus that there is an element of fiction in each performance, 
the actor is still constrained by who she could be in the eyes of her audience. If she 
strays outside the audience’s view of who she could be she runs the real risk of being 
seen as implausible, and thus not having that particular character accepted as “real”, 
which undermines the entire purpose of the performance. The greater the possible 
“plausibility gap”, the greater the planning and effort her performance will require in 
order to be believable, and the greater the possibility of failure. 
 
What are the factors that support or undermine the plausibility of a particular 
performance by a particular person? The literature has surprisingly little content on 
this particular issue: Alexander (2004) emphasises the importance of a performance 
being plausible in order for it to be “effective” (p529), and links plausibility to 
compliance with so-called “performance elements” (p566). He also links the 
likelihood of producing a plausible performance with cultural homogeneity and 
constancy over time. That is, he proposes that there is a direct relationship between 
cultural homogeneity and historical constancy, and the likelihood that one member of 
that community will produce a performance that is plausible for the others. His focus 
is, however, much more on ritual performances than everyday actions, and he does 
not specifically address the challenge of plausibility in a complex and heterogeneous 
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society in detail, save to say that in this instance there is a greater possibility for an 
actor to produce a performance that is not plausible to everyone.  
 
Goffman (1959) concentrates more on whether or not the actor believes in the 
character that is being played. He also focuses on the elements of the performance as 
key to plausibility, although he takes a slightly different approach to Alexander, since 
his focus is everyday, modern life in an industrialized country. He emphasizes notions 
of “coherence among setting, appearance and manner” (p16) as central to whether or 
not a particular character is believable.  For example, someone may have a luxurious 
home, dress in an upper-class way and affect upper-class mannerisms, but if they then 
speak with a broad working-class accent the upper-class character is no longer 
plausible.  
 
In this thesis I have differentiated between what I have termed “objective” plausibility 
(which broadly conforms to how Alexander (2004) sees plausibility as being from the 
audience’s point of view) and “subjective” plausibility (which broadly conforms to 
Goffman’s (1959) ideas about whether the actor believes in the character). Of course 
there is no easy sharp dividing line between these two notions; rather it is a fluid and 
mutually conditioning relationship.  The more our performance conforms to social 
“norms” and traditions the more likely it is to be judged objectively “plausible” since 
these norms are part of the audience’s cultural make-up. However, a performance that 
we ourselves do not believe in may not come across as plausible, even though it ticks 
all the right boxes in terms of compliance with the performance elements in question. 
Sometimes a performance is constructed to be “objectively” plausible (i.e. in the eyes 
of others) even when there is no audience (as is described in the discussion of mis-en-
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scene in Chapter 6). In these instances the (subjective) assessment of objective 
plausibility seems to support and reinforce subjective plausibility: that is, it appears 
that it is easier to believe in your character if the scenery around you and the props 
that you use would be (in your assessment) believable to others. The audience doesn’t 
have to be physically present for their presence and likely judgment to be keenly felt.  
 
Returning to the issue of what determines plausibility (whether this is objective or 
subjective): although I concur with Alexander (2004) that coherence among the 
elements of performance is certainly important for plausibility (and coherence in 
performance is a recurring theme throughout this thesis), I would propose that there is 
a more fundamental factor that determines the plausibility of performances, and that 
this “plausibility barrier” in fact determines what performances and characters are 
available to which persons, in most cases effectively overriding agency. This barrier 
is power – political, economic and/or social; something that Goffman (1959) hints at 
in his emphasis on the desire to be a member of a particular social class, but never 
articulates in more detail (most likely because of his stated focus on describing the 
framework of social performance, rather than the details of their motivations or 
outcomes).  
 
Power and power relations determine the potential playbook for each person – what 
performances are permitted to whom, and who is excluded. In South Africa, I would 
propose, the power-imposed limitations on performances are central to issues of 
plausibility: these limitations are both historical (apartheid-based ideas of who was 
entitled to be what kind of person are still deeply ingrained in many areas of the 
economy and society, particularly in agriculture) and new (in the pervasive neo-
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liberal depictions of poverty that tend to blame the victim for her material 
circumstances, together with the deep vein of materialism that characterizes current 
South Africa.) These factors both set very clear limits on who can undertake what 
kinds of performances, and (even more detrimentally I would argue) set expectations 
for what kinds of performances certain kinds of people will produce, effectively 
limiting their range of possible performances.  
 
Agriculture in South Africa is still very much dominated by white commercial 
farmers, many of them farming on land that was obtained from previous (black) 
occupants under the forced land removals of apartheid. These commercial farmers 
have generally enjoyed economic success. South African wines are recognized around 
the world; South Africa is an important exporter of citrus and stone fruit; and the 
country is generally food secure on a national basis. Behind this front of agricultural 
expertise and commercial success for many white farmers lies a history of extreme 
exploitation, poverty and deprivation for (the almost exclusively) black farm workers. 
Farm workers form (together with domestic workers) probably the single most 
exploited group of labour in South Africa’s history. On a typical large commercial 
farm some 30 or so years ago there was no doubt who was in charge, and from whom 
complete subservience was expected. In many places in rural South Africa not very 
much has changed: white people are the successful farmers and extensive land 
owners, black people are the farm workers, exchanging long hours of manual labour 
for generally meager salaries. Most of the members of the Motse Co-op had either 
direct or indirect experience of working on big commercial farms, and understood 
firsthand the precarious position of farm workers: they had come to live in Motse 
because either they or their parents had lost their farming jobs, or in some cases still 
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had them, but could not afford to live anywhere else on the income that this 
generated.  
 
The dominant position of white farmers is not challenged to any great extent by the 
current government, despite all the public noise about land reform and the 
“transformation” of agriculture. In official policy documents, (white) commercial 
agriculture is seen as the key to national food security, since it produces more than 
90% of the country’s agricultural output. Official policy has taken a hard line towards 
land reform beneficiaries who struggle to make a commercial success of their farms, 
from 2007 adopting a “use it or lose it policy”. At that time, the then Minister of 
Agriculture, Lulu Xingwana, was quoted as saying the following: “No farm must be 
allowed to lie fallow. Those who are not committed to farming must be removed from 
the allocated farm and be replaced by those who have a passion for farming.” (Mail 
and Guardian, 08 April 2009).  This kind of approach completely ignores the impact 
of the deteriorating terms of trade for farmers on farm incomes and profitability, the 
main reason behind the steady decline in the number of farming units in South Africa 
over the past few decades (Van der Heijden and Vink, 2013).  
 
Initially (post-1994) transformation efforts in agriculture focused on transferring 
ownership of land to black farmers, via government-assisted purchases. No more: 
farms purchased by government for the purposes of supporting new black farmers are 
now most often held by the state and leased to aspiring farmers rather than being 
transferred to the latter. This effectively symbolizes the official stance towards these 
farmers: since they are likely to fail a lease agreement makes it easier to expel them 
from the land and try again with another group.  
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Official agricultural policy is also dismissive of small-scale and semi-subsistence 
farmers, the category of farmers that are overwhelmingly black. These persons are so 
unworthy of recognition as “proper” farmers that they do not even fall under the 
auspices of the National Department of Agriculture; instead they have been pushed 
off into the Department of Rural Development.  These policies have, I would assert, 
effectively categorized black persons as a particular type of person within the 
agricultural sector and thus set clear limits on what kinds of performances are 
available to them: black persons are expected to fulfil the roles of farm labourers or – 
at best - of small-scale, almost subsistence farmers. This, I would further assert, 
underpins the generally disdainful manner in which community gardeners are viewed 
by the wider community, a key theme in this thesis: if it is not plausible that a black 
person could be a successful commercial farmer, then performances where that is the 
central theme are also not plausible. Instead the “audience” will always choose to 
believe that the person in question is a variation on a farm labourer, a person who 
historically has been very near the bottom of the economic, social and aspirational 
ladder. In these circumstances attempts by community gardeners to present 
themselves as aspirant farmers will seldom be believed.  
 
The likelihood that this racially-determined “plausibility barrier” in agriculture is in 
fact strongly entrenched was underscored for me by an account that Samuel (a person 
who seemed to me determined to make himself a “proper” farmer) gave me of the 
history of some of the residents of Motse when I was enquiring in general terms about 
the origin of the location. Some of the current residents had come, he told me, from a 
place he called “Portion Four”, which he explained to me was a failed land reform 
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project. “These people had everything”, he said, ”tractors, a packhouse, everything, 
but they failed. Now they don’t have anything; they have to live here, in a shack. I 
think, Tracy, it will be a long time before us black people know how to farm 
properly.” In Samuel’s account it was not the declining terms of trade for South 
African farmers, combined with little in the way of accumulated capital to support an 
enterprise with unpredictable cash flows, which was responsible for the demise of 
Portion Four, it was the blackness of its farmers. Although Samuel and his fellow 
Motse Co-op members seemed determined to present themselves as potential 
“proper” farmers, and worked very hard on the details of those performances, they 
had to struggle constantly against this widely entrenched view that successful farmers 
are white farmers. Nonetheless, they did exercise considerable agency (in the form of 
creative emplotment) in contesting the authorship of their identities; in creating 
identity performances that pushed against their categorization as farm labourers, and 
the next two chapters describes in detail how that was done.  
 
At this point, however, I would like to make some observations about who in the two 
gardens made the greatest efforts in this regard because after a few months I realized 
that this was very uneven. Not all the gardeners put the same amount of effort into 
constructing performances of identity that pushed against this particular plausibility 
barrier, although all were subject to the same stigmas and condescensions resulting 
from their participation in the gardens. It appeared to me that that the greatest efforts 
were made by the young men in each group, and the least efforts by the older women. 
In the Tshimo Co-op – a not very successful venture - this difference was most stark: 
Jacob was almost obsessed with projecting himself as someone different from an 
itinerant gardener; in contrast, Sarah and Elizabeth seemed largely unmoved by the 
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negative perceptions of others; their efforts were around working in the garden, not 
presenting themselves in a particular manner, at least not that I was able to observe. 
At Motse it was mostly Samuel, Kabelo and Lesego who were concerned about their 
performances (although the latter seemed much more laid back about this than the 
other two), while the two older women in the coop – Grace and Rebecca – seemed 
completely unconcerned. The three younger women in the group (Bontle, Lillian and 
Mpho) fell somewhere in between.  
 
There could be many explanations for this (and admittedly the sample is probably too 
small to make any generalisations), but I would propose that this may reflect the 
particular pressure that young black men in South Africa, most of whom would 
probably self-identify with a patriarchal social structure where men have clear 
responsibilities as bread winners, feel to “get ahead”, to somehow make real the 
promise of “a better life for all”. In contrast, women of Elizabeth’s and Sarah’s age 
have lived their whole lives in abject poverty, and at the bottom of apartheid’s social 
ladder. Perhaps they have internalized this plausibility barrier; perhaps they no longer 
believe another version of their lives is possible.  
 
Another possibility with respect to the apparently lower concern with performance of 
the younger women in the Motse Co-op is the extension of the state child care grants 
over the past ten years. These have (sometimes significantly) improved the material 
position of many extremely poor women, thereby making real a part of that “better 
life” and possibly removing some of the pressure to create performances of success in 
agriculture.  
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Closely related to performances that are “forbidden” (such as being a ‘proper’ farmer 
in the context of a community garden) - and just as limiting of personal agency – are 
what I have termed “expected” performances - those performances that poor people 
are expected to produce, simply because they are poor. The expectations in this 
instance belong to policy makers, development practitioners (including economists) 
and a host of do-gooders, based on their a priori assumptions about the ‘beneficiaries’ 
of development interventions. These pre-determine the motivations of the poor, and in 
doing so effectively prevent them from plausibly having any other. The resulting 
“expected” performances depict very strongly how power relations determine who 
poor people “are” and the enormous difficulties they face in trying to depict 
themselves as someone different.  
 
The most important - and invidious - of these expected performances is what I have 
termed The Grateful Hungry Poor. The cast of The Grateful Hungry Poor populates 
official food security policy documents (most notably DAFF’s Zero Hunger 
Programme) and media reports, and provides the background colour for hundreds of 
well-meaning NGOs and charity efforts. The script is both simple and well-known. 
Here is an (only slightly) ironic version: 
o The only priority for poor, hungry people is food. (This is usually the point 
where “hunger” is seamlessly transformed into “shortage of vegetables” in 
many narratives.) 
o They wouldn’t be hungry if they knew how to grow their own food. 
(Responsible citizens frown on simply giving the hungry food – it makes them 
“dependent”.) 
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o The only reason the poor do not grow their own food is because they do not 
know how to do so, or do not have the necessary inputs. 
o Poor, hungry people will thus be overcome with grateful joy at the prospect of 
having your government department/NGO/charity teach them how to grow 
their own vegetables.  
 
There were a number of variations on this expected performance that I observed 
during my fieldwork, but all were underpinned by similar ideas of how poor people 
should behave. Those that do not are quickly labeled “ungrateful”, “ignorant”, 
“stupid”, “lazy”, or all of the above. This pre-scripted performance results in an 
almost-endless number of small and not so-small indignities and humiliations being 
imposed on poor and food-insecure people. Government officials will routinely refer 
to food garden participants as “the poorest of our poor” in front of their own 
neighbours. I have witnessed NGO officials addressing grown men and women as if 
they were mentally deficient half-wits, telling them “we are here to help you so you 
will not be hungry”.   
 
I would assert that most of the struggles to be a particular kind of person that I 
observed were grounded in the (often overwhelming) desire not to be the kind of 
person depicted in The Grateful Hungry Poor. But the agency of the poor in this 
regard is so thoroughly and so effectively denied that many people simply cannot 
grasp this concept.  I had this point brought home to me personally on several 
occasions. When I shared some of the preliminary conclusions of my research with 
people who asked me about it, emphasising my belief that poor people may be 
eschewing home gardening because of how it impacted on their sense of self-worth, I 
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always got a variation on the same response, which in its own way provided an 
interesting, and not very flattering, insight into the way in which the total denial of the 
agency of the poor in South Africa has become entrenched in the general psyche: 
disbelief that this was actually the case mixed with no little amount of annoyance that 
community gardeners could be quite so foolish. One person (a woman – this 
distinction is important for the rest of this story) in particular was most outraged: “I 
can’t believe that”, she said. “Are you actually asking me to believe that these people 
would rather go hungry than have people think badly of them? What is wrong with 
them? How are you going to make them change?” My response to her was a variation 
on what I said to many others: I asked her how many of her friends and other women 
in the wealthy suburbs of Johannesburg did she think were currently going hungry 
and nutritionally compromising themselves in the interests of presenting themselves 
as a particular kind of person, the kind who can fit into a size 32 dress? These kinds of 
conversations raised a very important issue in my mind. Clearly there are a lot of 
people in South Africa who believe that agency like this – an “extreme” agency if you 
will - going hungry in pursuit of a particular identity – is the sole right of the 
materially wealthy, something forbidden the poor.  
 
These responses also emphasized to me how difficult it could be to present a plausible 
performance of identity  (to an audience of development practitioners or mainstream 
economists) that differed to any considerable degree from the script of The Grateful 
Hungry Poor. I would argue that it is just such a plausibility gap that lies at the heart 
of the development conundrum described by Oliver de Sardan (2005): development 
officials believe that certain performances are implausible for the poor, but the poor 
themselves rebel against these a priori limitations on who they are (or could be). It 
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should be noted that this is a different interpretation than Oliver de Sardan himself 
(ibid) offers. His account focuses more on the (neo-classical economic) constraint of 
imperfect and/or asymmetrical information; postulating that the beneficiaries of 
development are making rational decisions based on information that is either 
unknown or only partially known to development practitioners. I cannot deny that this 
may sometimes be the case, but I would also propose that this account takes 
insufficient account of the ways in which development discourse pre-categorises the 
poor as people they vehemently do not want to be, and the subsequent contestations of 
authorship that this creates. 
 
Another “expected” performance that I observed is what I have termed The Want 
Something for Nothing Poor. In this performance the poor are depicted as motivated 
almost entirely by money, but simultaneously determined not to have to work for it. 
An accusation (designed to insult I was sure) that I often heard leveled at community 
gardeners, particularly where the project was failing, was “these people just want 
money, they don’t love agriculture”. The underlying idea was that poor people were 
driven by the desire for money, rather than by the desire to do a good job, or to take 
pride in what they produced, and this was the reason why their project failed. Similar 
sentiments were repeated to me by provincial extension officers and trainers/mentors 
working in community gardens (paid by government). At Tshimo, where the three 
remaining gardeners had reportedly earned next to nothing from the garden for the 
previous three or four months, an extension officer said to me that the project was 
failing because the participants “just want easy money”, by which he meant they 
should be chastised for not realizing that they would have to work hard for a long 
period of time before they had the prospect of earning even R500 per month. Apart 
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from the rather bizarre idea that poor people should be criticised for their desire to 
earn money, it should be noted that the criticism was usually leveled by someone in a 
relatively easy and very well-paid job, compared to the community gardeners.  None 
of the government or development officials that I talked to during the course of my 
fieldwork was prepared to even entertain the idea that people might have left garden 
projects for any reason other than a desire for easy money or an aversion to work, or 
both.  
 
The characterisation of only wanting “easy money” was sometimes accompanied by 
wildly inaccurate depictions of laziness, and extension officers and NDA30 officials 
were often openly contemptuous about the gardeners. On one occasion I was talking 
to the extension officer responsible for the Motse Co-op – a young (around 25) 
woman who herself seemed to have very relaxed approach towards responding to 
problems at the garden and regularly missed scheduled meetings– about how well the 
project seemed to be doing and how pleased she must be about that. “Yes,” she said, 
“but these people are a bit lazy and so I have to come and kick them so that they work 
properly.” This was said in full hearing of the Motse Co-op members. None of them 
commented about it. I think they were used to it.  
 
The Want Something for Nothing Poor performance may sound a little ridiculous, and 
it certainly is that in parts, but this blame-the-victim story has debilitating 
implications for those who want to define themselves as a particular type of person. 
This pre-scripted performance emphasizes the differences between poor people and 
the officials who make those comments: the point was that poor people were 
                                                        
30 National Development Agency – the primary funders of the Motse Co-op during my time there 
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somehow less than they were, somehow deserving of contempt, since they were not 
prepared to work hard for some future reward.  The fact that work in the gardens was 
extremely hard, and that the members of the Motse Co-op had worked very hard 
indeed for almost three years before they got any kind of meaningful reward (which 
was still only a small fraction of the salary of an extension officer) was simply 
glossed over.  
 
These “want something for nothing” perceptions of officials are in sharp contrast to 
the key motivations of the gardeners themselves. As my fieldwork progressed I began 
to realise that although financial gain was a motivating factor (everybody felt the 
pinch of poverty acutely) it was very far from the most important motivating factor 
for the gardeners. It seemed to me that the reasons why people joined agricultural 
projects were much more complex than simply financial, and the reasons why they 
left them were just as complex. The desire to be, and to be perceived as, a particular 
kind of person was a much more important factor motivating meaningful action, even 
for the poorest members of the gardens. And certainly no one could seriously accuse 
the gardeners of not working hard. 
 
But when a pre-scripted performance depicts people as only greedy and lazy, the 
result is that their agency to be a different type of person – a person like the extension 
officer, for example – is effectively denied, since deviations from this pre-scripted 
performance are judged “implausible” by a wider audience. Those that choose to 
leave a garden because it undermines their sense of who they are effectively have that 
sense of who they are denied; buried under the twin weights of greedy and lazy, and 
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they now somehow “deserve” to be poor. They are damned if they do, and damned if 
they do not.  
 
4.3. Creativity and authorship: who scripts the performance? 
 
Authorship is related to, but a little different from, the issue of forbidden or expected 
performances. In the case of these latter, the plausibility gap for the community 
gardeners is almost insurmountable, ranged as they are against deeply entrenched 
power relations and historical perceptions of poor black people in general, and poor 
black farm workers in partiular. The result, I would propose, is that although the 
struggle to be a particular kind of person is based on the ultimate goal of overturning 
or abolishing both forbidden and expected performances, the actual day-to-day 
struggles over agency in this regard are focused on winning smaller victories in the 
area of authorship of more plausible performances.  
 
Even within those performances deemed broadly “plausible” for the gardeners, the 
question of authorship is continually contested: who gets to determine the details of 
the plot; of how a particular character will behave; what are the mannerisms and 
circumstances associated with this character; and so on. These small changes may 
leave the overall performance unchanged in many respects, but they do effect subtle 
changes in characters over time, gradually creating different persons.  
 
There is, I would propose, a constant tension for persons between being the actor in a 
particular performance, delivering your lines and acting in accordance with someone 
else’s script (whether that “someone” is an actual person, such as a development 
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official, or a cultural tradition, or history) and being the author, improvising outside 
and around a given script; expanding and adjusting the performance. This is a process 
that may be compared in some way to Medina’s (2004) observations around citrus 
farmers in Belize, who, although they had little control over the development options 
that were given them by global markets, did feel very strongly that they had the 
agency to remake these options in certain ways to better benefit themselves.  
 
These are not, I would assert, minor issues: I observed that through these apparently 
small efforts to take charge of and change even a small part of a particular script the 
community gardeners in Motse were winning small victories in the struggle to be 
persons of their own determination.  The issue of authorship is also closely related to 
power: who gets to exercise that freedom and choice, who gets to decide what kind of 
persons the gardeners should be in their various social performances? To what extent 
do the gardeners actually have the ability to write their own performances, given the 
constraints of the macro environment within which the producers and consumers of 
food find themselves?  
 
There are various approaches to the issue of authorship: Ricoeur explicitly followed 
Marx’s maxim that “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past” in stating that 
“we learn to become the narrator and the hero of our own story, without actually 
becoming the author of our own life” (Ricoeur, 1991b, p32, emphasis in original). 
What Ricoeur implied here was that we although we are limited by factors such as 
power, tradition, culture and economics which determine what narratives are available 
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to us, our ability to engage in creative emplotment allows us to exercise agency in 
scripting the details of a particular performance, although we do not have that ability 
with respect to every performance that makes up a life. We have the ability via 
emplotment to innovate: “this difference (between narrator and author) is partially 
abolished by our power of applying to ourselves the plots we have received from our 
culture and of trying on the different roles assumed by the favourite characters of the 
stories most dear to us” (Ricoeur, 1991b, p33, my emphasis). The possibility of 
innovation, I would suggest, implies that the actor may simultaneously be the author 
of a particular part (or parts) of a performance as well as its main actor. The greater 
the overlap of actor and author, while still maintaining plausibility, the greater the 
effective exercise of agency in becoming more like one of those “favourite 
characters”.  
 
Ricoeur’s view on the process of emplotment and innovation in narrative are 
instructive in illustrating the relationship and tension between tradition (in this case 
the pre-scripted performance expected of the actor) and innovation (the ways in which 
the actor adjusts the details of the script). For Ricoeur, emplotment is essentially a 
process of “synthesis of heterogeneous elements “ (Ricoeur 1991b, p21). These 
heterogeneous elements are all the separate components of a particular performance, 
and emplotment is what brings them together into one connected whole that can be 
understood by a particular audience. When crafting a plot for a performance the 
author is limited by the expectations of the audience with respect to how the story will 
unfold. If he does not meet these expectations, the audience is unable to follow and 
the performance will be implausible because it is unintelligible. For example, the 
audience expects that the motive for a particular action will be contained in the plot, 
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either directly (through a chain of events) or indirectly (through the details of 
characterization), and that this motive will link to the ensuing action in a way that 
makes sense, from their point of view. If this convention is not observed, the audience 
will be unable to follow, and very likely deem the performance implausible.  
 
Thus Ricoeur focuses on the need for emplotment to maintain a balance between what 
he terms “innovation and sedimentation” (ibid, p24), between creativity and 
observing the traditions that make a performance intelligible and plausible. The 
traditions are related to what Alexander (2004) has termed “performance elements”, 
but to my mind Ricoeur’s concept of mimesis1 provides a more satisfying insight, one 
that is better equipped to deal with the concept of tradition in complex, heterogeneous 
societies. As discussed in Chapter 2, mimesis1 is the “pre-understanding” (Moore, 
1990, p103) that is necessary before emplotment can take place. Developing a plot for 
a performance that will be intelligible both to ourselves and others (i.e. one that will 
be plausible) “presupposes a familiarity” (Ricoeur, 1984, p55) with a range of actions, 
cultural conventions, actors, likely consequences, causality, and so on. Mimesis1 
(prefiguration) thus informs the “intelligibility” of the plot and is what should ensure 
that the performance will be interpreted in one particular way rather than another, by 
situating the plot in a pre-existing meaning structure that is common to narrator and 
audience 
 
Mimesis1 is made up of a large number of “conventions”, ranging from the almost 
universal to the very particular, that make up the “tradition” which the author of a 
particular performance needs to keep in the back of her mind when thinking about 
innovation. It is these conventions that the gardeners need to keep in a constant and 
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careful balancing act when they are exercising their agency to “write” a variation into 
a particular script. If they innovate too much, their performance will not be plausible. 
If they stick to the traditional storylines and expected plot outcomes, their agency is 
effectively diminished. It required patience, skill and extensive creativity in order to 
maintain the plausibility of their performances in front of government officials and 
their own community (including those performances that essentially required them to 
be lesser persons), while still slowly recreating themselves.  
 
During my time with the Motse Co-op I witnessed the gradual extension of authorship 
of many of the members, particularly in Samuel, who in his role as chairperson took 
the responsibility of managing many of the performances of the cooperative, as 
cooperative. This pushing of the authorship limits came about at the same time as the 
success of the cooperative slowly grew. It was, I believe, an increase in confidence 
associated with these successes that facilitated a series of small victories in the 
struggle for authorship, catalysed by several interactions with a neighbouring 
commercial farmer.  
 
It seemed to the Motse garden members that all their years of hard work and struggle 
were paying off: the first three tunnels had yielded them a good profit (almost 
R40,000) from their first (2012/2013) summer tomato crop, despite some problems 
with plant diseases and learning the new (for them) hydroponic cultivation system. 
The NDA had made available a second tranche of funding, with which they were 
planning to purchase another three tunnels, due for planting with tomatoes in 
September of 2013 for the 2013/2014 summer season. This would double the output 
of the relatively high-value tomato crop.  
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In addition, in mid-2013 they won a youth farming competition, which came with a 
R30,000 cash prize from the Gauteng government. This money was going to finance a 
planned chicken house, for raising broilers. On the back of these successes the 
members of the Motse Co-op started to push back against characterisations of 
themselves as ignorants who should passively accept the superiority of those 
designated by others as “experts”. As they learned the process of hydroponic farming 
and saw that they could produce good crops, they began to be more confident of their 
own abilities and knowledge, and less willing to be the passive participants in their 
own performances. They also started to take a more proprietary view of the NDA 
funding, increasingly viewing the money as something they had “earned”, rather than 
charity from government. They thus began to take a more critical assessment of how 
it could best be spent to benefit the cooperative, on their own assessment of what that 
entailed.  
 
Against this background, the training and mentoring services that were provided as 
part of the NDA financing package become an area of first contention, and then 
outright revolt, where the cooperative members made extensive gains in authorship, 
effectively rewriting a significant portion of this particular script. The NDA had 
allocated a portion of the overall grant to Motse to pay for training and mentoring. 
This made good sense – the cooperative members needed training (and some 
oversight) to implement the hydroponic methods used in the tunnels. This is a fairly 
complex method of growing high-quality tomatoes in an intensive manner: the plants 
are fed a mix of chemicals several times a day, which chemical mix must be carefully 
managed at each stage of the plants’ growth. The high concentration of plants (900 to 
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a tunnel) facilitates plant diseases and fungus infections, requiring a careful regimen 
of spraying with pesticides and fungicides. The plants require regular pruning and 
training up climbing wires to keep the fruit clean and increase yields. The cooperative 
members were very clear about the value that training and mentorship would add to 
their enterprise, and how important it was to their success. They were, however, 
starting to get disgruntled with how they were being provided this service. 
 
The training and mentoring services were provided by NTC, a company specializing 
in providing such services to government funded agricultural developments projects. 
NTC had not been selected by the Motse Co-op (no one ever asks the opinion of 
people like Samuel on matters like these), but rather came as part of the NDA 
package. I got the distinct impression that NTC (owned by a white commercial 
farmer) was a very good business. In addition to providing training and mentoring 
services they supplied infrastructure and inputs to many government projects. They 
had, for example, supplied the original three tunnels and associated irrigation and 
hydroponics equipment for Motse, as well as the original tomato seedlings. Now they 
were providing training and mentoring (a service that was intended to be provided for 
an 18-month period, thereby – hopefully – greatly reducing the risk of failure of the 
new enterprise.)  
 
A mentor from NTC (Ernest) was assigned to the cooperative, and the plan was that 
he would deliver formal training twice a week, keep a general eye on day-to-day 
operations, and also assist the cooperative with ad hoc problems, such as when a new 
disease appeared in the tunnels.  
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The plan and the reality rapidly parted ways. I first started working at the garden 
some five months after the training/mentoring program had started. According to the 
Motse Co-op members things went reasonably as promised in the first few months of 
the programme, but then they deteriorated. Ernest seldom arrived as often as he was 
supposed to (twice a week), sometimes going for more than a week without a single 
visit. My conversations with Ernest (I chatted to him informally at the garden as well 
as a more semi-formal interview at the NTC offices) indicated that NTC was probably 
being paid for far more training and mentoring services than it actually employed 
people to deliver. Ernest seemed to spend his days rushing from one project to the 
next, and he was always in a hurry to get things done as quickly as possible when he 
came to Motse.  
 
Far worse from the point of view of the Motse Co-op was that Ernest did not seem to 
know that much about growing tomatoes (in our discussions he told me he was an 
expert on chickens, and NTC mentored several chicken projects). There was more 
than one occasion at Motse where he was unable to diagnose (and thus to remedy) 
some plant ailment or insect problem. Samuel complained bitterly that substantial 
losses in one of the tunnels (which happened shortly after I arrived at Motse) were 
due to the inability of Ernest to identify a problem in the hydroponic chemical mix. 
This significantly reduced the money that the Motse Co-op earned from that tunnel’s 
plants – almost one third of the plants failed to yield tomatoes of a sufficiently high 
quality to sell to Spar, with whom they had negotiated a supply contract. 
 
Ernest was quick to assign blame for problems to the Motse members for “not 
listening” to him, and initially this view – Ernest the expert, the Motse members the 
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slow students – held. This was the standard script: A significant portion of 
smallholder and subsistence agriculture policy is based on the assumption that small 
and subsistence black farmers are woefully ignorant and in dire need of training to 
“learn” how to practise agriculture. When a relatively sophisticated production 
method like hydroponics is involved, the ignorance gap is presumed to be even wider. 
In this narrative, the perceived ignorance of the Motse Co-op members effectively 
denied them the right to be able critically (and, in this case, accurately) to judge the 
service that they were receiving.  
 
 Although I was aware that the Motse members were frustrated with Ernest, they 
initially took a stoic approach – they were regular participants in this kind of 
performance that assigned them particular characters, and seemed unable to 
conceptualise that they could change it. When I asked what they were going to do 
about the problematic Ernest, there was a general shrugging of shoulders and “what 
can we do?” Ernest himself was totally unmoved by any complaints to him by 
Samuel. There were some – carefully worded so as not to seem too presumptuous - 
complaints to the project manager from the NDA, but he paid little attention. (I never 
saw him at the garden, never met him even once there, which says a lot about his 
involvement with the project). Motse had a provincial extension officer assigned to 
them (she of the “lazy” remarks), but she was seldom there more than a few times a 
month, and appeared to have little knowledge about hydroponics or tomatoes. 
Additionally, it was clear to me that she bought completely into the characterization 
of the Motse members as woefully ignorant, and appeared quick to believe a version 
of events that suggested that it was their incompetence and/or laziness that had 
resulted in the chemically-damaged tomato plants. Clearly this was the way that 
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things worked: the Motse Co-op was expected to be happy with their substandard 
service while NTC made money from the whole process and they, the extension 
officer and the NDA, could simply blame the Motse members for being lazy or failing 
to listen if and when things went wrong.  
 
But then something changed, and this well-used script took an unexpected turn. Silver 
Leaf Farms is a very large commercial salad grower located a few kilometres from 
Motse. The cooperative members had approached the owners – brothers Brian and 
John – a few months before I had started in the garden to ask for their assistance with 
a tractor to plough some of the open land, so that they could expand their outside 
planting area. When I asked Samuel why they had decided to ask these particular 
people for assistance (the area has many commercial farms with tractors) he replied 
that they had learned that the brothers provided financial support to a local orphanage 
“and so we knew they must be good people.”  
 
The contact with Silver Leaf was sporadic during my first few months in the garden, 
but then the brothers decided to take a more active mentoring role for Motse, seeing 
the first three tunnels as an indication that the cooperative was going places. (They 
also supported a number of other food-related projects in the area, such as a local 
school food garden.) They instructed their operations manager (Retief – a very 
personable middle-aged (white) man who had worked his whole life in horticulture) 
to support the project with free seedlings and general advice, which he did very 
enthusiastically. As a result, the Motse members started to go to Silver Leaf regularly 
(usually when I was there so that I could give them a lift) and Retief would drop past 
the project a couple of times a month.  
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The Motse members were very impressed with Silver Leaf, and so was I. They plant 
1.2 million salad plants each week (all of which they grow themselves from seed) and 
supply micro herbs and salads to several large retailers. The farm is a model of 
efficiency, beautifully maintained, and Retief appeared to be an affable and 
encouraging manager, with a good relationship with the farm employees. The Motse 
members said that they could dream about one day having such a beautiful place.  
 
The important point, however, was not just that Silver Leaf was a place that the Motse 
members could admire and aspire to, but – much more importantly – when they were 
on the farm they were treated by Retief as equals, not as poor people who were the 
lucky recipients of his largesse. He happily spent hours taking them around the 
greenhouses, discussing details of growing and planting, conferring with them on 
what varieties of tomatoes should be planted at what times. I never witnessed him 
talking “down” to the Motse members. For Retief, the Motse members were fellow 
hard-working farmers who needed some assistance because they were starting out, not 
because they were ignorant or lazy.  
 
The brothers who owned Silver Leaf, although not as often available when the Motse 
members visited, were extremely encouraging when they did see them, congratulating 
them on what they had achieved so far and exhorting them to continue their efforts. 
Samuel felt emboldened by all this, and one day, while talking to Brian, John and 
Retief made a comment to the effect that they were struggling a little with their 
mentor from NTC. Turns out the farmer who owns NTC is well known to the Silver 
Leaf team, they do not have a very high opinion of him or of his agricultural skills, 
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and they were quick to say so. When Samuel said how much the Motse Co-op paid 
(i.e. the money that the NDA paid as part of the grant package) for NTC’s training 
and mentoring services, the brothers burst out laughing in disbelief. “That’s a good 
business!” they said. Brian went to far as to say that if the Motse Co-op needed advice 
on the tomatoes they should ask Silver Leaf, who would happily provide a much 
better service for free.  
 
Samuel now had allies, people who supported and affirmed his dim view of NTC, and 
not just any allies, but farmers whom he respected tremendously. If Brian and John 
and Retief all said that the man who owned NTC was not a very good farmer, and that 
he was effectively ripping off the Motse Co-op, then the similar views of Samuel and 
the other members were vindicated; they were given “meaning-in-the-world” through 
their articulation by those the group admired and respected. And so he and the other 
Motse members decided to take a harder line: after all, if they made Ernest and NTC 
so cross that they refused to service the project further they could now rely on Silver 
Leaf. (Once again, the point here was not that the Motse Co-op didn’t want to receive 
training and mentorship - they fully realized the value of this - but rather that they 
wanted the right to determine whether or not they were getting what they considered 
to be a good service, and to initiate action for change when they were not happy. This 
may seem to many people to be an “obvious” right for them to have, but in the 
context of their expected performances, this represented a significant change in 
script.)  
 
Samuel then took the unprecedented step of going above the extension officer’s head 
to her boss, the GDARD manager for the area, and a very nice man (the same one 
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who had originally shown me around the gardens); and said that there was a big 
problem. Samuel insisted on a meeting with GDARD, the NDA and NTC. Somehow 
the GDARD manager got the wind up the NDA person, and the meeting actually took 
place. As a result, Ernest was replaced with a new mentor – Sundi, a recent agronomy 
graduate. At first she seemed the answer: she was tasked with going to the project 
four days a week, and she was certainly knowledgeable. Unfortunately it didn’t last. 
Three weeks after starting (and after following a pattern of increased and unexplained 
absences) she resigned suddenly from NTC to take another job.  
 
Other developments continued to show the Motse members the possibilities of life 
without NTC. Further discussions with Retief at Silver Leaf had ensured that they 
would get all the tomato plants for the next season’s planting for free (rather than 
having to purchase them from NTC). Retief had drawn them up a detailed spraying 
schedule and offered to organize them the chemicals from his own suppliers at a 
discounted price (once again, these would have automatically been ordered from 
NTC, at a much higher price). At much the same time the NDA made the funding 
available for the additional three tunnels, but instead of simply ordering them from 
NTC (as they had last time), the NDA asked the Motse Co-op to get three quotations 
(perhaps this had been done last time around, but Motse had not been actively 
involved in this exercise). This tunnel procurement process further cemented the 
Motse members’ view that they were correct to push back against NTC: I took 
Samuel and three others one day to one of the potential suppliers, who had a number 
of their tunnels set up on a small demonstration farm. The tunnels that the Motse Co-
op would get from here were much smarter than the ones they already had, and came 
with a far superior hydroponics mixing and irrigation system. The members were also 
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very taken with this efficient and well laid out demonstration farm.  When questioned 
if they knew who NTC was – as the company who had supplied the first three tunnels 
– the owners of the demonstration farm made no attempt to hide their view that NTC 
was “a lot of crooks” and not very knowledgeable about hydroponics. The final straw 
was when the three quotes arrived: NTC’s cost was by far the highest, although they 
would supply the lowest specification of tunnel and the least associated equipment.  
 
This further proof (from a “proper” source) that their perception of NTC was correct 
encouraged the Motse members to push the variation on this particular script even 
further. They told the manager from the NDA that they wanted another meeting. This 
time NTC was clearly in the wrong, since the new mentor had disappeared. NTC 
made several excuses and promised another mentor. No, said Samuel, we don’t want 
NTC here any more, we have got our own people who will help us. He told the NDA 
person that the Motse Co-op wanted the money for the training to be paid directly to 
the Co-op so that they could purchase additional infrastructure. “It is our money”, 
Samuel said repeatedly during this time. Although the Co-op did not get the money in 
question paid over, NTC’s contract was terminated. The fact that the NDA had 
effectively taken their side in not insisting that they take another NTC mentor is 
testimony to how far the Motse Co-op had progressed in making a new version of the 
script entirely plausible.  
 
To say that the owner of NTC was annoyed by this turn of events would be a gross 
understatement. For the next few weeks he threatened the Motse members with legal 
action and the possibility of jail. The members were concerned, but they felt very 
strongly that they had the moral high ground. Each time they went to Silver Leaf they 
  145 
had this reaffirmed by Retief or one of the owner brothers. Needless to say I also 
supported them. There were a few visits to Motse from an NTC manager who told 
them that his boss had agreed, as a conciliatory gesture, that they could go and watch 
the planting of the tomato tunnels at NTC as a training exercise. Actually, Samuel 
told him, tell your boss that he can come and watch us plant tomatoes. This story was 
regularly recounted by the members of the Motse Co-op, to considerable mirth. The 
manager never returned, and to the best of my knowledge the cooperative never 
purchased any significant amounts of inputs from NTC again. I am not sure what 
happened to the money, but it probably went to NTC as a settlement with the NDA. 
After all, only so many things can change.  
 
As they gained in confidence to push back against their characterisations as agency-
less recipients of whatever was directed their way, no matter how substandard, their 
views of NTC itself changed, and became more confident and more critical. The first 
few times I had gone to NTC’s premises with Samuel (he would sometimes ask for a 
lift to go and fetch something from there – NTC was located about 10 kilometres from 
Motse) he had been extremely complimentary about the demonstration farm: “Look at 
these beautiful tunnels/chicken houses”, he would say, or “look how nice this place 
is”. Later the comments became a lot more acid: “Look how they are eating our 
money to make themselves this nice place.”  
 
When the Motse Co-op had saved enough money for a chicken house they did not buy 
one from NTC, or indeed from anyone. Instead, Lesego designed and built one based 
on those he had seen at NTC, with a number of clever enhancements in efficiency. 
The fact that they had themselves built a chicken house better than NTC’s, at half the 
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price, was a constant source of pride. They would joke that they could set themselves 
up as a competitor to NTC, something they could never have even contemplated nine 
months before. In this particular performance, the Motse Co-op had successfully 
wrestled authorship away from much stronger opponents.   
 
This example of agency as authorship illustrates the relationship between subjective 
and objective plausibility: while compliance with certain conventions of mimesis1 is 
necessary for the audience to believe, the individual must also believe in her character 
– her mannerisms, actions and words. As this story about NTC shows, the more the 
individual believes in her own modified performance, the greater the possibility of 
objective plausibility. This, in turn, underpins the idea that agency must not only be 
possible in an objective sense (i.e. that a person can do something), but also that 
agency must somehow be inspired, a product of the creative imagination. There is a 
moment of faith when a person believes that her agency is possible, that she can 
convincingly be someone different, a person on her own terms.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE QUEST FOR TEMPORAL COHESION: EXPERIENCE, 
EXPECTATION AND THE SPACE FOR AGENCY 
 
“Hope and memory, or expressed more generally, expectation and experience – for 
expectation comprehends more than hope, and experience goes deeper than memory 
– simultaneously constitute history and its cognition. They do so by demonstrating 
and producing the inner relation between past and future or yesterday, today, or 
tomorrow.” 
(Koselleck,2004,  p258) 
 
"Living backwards!" Alice repeated in great astonishment. "I never heard of such a 
thing!"  
"—but there's one great advantage in it, that one's memory works both ways."  
"I'm sure mine only works one way," Alice remarked. "I can't remember things before 
they happen."  
"It's a poor sort of memory that only works backwards," the Queen remarked. 
(Lewis Carroll - Through the looking glass, and what Alice found there) 
 
5.1. Introduction: identity and temporality 
Ricoeur’s narrative identity (and thus my conceptualization of “performance 
identity”) is a fundamentally temporal identity, one that makes sense of and gives 
order to a simultaneously present past, present and future (Ricoeur, 1984). Because of 
this inherent temporality, performance identities are ever-shifting. The ongoing 
reworking – remaking if you will - of our performance identities is necessitated by 
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our experience of a constantly changing relationship between the past, the present and 
the future. As the present unfolds, our experiences change, together with how we 
interpret and “locate” those experiences, and our expectations of the future change. In 
order to preserve a sense of continuity in ourselves (Ricoeur’s “concordance” between 
what changes and what stays the same in identity) we need to keep adjusting our 
understanding of the past and our imagination of the future to make the present 
intelligible (Ezzy, 1998). The important point here is that our past is not “given”; it is 
not a fixed series of immutable and “true” chronological facts. Instead, what we 
consider as “the past” is a complex mix of what we actually remember (including 
those things that we are sure we do not remember), how we remember these events 
and persons, what we imagine we remember, collective (social) memory, and the 
memories of others that are accessible to us (such as those of our parents, our friends, 
events in the books we read, etc.), all conditioned by the context in which our past 
took place. In this way, a lot of our past may be said to be as much the product of 
imagination – in that it exists after having been “filtered” through our subjectivity and 
our cultural and social norms - as our anticipated future (which can never be perfectly 
predicted, but must be imagined).  
 
It is the temporal coherence mediated by our identity that determines our “space” for 
meaningful action – “both memories of the past and anticipations of the future …. 
provide a coherent self concept that serves to direct current action” (Ezzy, 1998, 
p241). Meaningful action may thus be described as taking place at the intersection of 
what Reinhart Koselleck (Koselleck, 2004) termed “the space of experience” and “the 
horizon of expectation” (p 256). The space of experience conditions our “historical 
self-understanding” (Tribe, 2004, pxix) – how we understand ourselves in relation to 
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past events, and in terms of those past events. Experience is the past made present. 
Expectation is the future made present. What we “remember” conditions what we 
believe is possible, and both of these impact on how we act in the present – how we 
understand what actions are actually “available” to us, and how we “choose” among 
these possibilities. As we continually reconfigure both our experiences and our 
expectations, based on a range of new inputs, new events or new memories, either 
personal, or of others or of the collective, so the “now” in which meaningful action 
takes place also changes. That is, the pool of possible actions and/or how we assess 
which actions to actually implement is constantly changing. Significant changes in the 
space of experience or the horizon of expectation may thus impact on latent agency, 
since a person may now effectively have more possible actions to choose from (or, 
indeed, fewer), as well as a different understanding of what she is able to choose. This 
perception of action as taking place in a permanently shifting, conditioned present is 
very different to the simple causality of “if x, then y” that permeates the thinking of 
mainstream development. 
 
One of the key proposals made by Koselleck (2004) is that the relationship between 
past and future has been fundamentally altered by modernity; specifically, that we no 
longer expect that the past will be a reliable guide to the future. Instead, modernity 
could be said to be characterized by a growing gap between the past and the future, 
which gap is generally in benefit of the future – we expect the future to be 
considerably better than the past, and as a result we make greater demands on that 
future (ibid, p3). At the same time, experience is further and further “detached” from 
a rapidly expanding horizon of expectation and is no longer a reliable guide for the 
future (Pickering, 2004, p286). That is, we not only generally expect that the future 
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will be better than the past, but also that it will be fundamentally different (Koselleck, 
2004).  
 
These themes of detachment and improvement are echoed in the discourses of socio-
economic development in South Africa, which has an over-arching goal of creating “a 
better life for all”. This better life for black South Africans (and particularly the poor) 
is not only imagined as fundamentally better than, but also fundamentally different 
from life under apartheid. In fact, it is better because it is different (although, of 
course, whose version of “different” holds sway is a key point of contestation, as this 
thesis has emphasised). We could, therefore, say that development policy in South 
Africa is characterized by the desire to create a significant detachment between the 
space of experience and the horizon of expectation for the poor (although, of course, 
not only for the poor). However, neither development policy nor development 
practitioners have fully taken into account the impact of this detachment on the 
fundamental requirement of temporal coherence in personal identity, and the 
challenges that this poses to meaningful action. If meaningful action, as Koselleck 
proposes, does indeed take place at the intersection of experience and expectation, 
how is the ability to undertake meaningful action impacted when that intersection 
becomes a vast no-man’s land, where the past must be discarded, but there are few 
guidelines for the new future? 
 
The notion of meaningful action as mediated by past and future in the context of a 
fundamental divergence between the space of experience and the horizon of 
expectation in post-1994 South Africa, and the challenges that this poses to the 
mediation of personal identity, is a central theme in this thesis. The community 
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gardeners (and in particular the younger gardeners) find themselves at a complex 
temporal intersection: a past where possible identities (that is, the repertoire of 
“available” performances) was greatly circumscribed by the conditions of apartheid, 
and a “New” South African future were this repertoire is supposed to be greatly 
expanded by “freedom”, but where the ability to construct new performance plots in 
the present is constrained. It is constrained by (actual and imagined) experiences of 
the past, together with the limitations imposed by the a priori assumptions of 
mainstream development about who the poor “are”. The actual repertoire of available 
performances (i.e the ability to engage in meaningful action in the present) is bounded 
significantly by the realities of economics, politics and power, as described in the 
previous chapter.  
 
Performance identity is our attempt to create temporal coherence in the “now” in 
terms of both experience and expectation. The question is, how do the gardeners 
achieve temporal plausibility in their performances; how do they make them 
temporally credible, both for their audience and for themselves? For the purposes of 
this thesis I have defined “temporal plausibility” as referring to a coherence between 
who the actor was, who she currently is and who she will be in the future, all situated 
within the macro constraints to plausibility discussed in the previous chapter – 
forbidden performances and expected performances. The audience (and the actor) 
need to believe in the internal logic of the chronological progression of the character 
from then, through now and into the future.  
 
Although temporal coherence in identity probably presents a challenge to most of the 
historically excluded poor who are trying to redefine themselves in terms of the 
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“new” South Africa, I would assert that the quest for temporal coherence is 
particularly challenging for the community gardeners, located as they are in the world 
of agriculture, where history is ranged firmly against them. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this is a world where strong racial stereotypes are still very firmly 
entrenched, reflecting the contemporary reality of South Africa’s agricultural sector. 
Successful commercial farmers are overwhelmingly white, farm labourers are almost 
exclusively black. White farmers and black farm labourers sit at opposite poles of 
standards of living. A key recurring theme in South African farming narratives is the 
“white people are good farmers, black people are bad farmers” storyline (as illustrated 
in Samuel’s account to me of the failed land reform beneficiaries). This theme is 
pervasive in the popular imagination, as well as being partially reinforced by DAFF’s 
“use it or lose it” policies towards land reform beneficiaries and emerging farmers and 
this sets a plausibility barrier in the form of “forbidden” performances. However, it is 
not only the challenge of “objective plausibility” that the gardeners must overcome 
(i.e. how to convince their community and government officials that they are, or can 
be, successful farmers), but also the challenge of “subjective plausibility” (i.e. that 
they themselves believe that this is possible).  
 
The desire to be a particular person in the future (i.e. expectation) is the aspiration that 
is spur to action in the present. However, as Ricoeur (1984) points out, a narrative 
(and in turn a performance) must form a temporally coherent whole; there must be 
some sort of logic, intelligible to the audience, to the sequence of events presented in 
the performance – the interlinking of cause and effect presented in the plot. And this 
is where the challenge for the community gardeners lies: how to achieve this 
continuity of storyline between who they were (which includes who they could have 
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reasonably aspired to be in the past) and who they aspire to be, when in fact the gap 
between the two is enormous. They have exercised considerable ingenuity in bridging 
this gap, and in doing so are effectively creating new hybrid persons who are not 
easily classified in traditional historical, racial or material terms. It is this necessity for 
temporal coherence, I would assert, that goes some way towards explaining what 
seems to be another example of paradoxical behaviour on the part of the community 
gardeners (something I have seen examples of in many other “emerging” famer 
projects) – their strong preference for building relationships with white farmers, and 
the generally friendly tone of those relationships, which stands in marked contrast to 
what their history would suggest.  
 
The possibility of reworking an identity to make it more temporally coherent (and 
thus more plausible) is facilitated by the notion (as expressed by both Ricouer and 
Kosselleck) that neither the past nor the future are composed of a finite set of 
completely verifiable true “facts”, but rather that both are remade on a regular basis. 
Although this is a fairly obvious notion with respect to the future (no one has perfect 
foresight and so our expectations must necessarily change as the present unfolds) it is 
not so obvious with respect to the past, but this conceptualization of personal history 
as a hybrid of fiction and truth is central to the challenge of temporal coherence. After 
all, if it were not possible continuously to remake our past (our “experience”) it would 
not be possible to manage the “gap” between experience and expectation, and thus 
engage in meaningful action. This thesis describes the efforts of the community 
gardeners in the remaking and reconfiguring of their experience – in effect the 
creation of “new” memories - in an endeavour to create a better connection between 
their pasts and their imagined horizons of expectation, and so meet the challenge of 
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temporal plausibility. The distance and details of the horizon of expectation, 
conditioned by your space of experience, impact on what kind of person you 
(reasonably, and keeping in mind the constraints imposed by plausibility) expect you 
may become.  
 
In the first part of this chapter I examine the details of the horizon of expectation, the 
imagined future – how the over-arching theme of progress is envisioned; what the 
future looks and feels like to the community gardeners. I have discussed some 
examples of how the possibility for meaningful action (and thus agency) is in reality 
greatly limited by the mutual conditioning of the space of experience and the horizon 
of expectation.  Thereafter I have considered the various strategies that are employed 
by the gardeners to go about remaking their “space of experience” in order to 
accommodate the possibility of a “better” future, and thus expand their ability to 
undertake meaningful action. A key point to make here is that, although there are 
some general over-arching themes – such as progress itself and the necessity of 
linking past and future in the present, the details of how temporal coherence is 
achieved are largely individual and contextual. For each of the cooperatives (Motse 
and Tshimo) and the members within those cooperatives, there were fundamental 
differences in how the future was imagined (limited, I have argued, by differences in 
the space of experience). This was not static, however: I observed that an expansion 
of the space of experience could result in an expansion of the horizon of expectation, 
and thus an expansion of what was temporally plausible in performances of identity. 
In this way, a creative remaking of experience can facilitate a remaking and 
“expansion” of the person. This dialectic reinforces the idea that there is a constant 
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and flexible mutual conditioning of past, present and future, mediated by 
performances of identity.  
 
5.2. Horizons of expectation: “We are moving forwards” 
The theme of progress, the desirability of “moving forward” is ever-present in 
contemporary post-1994 South Africa. That year is a temporal talisman of sort; a 
dividing line between a period when to be a black person was to have little 
expectation of the future; and a time when everyone can have a better life. This idea 
of a considerable expansion of the horizon of expectation is the over-arching theme 
that pervades all government policy, and all development planning in South Africa: 
The future will be different from the past, and it will be better than the past. Despite 
the various official disappointments in achieving that better future (most notably in 
the areas of income equality and employment), the conviction of moving away from 
the past remains strong. As President Zuma put it at the inaugural meeting of the 
National Planning Commission on 11 May 2010: “The establishment of the National 
Planning Commission is our promise to the people of South Africa that we are 
building a state that will grow the economy, reduce poverty and improve the quality 
of life of our citizens.” (NPC, 2012, p1).  
 
The general idea of progress as forward momentum from the past is held by all the 
gardeners, albeit to different degrees, and imagined in different ways. Samuel at 
Motse describes success in tomato sales as “now we are moving.” When Sarah at 
Tshimo talks about the brief period of success that the garden enjoyed before the fall 
out with Charles she describes how “we were moving forward”. Now, however, “we 
are going nowhere, we are stuck here.” 
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This imperative of “moving forward” mirrors in many ways the dominant discourse 
of development in contemporary South Africa. “Development” itself is fundamentally 
about leaving the past behind and moving into a new and brighter future. Metaphors 
of motion abound in the language of policy makers, provincial agricultural officers 
and community gardeners. It is, I would assert, the desire to be the kind of person who 
is leaving the past behind and moving forward that underpins many of the 
performances of identity described in this thesis. The person almost everyone wants to 
avoid being is someone who is “stuck” in the past. In very generic terms, the past 
person who must be discarded is a poor black person for whom apartheid provided no 
space to believe in a different future; and the future person is someone who “is going 
somewhere”, who is on her way to getting that better future in the “new” South 
Africa.  
 
The key point here is the equation of “better” with “different”: it is very hard to 
construct a plausible performance of identity around “moving forward” when the 
main components of that performance appear to others to be identical to some “past” 
person. This is the critical issue that all the gardeners must overcome. The desire to 
leave the past person behind and to embrace a new person generates some particularly 
complex problems when you are a community gardener: Much of what characterizes 
a past poor black person (i.e. under apartheid) is inextricably bound up with notions 
of dirty work, the obligation of and restriction to manual labour (agricultural labour in 
particular) and the bleakness of scratching a living from the earth in a remote corner 
  157 
of a Bantustan31. But how do you separate yourself from that past when your present 
and your future are based in agriculture, food production and undeniably dirty work? 
This challenge is, I would assert, the key driver behind the complexities of plot 
construction, characterisation and the choice of material “props” that make up the 
performances of identity described in this thesis. This desire to disconnect oneself 
from a past that is in fact unavoidably present in both your present and your future 
also has implications for the creation of temporal coherence in performances, since 
experience conditions expectation, and vice-versa.  
 
Moller (2005) describes a school gardening project where students were encouraged 
to work in the garden in return for a free lunch at the school. This proved a powerful 
disincentive, since working in the garden (even for students who genuinely enjoyed 
the activity) was now associated with being so poor that you were in desperate need 
of that free meal. During the period of my fieldwork I met a wildlife conservation 
NGO field worker at a conference. He was working in rural KwaZulu Natal, and had 
also been surprised by the negative attitude towards food gardening that he often 
encountered. He told me the story of a rural school that had started a food garden, and 
had decided that the children should work in that garden for an hour or so each day. 
Parents were outraged when they heard of the scheme, confronting the headmaster 
with “this is Bantu education32. When we were at school we had to work in the 
garden. Our children are not coming to school to be gardeners.” Clearly these parents 
were adamant about separating their children’s futures from their own pasts.  
                                                        
31 The so-called independent self-governing territories within South Africa, established under apartheid 
as an extension of the ideology of “separate development” and to which many black South Africans 
were exiled after forced removal from “white” areas.  
32 The segregated education system under apartheid was specifically geared towards excluding black 
South Africans from skilled jobs or the professions, and thus focused on providing only the most 
rudimentary level of education for those who were not “entitled” to have ambitions beyond labourer.  
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It should be pointed out that being a gardener was not the first choice of any of the 
community gardeners in either of the two gardens: instead the gardener (and 
developing from that the ideal of a “farmer”) became an adopted persona out of a 
combination of necessity, sometimes (as in the case of the Motse gardeners) tempered 
by positive experience. Both Kabelo and Samuel at Motse were quite clear that their 
first choice of job was some kind of office job – the kind of job that would most 
clearly effect a temporal split between the future and the past. Very soon after I 
started working at Motse Kabelo said told me that “by now I thought I would have an 
office job, sitting at a nice desk, drinking tea”, but both he and Samuel agreed that 
without some kind of formal qualification (which they did not have) this was not 
possible. And so they had adjusted their expectations, and the successes of the Motse 
Co-op had supported a reworking of those expectations into something desirable 
(although probably not as desirable as that office job). “I have learned”, said Kabelo, 
“that dirty work can also be a good job.” 
 
There is no one universal “horizon of expectation” evident across all the gardeners. 
Conceptions of the future differ considerably between the two cooperatives, and 
among the members of those cooperatives, both in terms of the perceived temporal 
“gap” between the horizon of expectation and the space of experience (i.e. how much 
better will the future be than the past), as well as in the details of what that future will 
look like. In addition, these expectations had changed in the period before I joined the 
gardens (as recounted to me by the gardeners themselves), and I witnessed them 
changing during my time with the gardeners. My initial observations about the 
differences in the horizon of expectation were around the differences between the 
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gardens, and then among the members of each cooperative within those gardens. I 
would assert that these differences reflect the relationship between the horizon of 
expectation and the space of experience of each cooperative member, and show 
clearly both the conditionality of the relationship between the two, and the resulting 
impact on both the extent of agency, and the possibilities of meaningful action.  
 
The members of the Motse Co-op had a generally much more positive and expansive 
(i.e. a further horizon) view of what the future would bring than the members of the 
Tshimo Co-op. They looked forward to the growth of the garden, the extra income 
that would come from the three new tunnels and their new chicken house. They had 
also invested in two entirely new businesses by the end of my time in the garden – 
firewood and the door-to-door delivery of paraffin. There was a general air of 
optimism in the garden and the gardeners often talked about how “lucky” the project 
was. They were also very future-oriented in their decision-making in the present: all 
the extra income in the garden (over and above what was spent on regular inputs and 
their R800 per month stipends) was saved for investment into expansion. None of the 
Co-op members suggested that they should instead take the money and use it to 
increase their monthly income.  
 
In terms of what the future looked like, and particularly what kind of persons they 
would be in that future, there was a general consensus at Motse (although for the 
purposes of the discussion below it is important to point out that it was the younger 
members of the Motse cooperative that articulated this view most clearly and most 
frequently). At some point in the future, if they could keep “moving forward”, they 
would have their own farm, and they would be “proper” farmers. It is important to 
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emphasise that, for the Motse gardeners, their horizon of expectation was described 
almost exclusively in terms of the kinds of persons they would be, rather than in terms 
of how much money they would have, reflecting Gibson’s (2011) assertion that what 
is at stake for the poor in South Africa is not their material circumstances, but rather 
the struggle to be a particular kind of person.  
 
As examples, when talking about their hopes for the future of the cooperative the 
Motse members would describe in great detail what their farm would look like (it 
would be big), what would be on it (there would be tractors and a bakkie33 and a 
“proper” packhouse and a “proper” office instead of the converted container) and 
their role on that farm (“we will own the farm and we will have people to do the 
work.”) These descriptions of material objects were intended to imply a particular 
type of person, not a particular kind of materiality. Not one of the Motse members 
ever included in the description of this future place “and we will make a lot of 
money”.  
 
When we made our regular visits to Silver Leaf Farm the Motse members spent a lot 
of time asking Retief about the details of how he constructs his growing tunnels, how 
he lays out the seedlings and the irrigation systems, what chemicals he sprays, and 
how many people he employs. They never, ever asked how much the salad was sold 
for, but they were extremely taken when they hear that it goes to Woolworths34, 
which for them is an unattainable retail nirvana, an unmistakable indication of just 
how good the Silver Leaf farm is. 
                                                         
33 A small pick-up truck 
34 South Africa’s most up-market food retailer.  
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Certainly the Motse Co-op members found it very hard to make ends meet on their 
R800 a month stipends paid from the project (which they were now paying out of 
their own retained income, rather than receiving them as part of their NDA grant), and 
it would not be unreasonable to assume that they desired to earn more than that to 
ease the constant worry about money. But when they did talk about their monetary 
ambitions for the project, it was usually the form of the income that was emphasized, 
not the amount: “We are waiting”, said Kabelo, “for that day when we can get a 
salary, and not a stipend”. Stipends are for project participants, salaries are for people 
who have proper jobs.  
 
I observed a narrative sub-theme common among the members of the Motse Co-op, 
related to defining what kind of people they believed themselves to be, which in turn 
defined a large part of what they expected from the future. That narrative theme was 
one of effort, sacrifice and “deserving”.  They often talked about “easy come, easy 
go” to refer to a person’s inability to hold onto money that had been earned with too 
little effort (such as a winning lottery ticket, or from gambling in a casino). In 
contrast, if one had worked hard for one’s money, and encountered hard times and 
struggled for success in the process, then that money would be properly respected, 
and not be wasted on frivolities. It would stay with you in the future. Once again, the 
basic idea underpinning this conceptualization of an aspired-to person was not that 
hard work would earn a person more money (although it certainly could), but that the 
money earned in this way was somehow more meaningful and more valuable than 
that earned through easier means. In my view, this particular narrative sub-theme 
supported the assessment that the community gardeners’ primary motivation was not 
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money by any means, but rather being the kind of person who deserved what it was 
that they had – who had earned it through hard work and commitment.  
 
For Sarah and Elizabeth in Tshimo there was none of the bright optimism seen at 
Motse. For them the possibilities of the future were envisioned as only slightly better 
than their present circumstances. Sarah recalled the brief period when the garden was 
producing enough basic vegetables to sell for a very modest income as the time when 
it was fulfilling its promise. For her, a “better” future was defined as a garden running 
in an efficient manner, with some extra members so that the work was not so hard, 
generating her a few extra hundred Rands per month in income. She was not 
enthusiastic about reinvesting too much money to expand the garden, and she never 
indicated that she shared any of Jacob’s relatively grand plans. Elizabeth’s 
expectations seemed even more modest. She appeared quite content to work hard in 
the garden every day in return for the small possibility that there might be some small 
financial reward coming her way some time in the future. Although we spent a lot of 
time together in the Tshimo garden, she never articulated any ambitions around the 
expansion of the garden, or having a farm, or indeed that her life could significantly 
change and improve.  
 
Jacob from Tshimo fell somewhere between these two groups (i.e. Motse and his 
fellow gardeners). He certainly seemed to feel a very keen desire to make a break 
with the past, to have that promised “better life” made real. I think that this desire was 
strengthened by the fact that he seemed to have a number of friends who were getting 
ahead: he spoke of them as people who had good jobs, and with whom he would 
spend the weekends “having a good time.” In this group his persona as a community 
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gardener made him firmly stuck in a past the others were moving on from. Of all the 
Motse and Tshimo members, Jacob was the one who seemed to feel most strongly the 
humiliation associated with being a gardener, and the one who would make the 
biggest efforts to avoid that. I once asked Jacob why he did not do door-to-door sales 
in the adjacent location. It was clear to me from Motse’s example that there was a 
ready market to hand for fresh vegetables at a reasonable price. He told me that when 
he had on a previous occasion gone around with a wheelbarrow to sell tomatoes, his 
neighbours and friends had laughed at him and he had not done it again. As the 
chairperson of the cooperative Jacob had decided that their primary goal should be 
selling their produce, not growing it for their own consumption (an important 
distinction for him), but he could not bear the humiliation that was associated with the 
only sales method available to him.  
 
Jacob articulated ambitions that the garden would expand, that the membership of the 
cooperative would grow, and that the garden would be some kind of commercial 
success. My initial impression was that he was trying to impress me with the potential 
success of the garden, on the erroneous belief that I was somehow reporting back to 
the provincial official who had first brought me to the garden. As an example, in our 
first few meetings he spoke a lot about the sales that the garden made in response to 
my questions around this, but after I had spent a few weeks in the garden it became 
clear that there were no sales at all, apart from very infrequent visits by teachers from 
the school to the garden. Once Jacob realized that I did not, in fact, have any 
relationship with the GDRARD manager and was not relaying any information to 
him, the stories about the potential of the garden largely stopped. These selling 
narratives were Jacob’s way of presenting the garden as a successful commercial 
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enterprise, reflecting his own hopes and ambitions, rather than any reality. “One day”, 
he said, “we will have a bakkie, and then we will do proper selling, and we will have 
a contract with Shoprite35.” In this respect, however, I never found his performance 
very plausible, and I do not think that either Sarah or Elizabeth did: he had not 
succeeded in creating Ricoeur’s concordant whole in his performances. I do not think 
that Jacob found his performance particularly plausible either, but it appeared to be 
his only way of avoiding the reality of his life as a gardener.  
 
In defining their horizons of expectation, Sarah and Elizabeth reflected a similar 
worldview as they did in their interactions with provincial officials, Beki (the school 
caretaker) and the local councilor. They clearly did not believe that they were entitled 
to more than the very little they received. In addition, their expectations of the future, 
such as they were, were described to me largely in monetary terms (albeit extremely 
modest terms). This did not suggest to me that they were more materialistic than the 
Motse members (or even than Jacob), but rather that they did not really believe it was 
entirely plausible that they should be different persons in the future, merely the same 
persons with a little extra money. The could not see themselves as successful farmers, 
or managing any kind of commercial enterprise selling anything to Shoprite. Both 
Sarah and Elizabeth had demonstrated agency, and a small step towards change by 
signing up for and completing the plant production course at the community college; 
and by joining the cooperative; and by arriving at work on a regular basis. But their 
ability to envisage the nature and scope of that future – their horizon of expectation – 
was severely limited. I would suggest that this limited horizon of expectation was 
conditioned by their limited space of experience: there was nothing in Sarah’s or 
                                                        
35 South Africa’s largest food retail chain 
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Elizabeth’s lived history which supported the idea that they could make their future 
fundamentally better or different. This in turn greatly limited their scope for 
meaningful action and thus the extent of their agency. For Sarah and Elizabeth the 
temporal dissonance was too great to be entirely overcome by any amount of creative 
emplotment, although (as described below) even they could find creative ways to 
enlarge their space of experience just a little.  
 
I would assert that Sarah and Elizabeth’s space of experience was fundamentally 
limited by a combination of their personal histories, their age (late forties and early 
fifties) and their gender (although admittedly all the older persons in the gardens were 
women). Both women had lived their entire lives in abject poverty, mostly in squalid 
informal settlements. They had very little education, no resources and no prospects. 
As poor black women they had lived their entire lives at the bottom of the social, 
cultural and economic ladder. (Elizabeth, with her noticeably San features probably 
was even lower down the rungs than Sarah). Their space of experience was one of 
forbearance and endurance, not optimism. As Koselleck (2004) has pointed out, the 
ability to engage in meaningful action to change your circumstances requires that you 
are able, even in fuzzy terms, to imagine yourself in a particular future, as plausibly 
carrying out a certain future performance. Your ability to do so is circumscribed by 
your space of experience; this intersection is where the plausibility of identity is 
tested.  
 
I would further suggest that Sarah and Elizabeth’s historical barrier to seeing 
themselves as different persons in the future was also the reason why they initially 
appeared to me be so apathetic about the indifference of the provincial officials that 
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was threatening their project. The broken borehole episode, which occurred a few 
weeks into my time at the garden is a good example of the dynamics at work. One day 
I arrived at the garden to find that no water was coming from the borehole tanks. This 
was a serious problem: there were hundreds of newly planted seedlings in the garden 
and it was very hot. I asked Sarah what the story was (Jacob was on one of his many 
absences) and she just shrugged and said it was broken. A few days later it was the 
same story, and the next time after that. Although I helped to carry water for the 
plants, I was getting annoyed, not just with the lack of response from the officials, but 
also with Sarah and Elizabeth, for what I perceived as their “whatever” attitude. On 
the third visit I asked Sarah if she had phoned the GDARD manager to complain: not 
only had she not done so, she was clear that she would do no such thing. Once again, I 
was annoyed at her apparent lack of interest, and nagged her until she did call.  
 
It was only much later I realized that her inaction had nothing to do with apathy or 
lack of interest. On the contrary, she was deeply concerned about the implications of 
the failed water supply for the garden. But she did not believe that a person like her 
had the “right” to demand anything at all from the government official, despite the 
“fact” that it was his job to do his best to make sure that her garden succeeded. She 
was also nervous about his perceived power to push her out of the garden if she was 
seen as “troublesome”. The garden wasn’t much, but she had nothing else. Her 
horizon of expectation in this regard was so limited as to be virtually non-existent. 
And why? Because nothing in Sarah’s life had ever given her the idea that she could 
be the kind of person who could demand (or even politely request) that the official do 
his job. In her world, whether or not he assisted with the borehole was entirely at his 
discretion, and had nothing to do with anything she might need or require. Without 
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the kind of external factors that had allowed the Motse members to take charge of 
their performance scripts, she never would have the opportunity to expand her space 
of experience to be robust enough to support an expanded vision of her own future. It 
is the reality of this history – this downtrodden space of experience – that effectively 
limits Sarah and Elizabeth’s agency to be equal persons with that provincial official, 
no matter how much “freedom” they have on paper.  
 
I observed that it was the younger members of both gardens who were the most 
optimistic about the future, and who were most likely to articulate that future in terms 
of the kinds of persons that they aspired to be (i.e. “proper” farmers). Even at Motse, 
the two older members of the Co-op (Grace and Rebecca) very seldom articulated the 
“proper” farmer future that the younger members did. Instead they gave general 
versions of hopes that things would go better and that the project would “grow”. At 
Tshimo, Jacob, although generally unconvincing in his performance of who he was 
going to be, also had a fairly ambitious idea of what kind of enterprise the garden 
might become, and his role in that. I would suggest that this age-determined 
difference simply reflects social and historical events: None of the younger members 
in either garden has a strong personal recollection of apartheid. Although they 
certainly feel the practical limitations of their colour and their poverty on their 
aspirations, and are regularly subjected to the kind of casual racism that has become 
entrenched in small towns, there is nothing legislated, nothing so final as the reality of 
apartheid. They may have little real chance of ever drastically changing their lives 
within the power structures imposed by mainstream development, but the possibility 
that they could do so now exists.  
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5.3. “No expectation without experience; no experience without expectation”36: 
expanding expectation by expanding experience.  
Throughout the greatest part of my time at Motse the members’ hopes and ambitions 
for the cooperative continued to increase, as did their belief that they might actually 
achieve these goals. They had not always been so optimistic: Samuel remembered a 
time when the Motse members had been “just sitting here; no resources, no 
connections…” I would propose that their later expanding horizon of expectation was 
made possible in part by a growing space of actual experience: as the present 
unfolded and they could add small progresses to their personal histories, and the 
history of the cooperative, so their conceptualisations of what could be possible in the 
future also expanded, in a temporally coherent manner. Their ability to remake 
themselves as more assertive persons in the relationship with NTC was, I would 
argue, supported in part by their growing experience of that assertiveness, of 
themselves as different persons. Each small success against NTC expanded the space 
of experience, which in turn conditioned the horizon of expectation, and created the 
possibility of additional meaningful actions. Thus the rescripting of the NTC 
performance was made temporally credible, achieving the necessary coherence 
between who the Motse members had been, who they were and who they could be.  
 
I observed a similar process in the expansion of the Motse Co-op’s horizon of 
expectation mediated by a widening of the space of experience in the adoption of new 
sales strategies. The increase in production at the garden during my time there created 
something of a problem: how to sell everything that was grown. All the Motse 
members were adamant that they would not be “one of those projects were the stuff 
                                                        
36 Koselleck, 2004, p257 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goes rotten”, watching all their hard work amount to nothing, but there was only so 
much that they could sell to Spar and the nearby China shop, and neither of those 
would take their spinach or the smaller tomatoes (of which there were plenty). They 
sold directly to customers who came to the garden, but this represented only small 
sales at irregular intervals. The members did occasionally walk around Motse doing 
door-to-door sales, which showed good results, but this was a fairly small market, 
nowhere near big enough for the hundreds of bunches of spinach and packets of 
tomatoes they would soon have to sell to prevent those piles of rotting produce. In 
conversation with the members I raised the possibility that I could transport them to 
nearby informal settlements (thereby removing one of the big cost obstacles) where 
they could do door-to-door sales. Initially there was very little enthusiasm for the 
idea, based, as far as I could tell, on the issue that they did not “know” that many 
people in these settlements.  
 
I continued to suggest the idea, and the spinach and tomatoes continued to grow, and 
one day I arrived at the garden to find big black plastic boxes (donated by GDARD 
and emblazoned with the GDARD logo) filled with packets of tomatoes (about 6 to a 
pack) and washed and tied bunches of cut spinach (big bunches – about 10cm across 
the diameter at the base). Samuel announced that today they would be going (with my 
assistance) to Maqa Hills (a relatively small informal settlement about 10 kilometres 
away, on the road to Steynsville). “We know some people there”, he said.  
 
Six of the members got in the car with me, together with the boxes of spinach and 
tomatoes. None of them seemed enthusiastic, and there was little conversation during 
the drive. I got the distinct impression that they were making the trip at Samuel’s 
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insistence that something had to be done. When we arrived in Maqa Hills, stopping 
under a tree near the dilapidated general store, the group was noticeably nervous; a bit 
worried that they would not be received well and fail in their selling plan. They were 
all neatly dressed in their blue overalls, much more so than they would normally be at 
the garden. Bontle told me later that “customers like to see that you are neatly 
dressed.” They split into 3 pairs (selling always takes place in pairs, that way there 
can be no argument about how much money should be handed over at the end of the 
selling) and Samuel carefully counted out and recorded how many packets and 
bunches went to each pair (for the same reason). Both the tomatoes and the spinach 
were to be sold for R5, a very cheap price considering the quality of the produce and 
the retail alternatives. I wished them luck, and said that I would be back in an hour 
and a half. “I hope we will sell something by then”, said Samuel. 
 
An hour and a half later I came back to find all six smiling and joking under the tree. 
The sales had been a tremendous success: not only had they sold everything, but they 
had been warmly welcomed and complimented on the quality of their produce. 
Thereafter selling trips were a regular occurrence, and expanded to other nearby 
settlements. The Motse members that went selling became enthusiastic about it, and 
gradually increased the amount of produce that they took with them. Near the end of 
my time in the gardens Kabelo had organized a deal with a number of local spaza 
shop owners to collect big tubs of bulk tomatoes (generally the smaller, riper ones) at 
R50 each. “We are known to have good tomatoes,” Kabelo told me when I asked how 
he had initiated the deal. They had also started negotiations with a local manufacturer 
of tomato sauce. As their experience of selling increased, and they saw positive 
results, so their space of experience expanded, facilitating a corresponding increase in 
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their horizon of expectation: because they could now imagine themselves as 
successful sales people they felt confident enough to act in that manner.  
 
I also witnessed one occasion when the cooperative tried to take a step forward that 
was not anchored in their space of experience (i.e. to “innovate”). In mid-May the 
cooperative was approached by a woman (Suzy) who had a small restaurant/craft 
shop on the road to Steynsville, a few kilometres from the garden. She appeared a 
very well-meaning person, involved in local charities, and keen to support the 
cooperative, which I had told her about when I stopped in for coffee one day. Samuel 
and Lesego and Mpho came to the shop to meet Suzy. They were very impressed, 
both by her shop and by her. Suzy was planning to start a Sunday market in the 
grounds of her place, and thought it would be “wonderful” if the Motse Co-op had a 
vegetable stand at the opening market (for which she would not charge them a fee), 
planned for late May. Samuel and the others agreed, but they had put themselves in a 
bit of a corner: at that time of the year all they had to sell was some spinach and the 
first of the second crop of tomatoes planted in one of the tunnels, but Samuel did not 
want to disappoint Suzy or undermine her impression of Motse as a “serious” 
vegetable growing enterprise. So the members decided to take R700 out of their bank 
account and go to a vegetable wholesaler in Rooidal and buy an extensive range of 
vegetables for their stand.  
 
The market was a dismal failure. It had not been particularly well-advertised, and the 
chosen day was freezing cold, with a nasty wind. Samuel and Lesego spent the day 
standing in the cold, and sold R45 worth of vegetables. Although they managed to sell 
a little more in Motse the following days, most of the R700 was lost. Samuel was very 
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upset about it, berating himself for taking the risk. He never again would consider 
participating in the market, even when it appeared that it was becoming a modest 
success, or anything similar. This incident highlighted for me the enormous 
difficulties that are faced by micro enterprises like Motse in innovating to any 
considerable degree. The potential risk of trying something completely new (neither 
Samuel nor anyone else in the cooperative had ever attended a farmers’ market, nor 
did they know anyone who had), something that was entirely unrelated to the space of 
experience, was clearly significant.  They did not have a reference point for 
calculating a range of likely scenarios of the outcomes of their participation.  
 
5.4. Something borrowed: remaking the space of experience  
 
“And the moral of the story is that you don't remember what happened. What you 
remember becomes what happened.”  
(John Green – An Abundance of Katherines) 
 
The relationship between experience and expectation varied considerably among the 
different gardeners, and I have argued that differences in the horizon of expectation 
were related to differences in the space of experience. This resulted in a wide variance 
in the actual agency of the different gardeners to undertake meaningful action. In the 
discussion above, about the Motse Co-op’s selling experiments in the nearby 
settlements, I have highlighted what I have termed an expansion in the space of actual 
experience, by which I intend to mean the way in which the space of experience may 
be expanded by those things that are either directly experienced by the members of 
the cooperative (such as being directly involved in a successful sales trip) or shared 
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among the members of the cooperative in a way that makes it a “group” experience 
(such as discussing the details of a successful sales trip with those members who had 
stayed behind at the garden). These experiences are then incorporated into each 
person’s history. However, keeping in mind Ricoeur’s assertion that there is no easy 
division between truth and fiction in what we consider to be “history” (Ricoeur, 1984) 
I also observed that this was not the only way in which the space of experience could 
be expanded. There were also ways in which the gardeners could remake and expand 
“their” space of experience by borrowing and assimilating the experiences of others, 
(which they had not experienced either directly or indirectly) thereby effectively 
incorporating it into their own personal histories.  
 
This borrowing allowed the gardeners to expand their space for meaningful action 
(and thereby their potential to exercise greater agency) while still maintaining the 
necessary temporal coherence between who they had “been” and who they could be, 
by means of the creative remaking of their experiences. They did this through a 
variety of methods based on imitating the events, actions and mannerisms associated 
with the borrowed experience (mostly because what was “available” to them was the 
visible, tangible and physical evidence of the experience, rather than an insight into 
what was “behind” this). This was, however, much more than simple imitation of 
those seen as more successful than themselves (such as the culturally biased 
transmission processes described by Henrich, 2002). Rather, the experiences in 
question (whether they were particular events or the actions of particular persons) 
were incorporated into the space of experience of the person, effectively making the 
experiences of someone else a part of their own history. They could thereafter draw 
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on “memory” to inform meaningful action in the present, even though that memory 
was not, strictly speaking, their own.  
 
The difference between imitation and incorporation is critical. Imitation (such as 
copying the hairstyle of your favourite Hollywood star) is, I would assert, about 
changing your and other’s perceptions of yourself. Incorporation is about effectively 
becoming another person. Incorporation changes who you were, who you are and who 
you could be; imitation, in this example, simply makes you look different (this is not 
to argue that physical “props” are not important in presenting plausible 
characterisations, simply that incorporation is a much more fundamental process of 
personhood.) It is unlikely that someone who copies Beyonce’s hairstyle thereafter 
believes that her childhood and upbringing is now “theirs”, and that they are now able 
to become a multi-millionaire singing sensation. But this is what incorporation of 
experience does: it changes the possibilities for your future by changing “your” past.  
 
These newly incorporated memories created the potential for greater agency: after all, 
if you could “remember” that you had succeeded in a particular endeavour you would 
feel more confident that you might succeed in another. The idea of incorporation 
reinforced for me both the fluidity and the flexibility of agency, as well as the 
importance of temporal coherence in creating the space in which agency is possible.  
 
In order to be incorporated in this way, the experience has first to be “available”, and 
it also has to meet some kind of plausibility test. You cannot successfully incorporate 
“memories” that are not in some way connected to your existing history, and the 
person that you are in the present. This is another key difference between borrowing 
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memories for incorporation into your space of experience, and simply imitating one or 
another attribute of someone you admire. The plausibility test was, I observed, a 
subjective assessment (i.e. each individual had their own ideas about plausibility for 
themselves) but it was clearly informed by the person’s ideas about objective 
plausibility; that is, how believable would this person be to others. For persons like 
Sarah and Elizabeth at Tshimo, whose lives were a story about always being lesser 
persons, the plausibility constraint was considerable. This meant that only a very 
modest expansion in the space of experience through borrowing was possible (this is 
not to suggest that the process may not be incremental in the long term, merely that 
this is what I observed during my limited time with them). However, both Sarah and 
Elizabeth were able to expand their horizon of expectation (albeit only very modestly) 
when they were able to remake their space of experience, which in turn was made 
possible by a series of interactions with the Motse gardeners.  
 
Samuel at Motse became curious about the garden at Tshimo as soon as he realized 
that I was spending part of my time there for my research. He asked me about the 
details of who was working in the garden, what they were planting, how they were 
doing. When I told him about the problems that the garden was experiencing he 
seemed to feel them very personally, referring back to the time when the Motse 
garden had just started, and the fears that they would never achieve anything. He 
started to ask if he could not go and visit the Tshimo gardeners, and one day I took 
him there with me. The Tshimo gardeners knew from me about Motse, that it was also 
a cooperative gardening project, but that it had been going for several years, and that 
it was doing well. Samuel got a reception that could best be described as “delighted”. 
I had never seen the three Tshimo members so enthusiastic, so animated. Samuel sat 
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on a pile of compost bags in the container/office and spoke to them for almost an 
hour; about the history of the Motse Co-op; the challenges that they had overcome; 
their fears of failure; and their ultimate success. He drew many parallels between the 
struggles that Motse had overcome, and the struggles that Tshimo was currently 
experiencing. He impressed on them that no government official was going to make 
their lives better, if they wanted something they would have to work for it themselves.   
Sarah and Elizabeth and Jacob might have heard this hard work mantra before, but 
they had never heard from someone so similar to themselves, but who had achieved 
so differently. Samuel was just like them (in a way that the extension officers and the 
school principle were not), but also fundamentally different. He was, therefore, the 
ideal source for remaking their space of experience.  
 
What I saw after Samuel’s visit was that the Tshimo members interpreted their 
experience of the garden in a different way, effectively making it different.  They no 
longer remembered the problems in the garden as a bad ending to a story that had 
started well (with their early successes), but rather as part of a process, a painful, but 
necessary step towards future success. They had effectively incorporated the Motse 
experience of a garden into their personal histories. This remaking of their past 
allowed them to expand their space of expectation, albeit it very modestly in the case 
of Sarah and Elizabeth, and after Samuel’s visit there was a renewed sense of purpose 
in their work in the garden. They tidied up the container/office, they made subtle 
changes to the way in which they constructed the garden beds, and to how they 
planted the plants. They were remaking their physical environment to reflect the 
subtle changes in who they had been, who they were and who they could become. A 
remade history had created a small space for them to imagine that a better future 
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could actually materialize from their efforts; a synthesis of their experience with 
Samuel’s had created a new temporal progression towards an expanded horizon. At 
much the same time they also managed to get a new cooperative member – Violet, a 
friend of Elizabeth, a small success that seemed in keeping with this new storyline. 
Things were looking up. 
 
A few days after the visit by Samuel to Tshimo I took the (now) four members of the 
Tshimo Co-op to visit Motse. There they were given a tour around the tunnels, where 
the winter tomatoes and spinach were growing well. Later both groups stood together 
in a circle in the sun, and the Motse members relived the history of their garden, their 
failures, their successes and, above all, their hard work. The Tshimo members were 
very, very impressed: never had they imagined that a group could progress from a 
basic garden of the type they had to this smart arrangement of tunnels; a place of 
business and purpose; a place very, very different from theirs. “This is not a project”, 
said Jacob as he walked through the tunnels, “this is a farm”. The visit to Motse made 
real in his mind a temporal connection between past, present and future. He accepted 
Lesego’s stern criticism that he was not doing a good job as the chairperson of the 
group, and that he was lazy.  
 
On the trip back to Tshimo there was lots of talk and laughter, and planning, with 
Jacob seemingly very enthusiastic about getting momentum in their garden. His 
transition to enthusiastic community gardener was short-lived, however, and after a 
week or so of regular appearances in the garden he largely disappeared. I only saw 
him again a few times, and it became clear to me that he could not see a future for 
himself in the garden because he really didn’t want to be a gardener, even a relatively 
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successful one like Samuel or Lesego. Neither their history nor their future could be 
reconciled with his desire to be a completely different person. It seemed to me that he 
avoided incorporating any of their experiences into his own because that would 
effectively expand his history as a community gardener, making it harder to escape 
from.  
 
In contrast, the Motse gardeners, by virtue of their relatively greater existing space of 
experience, and this applied particularly to the younger gardeners, were able to 
assimilate much more ambitious and aspirational memories and experiences, while 
still maintaining plausibility. Samuel in particular was a good example of 
significantly remaking his space of experience through his interactions with Retief at 
Silver Leaf. Initially he clearly saw Retief as his superior in the world of farming, but 
as they spent more time together Samuel began to incorporate Retief’s recounted 
farming experience and his observed behaviour into his (Samuel’s) version of 
himself. Once again, this was not simply about imitating Retief: instead it was about 
incorporating Retief’s memories of farming into his own, remaking and expanding 
his space of farming experience. This expansion of the space of experience in turn 
facilitated an expansion in Samuel’s horizon of expectation, and thus an enhanced 
present in which a greater range of meaningful action was possible because it was 
now plausible.  
 
After a while Samuel began to act as Retief’s equal, and to gain more confidence in 
his dealings with people like NTC, and the company that was finally awarded the 
contract for the three new tunnels. When this latter company visited Motse to make 
arrangements for the erection of the tunnels, he participated confidently in the 
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discussion, suggesting where and how the preparatory work for the tunnels should be 
undertaken. This did not reflect his actual experience at Motse (the new tunnels were 
of a different design to the existing tunnels), but rather his assimilation of Retief’s 
experiences, which he was now able to “remember” as his own. During these 
conversations with the tunnel suppliers he did not say “this is what Retief at Silver 
Leaf thinks we should do”, but rather made it clear that this is what he and the 
cooperative thought should be done, based on their experience.  
 
Samuel’s remade past had effectively made him a different person in the present. He 
became much more certain about the way in which things ought to be done at the 
garden, referring back to “his” experience. At one point Samuel told me that he would 
really like to learn to speak Afrikaans, because “it is such a beautiful language.” 
Afrikaans (Retief’s home language) for Samuel wasn’t the language of oppression it 
is often assumed to be, it was the language of farming, the language of this new 
expanded space of experience. Learning to speak Afrikaans would add an additional 
layer of plausibility to these learned memories of farming. 
 
I would also propose that a narrative sub-theme of sacrifice and deserving, which 
drew considerably on traditional Christian values (as these were understood by the 
Motse members) such as hard work and life as a struggle, had an important role to 
play in countering the narratives and performances of belittlement that were so much 
a part of the gardeners’ daily lives. This narrative assisted them in resisting the 
negative characterisations – such as “lazy” or “wanting something for nothing” – that 
development officials were so keen to impose on them. The incorporation of biblical 
values into their self-characterisations enabled them to effectively “borrow” the 
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history of someone else (like Jesus) into their space of experience, and thereby 
effectively expand their horizon of expectation beyond the limitations of personhood 
imposed by others apparently more powerful than they were. They seemed to draw 
particular encouragement from stories that emphasized the humiliation of Jesus at his 
crucifixion. Bontle was the person most likely to vocalize her views on the 
similarities between Jesus and the Motse members, although they were all regular 
churchgoers. On one occasion all of us were working close to one another washing 
and tying spinach bunches for selling. She said something in Tswana, to general 
agreement, and then translated for my benefit: “Tracy, I think that we in the 
cooperative, we are suffering to get somewhere. We are suffering like Jesus, but now 
we are moving forward”. She was clear that the current period of progress in the 
cooperative – the three new tunnels were up and planted, and they were doing regular 
sales in Motse and surrounding communities – were somehow “right”, that the Motse 
members “deserved” their success as part of a correct progression showing that there 
were earthly rewards for suffering as much as heavenly ones. In this manner was the 
temporal plausibility of who they had “been” maintained with respect to who they 
could become.  
 
 
 
Postscript 
The visit to Motse represented a high note for the Tshimo garden which was never 
repeated. After a week or so Jacob more or less disappeared for good. Three weeks 
after the visit to Motse Elizabeth was dead, passing on after a short unnamed illness 
and a few days in a government hospital. I never saw her friend Violet again.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
WHO WILL YOU BE TODAY? CHOOSING AND DEFINING A 
CHARACTER 
 
“...What happens is of little significance compared with the stories we tell ourselves 
about what happens. Events matter little, only stories of events affect us.”  
(Rabih Alameddine – The Hakawati) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Achieving temporal coherence and locating a performance of identity within the 
broad constraints of power, history and expectation is only the first step in presenting 
a successful performance. The details of the performance must now be carefully 
considered – who are the characters to be presented, and what physical objects will be 
used to support the plausibility of these characters? These issues are obviously closely 
interrelated – both experience and expectation are incorporated into performances of 
identity, via a range of tools of emplotment (mise-en-scene, characterization, the 
selection of physical props, etc), all designed to increase both objective plausibility 
(i.e. the likelihood that the audience will believe) and subjective plausibility (the 
likelihood that the actors believe). The next two chapters deal with these two issues – 
the selection of characters and the implementation of these characterisations. 
 
This chapter discusses the challenges of character selection when the constraints of 
plausibility effectively limit which characters are available to which actors. This is not 
to say that actors do not push against these constraints, and may do so successfully. 
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But not everyone has the same agency to attempt such a rebellion, and in consequence 
will have only a very limited repertoire of characters to choose from. In this chapter I 
discuss which characters are considered desirable from the point of view of the 
gardeners, and which are considered so undesirable that the gardeners will go to 
considerable lengths to avoid the possibility that they might be mistaken as one of 
these. Sometimes the differences between desirable and undesirable characters 
appeared so small from my point of view that I could not understand what all the fuss 
was about. But from the gardeners’ point of view these apparently tiny differences 
made literally a world of difference: the difference between being one kind of person 
and another. My initial inability to understand that merely reinforced that I (or 
someone like me) was not the primary intended audience. That intended audience (i.e. 
the community within which the gardeners lived) had the same reference points for 
assessing the characters as the gardeners, the reference points that I did not have, as a 
result of my very different history and present.  
 
My initial confusion also reinforced for me the often-gaping chasm between how 
development officials and practitioners see the world, and how the supposed 
beneficiaries of that development see the world. Most particularly, development 
practitioners seldom “see” or understand, or even acknowledge, the small details of 
characterization that are so important to the actors in question. I have seen this result 
in considerable frustration with the apparent intractability of beneficiaries; with their 
apparently irrational obsession with things that seem utterly unimportant to the larger 
goals of the development initiative; with their apparent refusal to behave in a 
particular way. I have been one of those frustrated people on more than one occasion, 
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sitting across from a group of resisting beneficiaries, thinking to myself “why don’t 
they get it?” It turns out that I was the person who didn’t get it.  
 
 In order to attempt an insight into what is actually going on, I have presented not just 
the detail of what makes up a desirable character, but also proposed the sources of 
these motivations: why are some characteristics considered desirable, while others, 
which seem so similar, are not? The issue of motivation, I was to discover, is not so 
straightforward as some of the status consumption literature presents it, instead 
reflecting the very complex process of characterization. The selected characters are 
never one-dimensional, easily relegated to a particular box made up of a few similar 
characteristics. Instead they are complex, often combining a number of seemingly 
disparate, even contradictory components. They are also fluid, adapting and changing 
for changes in circumstance and audience. This in itself is not a particularly new 
insight: the community gardeners are simply acting in a manner common to persons 
in general. The real issue is that they are generally not expected to do so: for some 
reason most mainstream development practitioners (and indeed almost everyone who 
is not poor) seem to persist in thinking that there is a direct relationship between one’s 
material circumstances and the complexity of your personality. The poorer you are, 
the more one-dimensional you become, reflecting the narrowing of your priorities 
down to the bare essentials of life (as assumed by Banerjee and Duflo, 2006, when 
commencing their study). The reality of the lives of the community gardeners is very 
different.  
 
Even those gardeners whose agency was most limited by their space of experience 
and horizon of expectation – such as Sarah and Elizabeth – would at times resist being 
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characterized as completely passive and helpless victims of their poverty, such as the 
way in which they limited the access of the CWP workers to “their” garden by 
withholding the key to the gate, or how they took to locking that gate during working 
hours so that Beki the caretaker had to ask for their permission to enter the garden. 
They took huge enjoyment in pretending not to notice someone trying to get their 
attention at the gate, and made a point of never apologizing to the CWP workers who 
would sometimes wait an hour or more for one of them to arrive to unlock the gate. 
To an outsider these actions might be considered foolish, petty, even malicious. But 
for Sarah and Elizabeth they represented a significant exercise of agency; critical acts 
of characterization that could make them into different, better (from their point of 
view) persons. 
 
The most complex and ambitious characterisations were undertaken by the younger 
gardeners in both Motse and Tshimo, particularly Jacob from the latter garden. This, I 
would argue, was the result of two factors. Firstly, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the younger gardeners had a much greater potential (latent) agency in respect 
of characterization, because of their greater space of experience and corresponding 
horizon of expectation. Secondly, it became clear to me that Jacob was, from all the 
gardeners, the one most conflicted about the person he would like to be relative to the 
person he currently was. As a result he engaged in some extremely creative ways of 
attempting to bridge this plausibility gap, working very hard to try and separate 
himself from the unwelcome reality of being a community gardener. Ultimately this 
extreme characterization could not be kept up forever, and Jacob left the garden, but 
his efforts in this regard provided me with some of the most important insights into 
the apparently irrational behaviour of development beneficiaries.  
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I would argue that many of the beneficiaries of development initiatives are in fact – 
like Jacob – reluctant participants in something not of their making. Their poverty 
pushes them to take almost any opportunity that comes their way, but their human 
agency compels them to push back against the (from their point of view) degrading 
characterisations that usually accompany that participation.  
 
Many of the characters presented in this chapter (and the next) are made up of 
seemingly irreconcilable components, patched together in a way that may seem messy 
and confused, discordant in the words of Ricouer (1984). This, I would argue, does 
not in any way suggest confusion or irrationality on the part of the gardeners. On the 
contrary, my experience was that their sense of self – who they were and who they 
wanted to be – was strongly held. The conclusion of confusion and irrationality does 
not reflect anything inherently discorandant in the gardeners’ performances of 
identity, but rather the inability of certain audiences to accept the complexity of the 
persons they are and the persons they wish to be. From the point of view of the 
gardeners there is no discordance; in fact they have exercised considerable creative 
imagination in crafting complex characterisations that successfully mediate the 
apparently discordant and heterogeneous components of their performances into the 
concordant whole that is “so necessary for the development of a sense of self-
sameness or “identity”” (Ezzy, 1998, p242). What is required to dispel confusion is 
for the audience of policy makers and development practitioners to correctly interpret 
these performances, not for the performances to change.  
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The analysis presented in this chapter (and the next) of the details of characterization 
and the likely motivations that supported these are subject to an obvious caveat. In the 
context of the gardeners’ larger lives I was only present for a very small time. 
Additionally I was a stranger in their world. My observations and comments thereon 
should be considered in that regard. I do not claim to be making sweeping 
generalisations about who the gardeners “are”; merely to offer some observations and 
comments around those aspects of the persons that I observed in the gardens, without 
presuming in any way that this is some kind of definitive or complete explanation or 
interpretation of their lives in full. To do so would mean that I have fallen into exactly 
the same trap as those development officials that I am so quick to accuse of failing to 
acknowledge the right of the gardeners the be all the persons the choose to be, on their 
own terms.  
 
6.2. Selecting and discarding characters: who you are not is as important as who 
you are 
 
It soon became clear to me that the gardeners allocated a considerable effort to 
making sure that they were not characterized as an undesirable person. Sometimes the 
effort spent in preventing this negative characterization outweighed what I observed 
in terms of efforts to portray oneself as a desirable person. I have referred to these as 
“negative characters” and “positive characters” – the latter are the people we want to 
be perceived as, the former are the persons we are determined not to be perceived as. 
Although all the gardeners, by virtue of the poverty, their occupation and their race, 
were engaged in avoiding the negative characters that so many were quick to assign 
them, their relative focus in this regard was very uneven.  As I have already indicated, 
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Jacob was the person who allocated the greatest efforts to not being seen as a person 
he deemed deeply undesirable – a community gardener. He did not allocate so much 
effort to being seen as a supposedly positive character – a “proper” farmer. In 
contrast, Samuel and the other members of the Motse Co-op seemed to focus more 
efforts on these positive characters, going to sometimes great lengths in the creation 
of appropriate “sets” and “props” to support these characterisations. I would argue 
that the difference was in motivation: The members of the Motse Co-op had 
consciously located themselves in the world of agriculture: they might not want to be 
seen as itinerant gardeners, but the persons that they wanted to be still were firmly 
based in farming. Jacob, on the other hand, wanted to rid himself completely of the 
agricultural stigma that he perceived. He didn’t make any real efforts to be seen as a 
“proper” farmer because that would still have made him the kind of person he did not 
want to be. Ultimately this schizophrenia of characterization is, I believe, what led 
him to leave the garden.  
 
Nowhere was the conflict between negative and positive characters so well illustrated 
as with respect to my very original research question: why are poor and hungry 
households apparently so reluctant to grow their own food?  The partial answers to 
my question have very little to do with food itself or the mechanics of its production. 
As I discovered, the issue of the provenance of food, and the right to eat (or not to eat) 
on your own terms, is a battleground for identity, something that has completely 
escaped the attention of development practitioners. 
 
My background in agricultural development had made me enthusiastic about own 
production of food as a viable way of addressing food insecurity. I and many of my 
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friends were also enthusiastic home gardeners, we all had a vegetable patch and 
greatly enjoyed our home-grown produce. Although we didn’t do much of the work 
ourselves, we felt a great sense of accomplishment in eating our own food. Surely 
everyone else would feel the same way?  
 
Almost the first questions I asked and the first conversations I engaged in with the 
community gardeners were about how much and what produce they took home for 
themselves, their families and their neighbours. Initially I found the answers to be 
both evasive and making little sense.  Neither did observed behaviour make much 
more sense against my initial conceptions of what constituted “rational” behaviour. At 
neither Motse nor Tshimo did I ever actually see anyone take any produce home 
(although many of the Motse members said that they did, and I had no reason not to 
believe them). At Motse there was a steady selling activity, so there was no large-
scale excessive waste of produce, although it did occur. One good example was a 
hundred or so (sweet) red pepper plants, obtained from Silver Leaf. The plants did 
very well, but the peppers were left to rot on the plants (I took many of them home – 
they were excellent quality). When I asked about this the Motse Co-op members 
simply shrugged and said that they weren’t going to eat them, and they didn’t know 
anyone who would buy them. Red peppers were not a usual part of the daily diet of 
the Motse gardeners, which may explain this. Also – they were selling a great deal of 
tomatoes and spinach, and maybe thought that trying to find an additional market for 
a relatively small number of peppers was not worth the effort.  
 
 At Tshimo it was a very different story with respect to unused and wasted produce. 
When I arrived at the garden for the first time there was a pile of about 60 or so 
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butternuts lying in a heap in the container, harvested some weeks previously. When I 
asked Jacob why he did not sell them he said that they were not “up to standard” for 
his customers (not, as I later discovered, an accurate story since he was not really 
trying to sell anything to anyone). I then asked why the members of the cooperative 
did not take them home; after all, they all confirmed that butternut was something that 
they ate (even if they conceded that “children” don’t like to eat them) and it was clear 
that there was little or no cash being generated in the project. If the meager lunches 
that Sarah and Elizabeth brought to the garden were anything to go by there was 
precious little to eat at home either. I got some mumbling about taking the butternuts 
home at some point in the future, but this never materialized. Day after day I watched 
the butternuts first wizening and then rotting in the heat of the container. This pile lay 
there for about 6 weeks after my arrival in the garden, until most of them went bad 
and they were thrown away.  
 
At the same time there were a lot of spinach plants in the garden that were a little past 
their prime, with smaller leaves than potential customers may have wanted. These too 
never seemed to find their way into anybody’s pot at home (or a neighbour’s pot). 
Every day the spinach plants were watered and weeded and pruned, but I never saw 
them taken home to be turned into a meal. When I asked if the members would take 
spinach home “today”, the normal answer was a variation along the lines of “maybe 
tomorrow”, “maybe Friday”.  (In hindsight this evasiveness seemed to me to be the 
result of the Tshimo members’ full awareness that own food production was supposed 
to be the key rationale behind their project – as was emphasized to me by provincial 
officials – together with an initial assumption that I was somehow there as a 
  190 
representative of GDRARD and did not want to say too much that might undermine 
that, and thereby further threaten their already precarious tenure in the garden.) 
 
The reluctance to take food home was not, in my assessment, an issue of personal 
taste in food. The produce grown in the gardens (mostly spinach, tomatoes, onions 
and cabbages) mirrored what would be eaten at home (albeit as the supporting role in 
most meals) and none of the cooperative members in either garden ever said that they 
didn’t eat a particular item (save for Motse’s red peppers), although Sarah and 
Elizabeth did volunteer that their children and grandchildren preferred sweets and 
snacks to vegetables. The pressure to buy children nutritionally inappropriate food so 
that they will not stand out as being poorer than their peers (as described in Gross and 
Rosenberger, 2005) seems to be an issue in many places (Gross and Rosenberger 
were writing about food security in rural Oregan), but this is not exactly the same as 
not taking food home for dinner, as the two are not necessarily irreconcilable 
behaviours.  
 
Even more puzzling, nothing in what I observed reflected the idea that there is a 
stigma against this type of produce (i.e. home-grown food), with people preferring to 
have supermarket produce which they perceived as superior (as Moller, 2005, 
suggested). Quite the opposite: there was enthusiastic demand in the neighbouring 
communities for the produce from the gardens. One of the teachers at the school at 
Tshimo told me that she (and most of her friends) greatly preferred spinach grown in 
someone’s garden or a community project because it was of a superior quality and 
freshness than that in the local supermarket, and represented good value for money. 
When the Motse Co-op started selling tomatoes and spinach in the surrounding 
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communities they also got an enthusiastic response, and never on any of the selling 
trips that I participated in did they come home with unsold produce. They reported 
regular compliments on the quality of their produce. So what exactly was going on?  
 
Clearly a bunch of spinach was not just a bunch of spinach with a particular value in 
utility. Instead the spinach appeared to play an important role in signaling what kind 
of person you were. But what was it about the spinach that determined what kind of 
signal it sent? My assertion is that it isn’t the spinach as spinach itself (i.e. that 
spinach is perceived as an inferior food, or a food associated with a particular 
undesirable character) or its provenance per se (whether it came from a community 
garden or the supermarket) that is important, but rather the relationship (or rather the 
presented and perceived relationship) of its provenance with its consumer. That is, the 
pivotal issue is not what it is or how it was produced, but how you obtained it. This 
seemed to function as a critical identity “marker” and for basic food items consumed 
by almost everyone on a regular basis – such as spinach – this identity function 
appeared much more important than the item itself. And it was, I would argue, the 
relative mundane nature and cheapness of a bunch of spinach (R5 from the 
community gardeners, maybe R8 in a supermarket) that made it so important, in sharp 
contrast to the normal assumptions about what kinds of goods are used to indicate 
personal characteristics (such as those made by Veblen, for example).  
 
In this respect the crucial division is between being the kind of person who can buy 
something as small as a bunch of spinach and the kind of person who cannot, who is a 
member of the “poorest of the poor” that provincial officials are so keen to identity as 
the beneficiaries of their food garden interventions. In communities like Motse and 
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Tshimo – located in a deeply materialistic society in the most unequal country in the 
world – your relative poverty position is central to who you are. From the point of 
view of a development economist almost everyone on Motse or Tshimo would be 
lumped under the category “poor”, but within these communities there is a minutely 
calibrated scale of poverty, and most people are at pains to avoid being positioned at 
the lower end of this scale. Growing your own food places you pretty near the very 
bottom, incorporating all of the negative connotations of manual agricultural labour 
under apartheid with a clear demonstration that you have no money (because if you 
did you would not choose to publicly humiliate yourself with this kind of activity.)  
 
During my fieldwork I was able to identify and/or hypothesise about the main factors 
that determine a person’s location on this poverty scale. These were both multiple and 
complex, often involving much more than monetary factors, and what I have 
presented in this thesis is far from comprehensive. Mainstream development is, I 
would argue, largely blind to these critical markers of personhood that underpin 
meaningful action.  
 
Being employed was a critical factor: having a regular job placed a person well up on 
the scale. Within the employment matrix, having an “office” job rated highest, with 
manual labour and “dirty” work rating lowest (although there was a further series of 
categorisations within manual labour: construction work, for example, rated 
considerably higher than gardening). Self-employment was perceived differently, and 
its impact on your position on the scale depended to a great extent on the income that 
you earned, as well as the kind of work that you did. Sitting behind the counter in a 
well-established spaza shop rated considerably higher than manual labour, but 
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working as an employee in someone’s suburban garden (in return for a cash wage) 
usually rated higher than membership of a community garden. The key point here is 
that it is your perceived position on the scale that is important, rather than your actual 
position, and the key driving force behind much of the creative emplotment that I 
observed was to create a perceived person who was higher up that scale than the 
actual person was. This thesis documents the creation and enactment of these plots, 
designed to create the impression of relative prosperity, using the limited resources 
available.  This – limited resources – is an important point, driving emplotment and 
requiring considerable imaginative effort. In an environment of very limited material 
resources, and thus limited material transactions, but where materiality is central to 
perceptions of poverty, each material item to hand and each material transaction must 
be used to maximum effect.  
 
The community gardeners were keenly aware of what the method of obtaining food 
said about what kinds of people they were, and re-worked the sometimes 
overwhelming necessity to take food home into a different plot line in order to avoid 
classification as the negative character. Jacob at Tshimo exercised his agency with 
considerable ingenuity in this respect. He confided to me that he seldom took produce 
home from the garden, but that when he did he told his family members (he lived at 
home with his mother and two brothers) that the Tshimo members had to buy produce 
from the garden. Through this small deception he made the vegetables he took home 
into something purchased (out of earnings from the garden), as opposed to something 
he had grown, changed his method of procuring the food, and thereby effectively 
made himself into a different person. This difference in how the food was obtained 
was crucial, both for himself and for the audience for whom the performance was put 
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together: the perception of an exchange of money (that is, a narrative of purchasing 
something together with the presentation of the something purchased) effectively 
made him a different person from one so poor he had to grow his own food (the 
dominant perception created by his participation in the garden project). Even though 
the economic utility of the item in question was unchanged, the difference in identity 
implied by the two different performances was critical.  The money performance 
implied several (positive) things about the lead character: that he was employed in a 
successful enterprise that paid him an income, and that the primary goal of that 
enterprise was to make money, not to produce food. Jacob was very clear about this 
latter point, often telling me that the reason why the Tshimo members did not take the 
food home was because they needed it for sales. The fact that there was hardly any 
selling going on was not the point; in Jacob’s mind the fact that they acted as if this 
was the case was what was important. If they started to cart the butternuts home, that 
would shatter the credibility of the positive characters.  
 
I would argue that the focus on money in these characterisations in fact had little to do 
with materiality, i.e. with money itself, but rather reflected a desire to be a particular 
type of person; a person who had and who could make choices about something so 
apparently unimportant as what to have for dinner. A person who had freedom.  
 
The creation of this (fictitious) moneyed lead character was entirely the result of 
Jacob’s own “creative power of imagination” (Ricoeur, 1981, p16), an exercise of his 
own agency to substitute one version of himself for another. The performance was 
carefully managed to ensure that there could be no (or at least very little) question of 
the plausibility of the plot. The reality was that Jacob earning next to nothing from the 
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garden. He had a girlfriend with whom he had a young child, and regularly mentioned 
that two of his best friends with whom he spent the weekends “having a good time” 
were regularly employed. It is thus likely that he felt daily pressure to produce cash, 
of which he had precious little (I did not ask too much about his other sources of 
income, but got the impression that they were sporadic and limited). Against this 
background he would have had some trouble explaining why he regularly came home 
with “purchased” vegetables, but did not have money for other things. This is, I would 
assert, why he only did it on an irregular basis. More infrequent purchases were more 
plausible with respect to creating concordance, and so in practice he only took food 
from the project about once a week.  
 
Even at Motse, where I had hypothesized that the close ties of family and friendship 
within the cooperative to some extent insulated the members from the kind of ridicule 
from family and neighbours that Jacob and Sarah seemed to be subjected to as a result 
of their involvement in the garden, there were instances where the importance of 
being a “money person” with all that implied was paramount. Samuel, the normally 
practical chairperson, told me one day that on the previous Saturday he had purchased 
spinach for lunch from one of the bicycle traders in the location rather than coming to 
fetch some from the garden (a 700m walk from his house). He said that sometimes “it 
is just easier to buy”, but his telling of the story also involved his wife, who was the 
person who had flagged down the bicycle trader. I don’t think that Samuel wanted to 
or was able to tell her that she could not buy from the trader like her neighbours, but 
that he (Samuel) would walk to the garden to cut some spinach. This interpretation 
corresponded with other comments that he made about the pressure to generate cash 
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in the project: “you cannot”, he said, “go home to your wife every day with just 
spinach”.  
 
The preference for money over food-in-kind as payment for labour, even when the 
end use values were likely identical or even in favour of the food, was demonstrated 
by the difficulties that the Tshimo members had in recruiting the extra temporary 
labour that they required to make up some of the shortfall created by the departure of 
more than half the members. When they bemoaned the fact that they did not have 
enough money in the cooperative to employ an additional two workers for a week or 
so to assist with clearing some additional land I asked why they did not offer the 
people food as payment. I was assured that no one would work under those 
conditions: They could find people to put in a day’s hard labour for R30, but not for 
the in-kind equivalent of R50 worth of vegetables. Nor were these potential 
employees selecting between this opportunity and others: if they did not work at 
Tshimo they would in all likelihood stay at home. Staying at home was clearly worth 
more than returning to it with a bag of vegetables.  
 
At Motse the cooperative needed to employ three labourers for a period of about four 
weeks to assist with the heavy work in preparation for the three new tunnels. When I 
asked whether the labourers in question (unemployed men who lived near the garden) 
would take produce as payment or part payment Samuel looked at me as if I was 
crazy. Instead they worked for R4037 per day. 
 
                                                        
37 Around $4.15 at the time 
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Despite the lack of vegetable gardens (by my admittedly casual estimation fewer than 
5% of households grew their own vegetables), many of the residents of both Motse 
and Tshimo kept chickens (of the extreme free-range variety), either for eggs or for 
meat. There was clearly no stigma attached to this activity, although it is also a form 
of own food production. Sarah at Tshimo – who was ridiculed by her family for her 
participation in the community garden, and who told me that she had never had a 
vegetable garden at home – raised a few chickens which she slaughtered for her own 
consumption. I would hypothesise that the difference between vegetable gardening 
and keeping chickens is around the type of labour associated with each activity, rather 
than its purpose (food). Vegetable gardening requires hard “dirty” labour, but keeping 
chickens requires practically no labour at all, apart from occasional feeding and 
ensuring that they have access to water.  
 
6.3. Concordance from discordance: reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable 
The following account of characterization provides, I believe, a very good example of 
Ricoeur’s notion that a narrative identity (and thus what I have termed a performance 
identity) mediates among the seemingly hetereogeneous components that make up a 
person’s life. Working backwards from this idea – i.e. proceeding from the 
assumption that a performance identity is in fact concordant, and not discordant – 
results in a different understanding of what is actually going on in a particular 
characterization. The gardeners have exercised considerable care and creative 
imagination in crafting these composite persons to ensure that they are able to pass a 
credibility test, to be plausible, against the complex motivations of the gardeners 
themselves and their perceived audiences.  
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While Samuel and the other members of the Motse Co-op seemed determined to make 
themselves “proper” (i.e. modern) farmers, they were just as determined to hold onto 
traditions that could easily be deemed outdated, making it clear that their desire to be 
a particular type of person could not easily be pigeon holed in material terms.  
 
Towards the end of my time at Motse garden the cooperative was doing well 
financially. They had won another youth gardening competition (which came with a 
generous money prize), the new tunnels were producing lots of tomatoes, and they 
had done well enough to obtain another tranche of funding from the NDA. With this 
extra cash they were planning to build a chicken house in which to raise broilers for 
sale on the local market. It is a potentially lucrative business, but they were very 
concerned about losing the chickens to thieves. Theft is an ongoing problem at Motse. 
On the lower side of the site (furthest away from the location) there is a 1.6m mesh 
fence on metal poles, but it is easily traversed, and people coming from that side are 
not visible to anyone in the location. Two of the tunnels have had their plastic sides 
cut open for thieves to access the tomatoes (which are an attractive crop to steal – 
they are easily picked and there is a ready market). This tomato theft is, however, 
more of an irritation than a serious problem: Only a very small percentage of the 
tomatoes are stolen and the damage to the tunnels is annoying, but can be repaired. 
However, given the relative value of a live chicken (which greatly increases the 
motive) and the relatively small number of chickens planned (about 500), the prospect 
of chicken theft is much more serious.  
 
While the chicken house was under construction the cooperative became more 
security conscious. There was a new lock on the main gate (which faces the street in 
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Motse), and this was kept locked – no more casual visitors during working hours. 
During this time I arrived at the garden one day to find that someone (or more than 
one person) had stolen the metal poles that supported the fence on the blind side of 
the property. The fence was now lying on the ground, easily walked over. The Motse 
members were clearly concerned about the implications of this brazen theft for their 
chicken enterprise, and were determined to catch the perpetrators as a deterrent to 
others.  I asked Samuel if they had reported the crime to the police. He laughed at me 
and said that they (the cooperative) are going to use “chemistry” to catch the thieves. I 
was a bit confused for a while, stuck in my own version of mimesis1, and thought that 
he was talking about fingerprints or some other aspect of modern policing. After a 
few minutes I woke up and realized that he was talking about a sangoma38, not 
SAPS39. I asked for more details. 
 
Samuel seemed a bit embarrassed/abashed while he was explaining to me why they 
had decided on this approach. Does he think I will judge them badly as somehow 
being “backward” and believing in witchcraft? Although I raised nothing like this – I 
was merely listening to him – he seemed to feel the need to explain the differences 
between us: he said “you are a white person, but we black people have our own way 
of doing things.” He said that the police cannot help them and they have decided to 
consult with a local sangoma. I asked when she is coming and he says at 10 and I say 
oh good, then I will see her, and he laughed at my naivety and says 10 tonight, ”these 
people do their work in the dark.” During the course of that morning I mentioned the 
sangoma’s visit to the other members of the coop and they laughed a bit, avoided my 
gaze and changed the topic. In the end I did not meet the sangoma, but she seems to                                                         
38 Traditional healer, a “witchdoctor” if you will 
39 South African Police Services 
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have been successful. A few weeks later the Motse members do catch someone who is 
trying to steal their chickens, and he is promptly taken off to the local police station 
(SAPS clearly has a role in punishment, if not in detection). The cooperative members 
are clear (and no doubt make this view known to the wider community) that it is the 
“chemistry” of the sangoma that has enabled them to catch the thief.  
 
An interesting issue here was how Samuel could reconcile the inferiority of being 
black in one kind of situation (as a land reform beneficiary on Portion Four) with the 
conviction that the “black” way of solving his crime problem was superior to the 
“white” way. This apparent contradiction made it clear in my mind that the desire of 
someone like Samuel to be a different kind of person in the new South Africa was in 
no way to be confused with the desire to become a “white” person, although this is the 
usual way in which aspiration in this country is accounted for (as in the language of 
“coconuts40”), or even a completely “modern” person. Although the gardeners went to 
considerable lengths to copy the practices and mannerisms of white farmers (as 
detailed in this thesis) I do not think that it was the whiteness of the farmers that was 
the reason for emulation, but rather that they seemed to know the secret of successful 
farming better than black farmers. Continuing with this thread, I would propose that 
what Samuel and the other gardeners wanted to emulate was those things that were 
associated with power, because power implies freedom and choice. The fact that 
certain (many) types of power in South Africa are associated with whiteness, while 
many types of powerlessness are associated with blackness is the logical result of our 
history. Thus, it should be expected that many of the facets of a desirable person 
should be associated primarily with white South Africans (particularly white 
                                                        
40 Brown on the outside, white on the inside 
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commercial farmers, as is detailed in the next chapter), but not all of them, and none 
of them solely because of their “whiteness”. The use of a sangoma is associated with 
power, one of the few examples of “black” power that is available for the author of a 
performance to emulate, and thus a factor worthy of incorporation.  The criterion of 
power as the basis for the incorporation of seemingly disparate actions into 
performances of identity has many manifestations: one of these is the apparently 
modern black person who has all the trappings of a “white” wealthy lifestyle, who 
engages in the ritual slaughter of an ox (White, 2011).  
 
Choosing the most suitable persona for a particular performance is not always an 
easy matter and requires careful balancing of competing goals. Although there is a 
clear stigma attached to being the kind of person who is so poor that they need to 
grow their own food, there are clearly many people who are prepared to allow 
development officials to characterize them in this way in order to get the opportunity 
to join a gardening project. This performance should, I would argue, be seen as an 
ingenious exercise of agency, rather than a passive acceptance of a particular 
characterization. Although government officials seem to be under the impression that 
the primary goal of food gardens is the production of food, both Ruysenaar (2012) 
and my own observations clearly show that, for the participants, the main goal is 
usually income generation. This does not imply that the community gardeners are 
unaware of the aims of government officials, but rather that they are prepared to 
tolerate them in exchange for the opportunity to access resources (all garden projects 
carry a monthly stipend of around R800 for each participant for the first six months or 
so), and the possibility that the garden may turn out to be a viable business.  In these 
performances the community gardeners are using their creative imaginations to create 
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a “front” persona that doesn’t really exist. This persona is easily discarded if the 
project doesn’t succeed (because it is no longer needed), to the bafflement and 
annoyance of the development officials in question.  
 
Although the cooperative members at both gardens were all poor in material terms, 
they were not preoccupied with this monetary poverty to the exclusion of everything 
else that made them human in their own perceptions, in sharp contrast to how they are 
portrayed in mainstream development literature. As Banerjee and Duflo (2006) 
discovered, the range of choices that the poor see themselves as having is much wider 
than the range of choices development practitioners (and theorists) believe they have. 
Choice, and the freedom to choose, lie, I would argue, at the very heart of human 
agency. It is the right to be able to choose one particular course of action over 
another, even when (and sometimes because) the former has a less favourable 
monetary outcome than the latter, that is at the heart of the contestations of identity in 
the gardens.  
 
I observed numerous times when the benchmark of what a “proper” farmer would do 
was clearly prioritized over the financial implications of particular decisions. This 
was most noticeable with respect to the preferred selling practices of the Motse Co-
op. The most profitable market access channel for the cooperative for tomatoes – their 
largest crop in terms of output and value – was the very local market (i.e. households 
in Motse and nearby settlements), to whom they could sell packets of 6 or so tomatoes 
for R5. This market was willing to take medium-sized tomatoes, there was good 
demand, and they were packaged in a cheap plastic bag. There were transportation 
challenges to consider in accessing these markets, but that held for most of their 
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possible options. In contrast, the Spar in Rooidal would buy a box of about 30 of the 
largest and best-quality tomatoes for about R23, and the box in question cost between 
R3 and R5, depending on where they purchased it. In addition, they had to pay the 
cost of transporting the tomatoes to the Spar by taxi, which cost was not really 
affected by whether or not the Spar wanted 5 or 8 boxes (there was no fixed order 
amount). In contrast, they could take as much produce to the local communities as 
they could transport in one trip, and reasonably hope to sell all of it. Thus the 
transportation costs per item were usually lower for the very local markets.  
 
My observations of the comparative advantage of local “wet” (i.e. fresh produce) 
markets over formal retail markets in terms of farm income is echoed in Chikazunga 
(2013). This study investigated tomato production in Limpopo and found that farmers 
supplying to informal/traditional markets achieved an average net income per hectare 
almost 20% higher than farmers supplying modern markets, even though the latter 
tended to be larger landowners with more and “better” infrastructure, and could 
therefore be assumed to be more productive in output per hectare terms. On the one 
ocassion that I accompanied the Motse members to the informal market that happens 
each month on social grant day in Steynsville they made a profit of almost R400, 
about which they professed themselves to be very happy. They did not, however, 
make plans to attend any other market days, and they had seemed to me to be very 
self-conscious standing in front of their pile of vegetables on a patch of grass near the 
municipal office. A month or so after the market day in Steynsville I drove with 
Samuel and Lesego to wholesale nursery about 5 or so kilometres in the opposite 
direction. Near the nursery, along both side of the road adjacent to the police station 
was a site of considerable activity. Lots of people milling about and lots of informal 
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retail activity. “What is going on here?” I asked. “It is this social grant day for this 
area”, they replied. I asked Samuel and Lesego why they have not come to sell – they 
have produce, and it is close to the garden. They muttered something vague about 
“forgetting”, but they didn’t say that they would come next month. We changed the 
subject.  
 
Despite the clear and demonstrated advantages of local wet markets over formal 
market access channels, the Motse members retained a very strong preference for the 
latter, often keeping produce aside in order to fill an order from the Spar, rather than 
selling in the more lucrative local market. Towards the end of my time in the gardens 
Samuel and Kabelo had worked out a deal with spaza shop owners in the surrounding 
settlements for the bulk sales of the smaller and riper tomatoes (at a good price and 
the buyers came and fetched the tomotoes), but continued to insist that the best 
produce went to the Spar. When they talked about the expansion of the project they 
talked about becoming a supplier to Shoprite, with their produce branded in the stores 
in the same way as ZZ2 (the largest tomato producer in South Africa.) They often 
mentioned how “wonderful” it was that Silver Leaf supplied Woolworths. They did 
not ever suggest that their preference for these formal retail outlets was because of the 
price they would receive. Rather it formed part of their general assessment of the 
superiority of the modern – the new, over the old. Inclusion in this new world was 
desirable at almost any price. Samuel and I once drove together past the new 
Cradlestone Mall, to my middle-class mind 80,000m2 of ugly and unnecessary retail 
space. “Isn’t it beautiful”, said Samuel, “I would love to go there.”  
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The Motse Co-op was located close to a busy main road that saw a lot of traffic, and 
the regular minibus taxi stop on this road was about 300m from the garden. I 
proposed on several occasions that they set up a roadside stall here, which would see 
a lot of potential customers. Although the Motse members made positive noises, they 
never did set up the stall and became evasive when I started to push the issue (which I 
then left alone). Although they did not put it into so many words, I believe that they 
resisted this relatively easy, relatively lucrative marketing opportunity on the basis 
that it was not something a “proper” farmer would do.  
 
In this conceptualization of what constitutes a desirable and an undesirable person, 
“success” in sales is not measured only (or even mostly) in monetary income, but 
rather in the form of market relationships, and how these resemble or are different 
from a designated benchmark of successful personhood. As long as government 
policy and development officials insist that the priority of the poor and food insecure 
is food and the “opportunity” to earn a little extra cash, we should expect that 
community garden projects will continue to fail.  
 
At Tshimo there was a much more extreme version of this trade-off between dignity 
and money. Despite the almost complete lack of income in the project, Jacob could 
not bring himself to do door-to-door sales on foot, even after the Motse members had 
taken him along on a sales trip in Tshimo itself, by way of example. This aversion to 
selling something, even when you are in dire need of the money, if the method of 
selling it presents you as a particular (undesirable) kind of person appears to be a 
common theme throughout community gardening projects, making government 
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assumptions that the gardens are a source of extra cash for gardeners naïve in the 
extreme.  
 
I spent some time discussing this issue with Ernest who was the original NTC 
trainer/mentor allocated to the Motse project under the terms of the NDA grant. 
Ernest had worked with a number of community garden projects, and reported a 
strong aversion to selling produce, because of the selling methods that were available. 
None of the projects could afford a bakkie, and most did not have the prospect of 
contracts with large retailers or wholesalers. So their only practical market access was 
door-to-door, wheelbarrow or bicycle sales in their community, and this they resisted 
very strongly. Ernest tells of more than one project were vegetables were left to rot in 
the garden because the gardeners refused what they saw as the humiliation of walking 
around selling vegetables. He says that it is “pride” that stops people from going out 
and selling. I queried him in more detail about this, because it didn’t seem to make 
perfect sense. “Hold on”, I asked, “that doesn’t sound right. Everywhere I go in the 
location and around there I see people selling lots of stuff, sunglasses and cell-phone 
covers and all sorts of other stuff.” “Ah”, said Judge, “but that is fancy stuff. No one 
minds to sell fancy stuff, but food is everyday stuff. People are eating every day, and 
it is not fancy.” 
 
6.4. The Intricate Matrix of Work 
What kind of person you are is very closely associated with what kind of work you 
do, and thus performances of identity are strongly focused on presenting a person who 
does a particular kind of work. But the division of labour – with respect to its 
implications for what kind of person you are – is, I would propose, much more 
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complex than a relatively simple split between dirty, manual labour and cleaner, less 
manual labour, but is also determined by the context surrounding the work. As a 
result, two kinds of work, which appeared to me to be almost identical in every way, 
were in fact subtly, but very importantly, differentiated.   
 
Jacob told me that his involvement in the community garden was ridiculed by his 
family, who told him that he was wasting his time “scratching in the garden”. When 
he would say in the morning that he was “going to work” they would reply – “that 
isn’t work. Why don’t you get a proper job?” Sarah had a similar experience with her 
children, who often asked when she was leaving the project to get a proper job (by 
which they intended something along the lines of domestic work). When I asked why 
her eldest child (a 19-year old son) did not come and work in the garden, which really 
needed the extra labour, she burst out laughing: “he won’t do this work”, she said. He 
was unemployed. There was at least one member of the Tshimo Co-op who had left in 
order to go home and be unemployed in preference to continuing in the garden.  
 
Choosing to be perceived as a certain person over material benefits (where there is a 
clear conflict between the two) is a clear exercise of agency. In a world of extreme 
material deprivation people fight for their dignity, on their own terms. Nowhere is this 
agency better displayed than in the examples of people who consciously select 
unemployment over participation in a community garden. This is a powerful exercise 
of agency, a strong push back against the policy makers and development 
practitioners who assert that the poor will (i.e. “should”) be grateful for any 
opportunity to do any kind of work for any kind of reward. Walking away from work 
that makes you a lesser person in your and other’s eyes when you do not have an 
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alternative is not a sign of ignorance or laziness or any of the other pejorative terms so 
many are so quick to assign; it is a sign – a shout – that you are the kind of person 
who can make that decision, who has the right to do so, who is prepared to sacrifice 
materiality for self.  
 
The stigma does not, however, appear to be about physical labour per se, (although 
the overall preference in work certainly seems to be for some kind of “office” work as 
opposed to “dirty” work), but about the context within which the physical labour 
takes place. One particular kind of work (such as gardening) can have completely 
different implications for the kind of person you are, depending on that context. The 
difference between what makes physical labour acceptable or unacceptable is often so 
apparently small that it is hard to see at first. The participants in the various groups of 
subsidized public works programmes provided some possible insights into these 
distinctions. At the Tshimo site there was a group of Community Works Programme 
(CWP) employees as well as a group employed by GDARD. Essentially both groups 
were employed to do gardening/site maintenance at the Tshimo school, including 
expanding the school’s small vegetable garden41. As detailed in Chapter Three, a 
portion of the Tshimo Co-op’s site was “given” by the school caretaker to the CWP 
employees, who worked enthusiastically on this site a few times a week (I was never 
sure exactly what they were “supposed” to be doing instead). They grew cabbages, 
spinach, tomatoes and onions, which they took home. However, when I asked Jacob 
and Sarah whether or not any of these apparently enthusiastic gardeners were not keen 
to join the cooperative (CWP employment is only for a limited time) they replied in 
the negative. This was confirmed with conversations with the CWP members 
                                                        
41 Produce from which was used to supplement the school’s feeding scheme 
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themselves, who looked frankly surprised at the idea. I would argue that there was no 
problem with these CWP people growing and consuming their own food because, in a 
way that could easily be made plausible in their characterisations, they were being 
paid by a third party (the government) to do it; it was a “proper” job.  
 
At Motse a delegation of CWP workers often pitched up to assist in the garden (the 
CWP mandate specifically allows for support of community projects), and certainly 
appeared to be competent at the work, but when I asked the group if any of them had 
vegetable gardens at home everyone said “no”. What seemed to be the issue was not 
the type of labour, or even the activity of growing vegetables, but the role that you 
were playing when you did it: who was the character who was weeding the cabbages 
and watering the spinach? The CWP character was very different from Jacob, and a 
far more desirable role, because the CWP character had a “proper” job, with a fixed 
monthly income and a regular daily routine. CWP workers counted amongst the 
employed in the community, but the community gardeners did not. When in character 
as a CWP employee there was no stigma attached to growing and tending vegetables 
– it was simply your job. But when you got home it was a different story. 
 
The role of work, then, in identity management is complex. I would propose that we 
could best conceptualise the way in which different kinds of work are ranked as a 
matrix of inter-linked, mutually conditioned and shifting context-dependent options, 
rather than a simple list, running from most to least desirable. What is considered 
“desirable” in one context or for one particular audience may be completely 
undesirable in another set of circumstances. The notion of a complex matrix of work 
closely connected with a range of different personas and characterisations, wherein 
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differences are often invisible to outsiders, may provide insights into another 
apparently paradoxical behaviour in the world of food gardens. Almost everyone I 
met who was involved in a community garden did not have, nor had they ever had, a 
vegetable garden at home, even when they had prior experience in growing vegetables 
(usually gained by working in the horticultural sector). Given the fact that most 
people did have an ornamental garden (usually a patch of lawn, a fruit tree or two and 
small patch of flowers) of some kind, this seemed a little odd: why join a community 
food garden, but not do the same activity at home? I would propose that it is the 
structure of the community garden and the associated activity around it that makes it 
an attractive (initial) option. In the first few months of the garden’s life there is 
usually ongoing supervision by government officials, the rollout of infrastructure such 
as fencing and electricity, lots of training activity and typically some kind of official 
“opening” of the project. In addition, there is the payment of monthly stipends – each 
gardener takes home a regular amount of money at the end of the month.  All of these 
factors combine to give membership of the garden the appearance of “proper” 
employment (with government officials and trainers in the roles of supervisors and 
managers) accompanied by the requisite “proper” regular income (the monthly 
stipend).  It is when these things disappear (normally some six months down the line) 
that the performance is no longer plausible, and the characters are transformed from 
employees in an agricultural enterprise to people who grow their own food. The 
stagecoach is once again a pumpkin.  
 
Creating an office job in a garden 
The attractiveness of the “office job” was fairly common. When I first met Kabelo at 
Motse he said to me that “by now I thought I would have an office job; sitting around 
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in a nice place drinking tea”. Even Samuel, the committed chairperson, surprised me a 
bit by saying that “of course” he would rather have an office job, but that he doesn’t 
have enough schooling to get that kind of job. Both he and Kabelo mentioned on 
several occasions their ambition that one day the project would be big enough for 
them to employ more people “and then they will do the work, and we will be the 
supervisors”. But Kabelo was pretty determined to have his office job before then, 
and managed to arrange matters so that he could get part of the way there. 
 
As the only site in Motse with electricity, the cooperative had been making some 
extra cash by levying a fee for the charging of cell phones. They also had a computer 
and a printer, and sometimes charged for printing. Kabelo – despite his lack of a 
matric certificate or tertiary education – is highly literate, and spotted an opportunity 
to create his desired job for himself. Over a period of about 6 months he built up a 
little business writing and printing curricula vitae, job applications and similar 
documents. During my last month in the garden there was a client in the office with 
him on most days. Kabelo was responsible for marketing in the cooperative, but as 
long as he spent some time on this activity with acceptable results (which he did) the 
other members seemed happy that he spent the majority of his time doing office work 
rather than gardening. The income of his business accrued to the cooperative rather to 
him personally, so there was no monetary benefit for him. Far more importantly, he 
had created for himself a proxy of the kind of job he wanted, and was thus one (big) 
step closer to being the kind of person he aspired to be.  
 
There were certain times that Jacob at Tshimo was very careful about what kind of 
person he projected, while in the garden. When the contractors appointed by the 
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province were (finally) working on fixing the borehole in the garden I noticed that 
Jacob adopted a different character to gardener. When they were there he did not put 
on his overalls, nor did he do any manual labour (unlike Sarah and Elizabeth). Instead 
he made a big show of sitting on a chair under the tree, in full view of the contractors, 
ostensibly working on some notes in a big blue file. When I asked to see the file it 
contained some documentation for the garden – attendance registers, notes of 
plantings, records of sales, etc – but none of these was less than three months old, and 
Jacob was not actually updating them. What then was he doing? He would sit leafing 
through the files, rearranging the papers, and get up a regular intervals to see what the 
contractors were doing, and talk to them for a brief period, before resuming his spot. 
After two days of observing him I clicked: of all the members of the Tshimo project, 
Jacob was the most concerned about being perceived as someone who grew his own 
food, who was so poor that he spent his days digging in a garden, in return only for 
food. He employed considerable ingenuity to present himself to his family, his friends 
and anyone who observed him walking to and from the garden as someone different. 
He was, I realized, just as concerned about presenting a particular version of himself 
to the borehole contractors. He could not put on his overalls and dig in the garden 
while he was being observed by four men who all had a ”proper” job, he could not be 
a gardener in their sight. Instead, by remaining in his casual “civvie” clothes, by 
pretending to be doing administrative work, and by a regular show of “supervising” 
the contractors he presented himself as the “supervisor” or “manager” of the garden. 
This was a considerable step up from being a gardener – as Sarah and Elizabeth were 
no doubt perceived.  
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It is not clear how successful Jacob’s characterization was from the point of view of 
the borehole contractors (I never asked them who they thought Jacob “was”), but it 
appeared to be successful from Jacob’s point of view, which I suppose was the main 
purpose: he had created for himself a version of himself that he could live with. 
 
As I learned, the common view of a supervisor – which is an aspirational position – is 
someone who doesn’t actually do any work themselves, but rather watches other 
people work. This is how you know who the supervisor is – they are the one not 
working. It should also be pointed out that people do not aspire to be a supervisor 
because they are lazy (although this is commonly attributed to them by outside 
observers), but because a certain type of person does manual labour and a certain type 
of (better) person does not. When you see the supervisor of a group of CWP people 
not joining in the work this is not primarily because the person is lazy (although they 
may be), but because to do so would completely undermine the supervisor character, 
and make it less important in everyone’s eyes, including the CWP workers being 
supervised.  I did not investigate in any detail the origin of the supervisor 
characterization, but it doesn’t take too much insight to associate it with the job 
reservation of grand apartheid South Africa, a place where manual labour was for 
black people, and watching black people work was for white people.  
 
An important point of characterization is that when you want to present yourself as a 
particular person, you need to do so in a way that will be recognisable to your 
audience. How does your audience (i.e. your neighbours in the location) actually 
know who the character “is”? This, I would argue, depends to a very great degree on 
their (the audience’s) experience of the character. How do they know what a 
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supervisor is when very few of them have ever been a supervisor, but have merely 
observed them?  Art imitates life – you become someone by incorporating their 
observed behaviour into your space of experience, so that you now are able to 
“remember” what makes someone a supervisor – standing around watching others 
working.  
 
You cannot incorporate what you do not see or for which you have no existing 
“conventions”. The idea that “office work” consists of sitting around and drinking tea 
may be nonsensical to me (who makes a living from sitting around typing on a laptop 
and considers it to be “work), but it made perfect sense to the Motse members (who 
would probably consider that I was not actually “working”). They could not “see” the 
administrative work (often hard work) that is done in an office, because neither they 
nor anyone around them had ever done that kind of work. All they could see on their 
visits to places like the municipal offices or Eskom was neatly dressed people sitting 
down in comfortable chairs and fiddling with papers or a computer. When developing 
a character that you have little direct experience of you have to go on what you do 
have – your observations of what the person does – their mannerisms, their actions 
and their words. Your hope is that this is sufficient to convince your audience – that 
you can “fake it until you make it.”  
 
With respect to being self-employed or employed by someone else, the general 
feeling among the gardeners was that employment was preferable, mostly because it 
was associated with a regular income. But there were some differences of opinion: 
Bontle at Motse had a strong preference for the self-employment of the kind offered 
by the Motse Co-op (and I got the impression she had always thought this way). After 
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I had been at Motse for about seven months Lillian said that she had gotten a “proper” 
job, working in a kitchen, and was going to leave the garden. Most of the other Motse 
members were visibly fed up about that: not only was she letting them down and now 
they would each have more work, but they could not understand why she had stuck it 
out for five years, and then left when things were finally (in their view) starting to 
come right. Lillian was Bontle’s neighbour and she (Bontle) had tried very hard to 
convince her to come back to the garden. More than anything she seems disappointed 
in Lillian: “Can you imagine”, she says, “working in a kitchen when you have a 
project like this?” She says that maybe the problem is that Lillian doesn’t have a 
dream, that she doesn’t believe enough in what they can achieve. She says that when 
you don’t have a dream you will take a job from someone else, but when you have a 
dream and you want to make a success for yourself, then you must work for yourself 
and build something.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WHY DO YOU WANT SUCH THINGS? MISE-EN-SCÈNE AND THE 
MATERIAL WORLD OF PERFORMANCES 
 
“eke out our performance with your mind” 
(Shakespeare - Henry VI, Part III) 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The setting within which a performance takes place, and the physical props that are 
used by and associated with the different characters, are key factor contributing to or 
undermining the plausibility of a performance. I have used the term “mise-en-scène” 
to refer to these material objects – both immovable and movable – that are used to 
support the plausibility of performances of identity. In film and theatrical terms, 
“mise-en-scène refers to those elements of a movie (or theatre) scene that are put in 
position before the filming actually begins and are employed in certain ways once the 
filming begins” (Corrigan and White, 2009, p42). The idea of mise-en-scène in 
performances of identity reflects the long-held notion in social theory that context, the 
setting within which action takes place, “matters” (Xu, 2012). The crafting of mise-
en-scène – what objects are chosen, how they are used, and how they are incorporated 
into characterisations are central to performance plausibility, both in terms of 
objective plausibility (that the audience believes) and subjective plausibility (that the 
actors believes),  - “it provides the key to explaining the effectiveness of 
performance” (Xu, ibid, p116). This is not to suggest that important elements of a 
successful mise-en-scène are always prominent or immediately visible to a casual 
observer. In a successful performance of identity, one that achieves perfect 
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plausibility “script, direction, actor, background culture, mise-en-scène, audience, 
means of symbolic production – all these separate elements of performance become 
indivisible and invisible” (Alexander, 2004, p549). While I agree with Alexander’s 
assertion of the indivisibility of the elements of a successful performance (that is a 
key to plausibility), I am not so ready to agree with the idea of “invisibility”. Which 
elements of the performance become “invisible” is, I would argue, very much 
determined by who the audience is. I realized that certain important parts of the 
various mise-en-scènes created by the gardeners were certainly (initially) invisible to 
me, because, I would argue, my reading of the performance was not located in the 
same mimesis1 in which it was conceived.  However, these performances were not 
crafted for me, and for the intended audience these mise-en-scènes were very visible. I 
would argue that herein lies another source of the inability of many development 
officials to understand the social reality of the beneficiaries of development projects: 
their inability to “see” the individual components of a particular mise-en-scène as 
more than just “stuff” (Harré 2002, p25), and thereby correctly to interpret its 
meaning.  
 
The likelihood of misunderstanding is, I would suggest, further compounded by the 
incomplete information that is often available to the community gardeners about the 
details of a particular mise-en-scène they wish to project; a similar challenge to the 
one described in the previous chapter with respect to different types of work. 
Sometimes the gardeners had only anecdotal or limited access or exposure to the 
mise-en-scène they wished to replicate. They would thus focus on the details that they 
could remember, as well as those things to which there was some kind of reference 
point in their space of experience (another component of the drive for temporal 
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coherence among the person you were, the person you are, and the person you will 
be.) The resulting mise-en-scène could thus be difficult to translate accurately, unless 
it was located in and interpreted with respect to the larger theme and plot of the 
relevant performance of identity, which, of course, was how the actor in question had 
conceived and created it. The “decontextualisation” of a particular mise-en-scène 
from its plot – the overarching theme of the performance – is, I would argue, one of 
the main reasons for the accusations of “irrationality” that are so often levied at the 
beneficiaries of development projects like community gardens.  
 
I have proposed that the various components of mise-en-scène may be analysed under 
the following differentiations: 
 
1. Immovable versus movable components: Immovable elements of mise-en-scène 
include material objects such as a horticultural tunnel, a packhouse, etc. 
Movable elements are items that tend to ‘travel’ with the actors, such as 
clothing. The division between ‘movable’ and ‘immovable’ elements is not 
always straightforward, nor does it always coincide with the physical 
‘portability’ of the item in question. A wheelbarrow is a good example: 
Technically speaking it is a “movable” item, but it does not travel with the actor 
in the same manner as clothing. Whether it is more like an immovable or a 
movable object is determined in large part by the context in which it is used. As 
part of the mise-en-scène within the community garden it is something that 
contributes to the immovable “set” of the garden; used outside the garden, such 
as the transportation of produce, it becomes much more closely associated with 
the individual character, sending signals about what kind of person she is. In 
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this process, the meaning associated with (and implied by, which is not always 
the same thing, since the former is determined by the audience and the latter by 
the actor) the wheelbarrow also changes. This idea that the context within which 
the object appears is central to its “meaning” reflects Xu’s (2012) distinction 
between “foregrounding” and “backgrounding”, but I have proposed that 
Ricoeur’s theory of the metaphor (Ricoeur 1976, 1981) provides a more 
nuanced 219haracterization219 of the relationship between object and context, 
and this is discussed in more detail below.  
  
2. Given versus created components. The differentiation here refers to whether or 
not a mise-en-scène, either in totality or, more likely, certain parts of it, may be 
considered “given” or “created” from the point of view of the actor. Where a 
particular mise-en-scène is created by the actor, she often has greater control 
over her performance.  Where the mise-en-scène is largely “given” (such as a 
visibly struggling community garden, like the one at Tshimo), the actor often 
has to use considerable creativity to overcome the impression of personhood 
created in the minds of the audience due to the mise-en-scène. An example was 
Jacob’s behaviour in the garden when contract workers were fixing the 
borehole. The community gardeners, by virtue of their relative power position 
and limited material resources, seldom, if ever, had the ability to create every 
part of a particular mise-en-scène. For example, the interior of a dwelling in 
Motse may be considered a “created” mise-en-scène, but it actually is so to a far 
lesser extent than the similar space of a wealthy person: the actor has only 
limited resources with which to remake her space, and there is no getting away 
from its wider location in an informal settlement. This overlap between given 
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and created space, and the consequent limitations on the agency of the actor to 
present a certain performance in discussed in more detail below with reference 
to gardens in the location. The limitations on the extent to which any mise-en-
scène is actually completely created by the community gardeners requires them 
to exercise considerable ingenuity in working with what they have to present 
plausible performances that transcend the limitations of a particular mise-en-
scène.  
 
3. Present versus absent components: It is not necessary for an object to be 
physically present at a particular place at a particular time in order to be an 
important component of that mise-en-scène. Shankar (2006) has described how 
people may form relationships with “objectifications… of objects” (p293), 
which objectifications may take the form of either verbal (i.e. stories about the 
object) or visual (such as photographs) representations of the object. These 
representations may refer to actual objects (owned by someone else), or to 
imagined objects. So an object does not have to be physically present (or even 
exist) to be an important part of a mise-en-scène. References to absent objects 
were I observed (and as would be expected), most common with respect to 
objects associated with aspirational characters. A good example would be a 
reference to a (not-present) bakkie owned by the project in conversation with 
another farmer.  Jacob at Tshimo, by referring to the successful sales of produce 
that had never occurred, was hoping to create the impression of money that had 
actually never materialized.  
 
 
  221 
As my fieldwork progressed I realized that some of the most important plausibility 
functions in the performances of identity that I observed were being fulfilled by what 
at first glance seemed to be the most mundane of everyday objects. This, I would 
assert, is one of the reasons why important messages of meaning go unread by 
development theorists and practitioners, because of the “ordinariness” of the objects 
involved. Of course any object generally considered “everyday” may hold significant 
metaphorical meaning in a social performance, but the gardeners were usually 
compelled to make use almost entirely of such everyday objects in their processes of 
meaning making by simple virtue of their material circumstances. In the world of very 
limited material resources where the community gardeners found themselves, actors 
have to exercise considerable ingenuity in using the most basic objects, usually 
available only in limited quantities, to signal a wide variety of messages about the 
details of different characters.  
 
The gardeners did not always have access to all of the physical “props” that they 
might deem necessary to create a convincing mise-en-scène, and so had to exercise 
considerable ingenuity in making up the shortfall, while still maintaining overall 
plausibility. The result is that individual objects are used in a variety of ways to say 
different things about different characters at different times. This “multiplicity of 
meaning” is a key feature of the way in which I observed that objects were used in 
crafting a particular mise-en-scène by the community gardeners. I also 221haracte that 
even small differences in objects, that appeared to my initial examination to be 
identical, such as overalls or the type of shade cloth used in the construction of a 
planting tunnel (as discussed below), could signal significant differences in who a 
person was, or who they aspired to be. Sometimes those differences were only 
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apparent to the actor in question; in those instances the primary goal of these details 
was to increase subjective plausibility – to increase the belief of the actor in her own 
performance as a particular person.  
 
In this chapter I discuss the various examples of mise-en-scène that I observed being 
used by the members of both gardens. Once again, there was a clear unevenness in 
both the utilization of mise-en-scène and the creative effort that was involved in its 
construction among the members of the two cooperatives. This, I would argue, 
reflected the differences in how the various members viewed their agency to plausibly 
be different people. Certainly, the less likely you considered it plausible that you 
could present yourself as a different person (like Sarah or Elizabeth), the less time and 
effort you spent on constructing those performances, including the components of 
mise-en-scène, such as your clothing or the details of how the garden was organized. 
There were also differences in the purpose of the various mise-en-scène. Jacob (as 
discussed below) put in an enormous effort with respect to mise-en-scène, but in his 
case, his efforts were more about deflecting a particular characterization that many 
people had already made about him. He was also very clearly focused on how he 
presented himself as himself alone, such as what clothes he wore on what occasions 
(i.e. on constructing what we could call an individual mise-en-scène, although of 
course all mise-en-scènes are related to notions of personhood), rather than on how 
the garden was presented, a very clear indication to me of his desire to separate 
himself from the garden in his performances of identity.  In contrast, Samuel’s efforts 
around mise-en-scène (almost as considerable as Jacob’s in many ways) were focused 
almost exclusively on the details of the garden, reflecting in turn his incorporation of 
the garden in his understanding of his current and future identity. He seemed to take 
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little interest in the details of how he was dressed, but could obsess over the most 
minute aesthetic details of tunnel construction. 
 
7.2. The mise-en-scène of the “proper” farm 
The overarching theme – or plot – of the performances of identity is what determines 
the details of the mise-en-scène, which it must support in creating plausibility. At 
Motse, the key over-arching theme was that of “progress”, of moving forward to a 
better future. I spent a lot of time discussing with the Motse gardeners how they 
understood that future, particularly with Samuel, who came to use me as a person to 
discuss ideas with about the garden before he was ready to share them with the other 
members.  There was a remarkably consistent idea of what constituted “progress” 
across the Motse members: the components of what the better future would look like 
(i.e. its mise-en-scène) were understood in considerable homogenous detail by all the 
members. That better future was a farming enterprise (owned by the cooperative, not 
on rented or leased land, they were very clear about that). The farm would be big, it 
would engage in large-scale production, it would be mechanized, it would employ 
people additional to the current cooperative membership, and it would sell produce 
exclusively to big retailers. That is, the vision of the Motse members was to create for 
themselves a farm that was similar in almost every way to a successful white-owned 
commercial farm. (Of course there are a small number of commercial black farmers in 
South Africa, but I never heard reference to any of them, and the commercial farms 
that we visited during my time in the gardens were all white-owned, reflecting the 
racial profile of the sector. The cooperative members never indicated that their goal 
was to be successful black farmers – just that they wanted to be farmers like the ones 
they had visited.)  
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That in itself may not be very surprising. After all, these farms are generally seen as 
the most commercially successful across the agricultural sector by government 
officials and this is reflected in the discourse of agricultural policy. However, it 
became clear to me that it was not commercial success (in the form of monetary 
reward) that was the main driver behind the white commercial farmer as role model 
for progress. Not once did any of the Motse members say that they wanted to have 
this kind of farm because it would represent financial success. Instead, their 
conversations, their performances and their careful selection of material objects to 
accompany these performances were based on a very clear idea that white commercial 
farms were “proper” farms, and that their cooperative was not (yet) a proper farm. 
This idea of the white commercial farmer as the benchmark for what constitutes a 
“proper” farmer was reinforced by Samuel’s recounting to me of the demise of the 
land reform project at Portion Four. The owners of Silver Leaf Farms presented an 
almost perfect role model in respect of what constituted a proper farm.  
 
In order to support this aspiration, that they themselves could also one day be 
“proper” farmers, the Motse members made considerable efforts to create a mise-en-
scène of a successful commercial farm in their garden, no simple task given the 
enormous differences between the Motse garden and places like Silver Leaf, and the 
very limited resources that they had to hand. Most of the cooperative members had 
worked on large commercial farms at some point in the past (Samuel and Lesego for a 
short time at Early Bird – a commercial broiler operation, and Grace and Lillian at a 
wholesale ornamental tree grower) and during this time had clearly taken notes of the 
physical attributes of and organization at these farms. These formed the foundation of 
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their space of experience with respect to remaking themselves from community 
garden project beneficiaries into real farmers.  
 
Samuel in particular was almost obsessive about the smallest details at the 
cooperative that in his mind threatened their “moving forward” to (the appearance of) 
a proper farm. I recall in particular one occasion where I was helping Lesego to fix a 
shade cloth cover over a part of one particular open (i.e.outdoor, rather than in a 
tunnel) planting. This was a space some six metres wide and ten metres long between 
two of the original tunnels. The cooperative planted it with crops like onions, wild 
spinach and cabbages. It provided a good sheltered spot, in part because of the 
surrounding tunnels, but also because it was covered with shade netting (positioned 
on a high wooden frame) that kept the birds out. The shade cloth arrangement had 
been there from the first time I visited the garden, and it was an effective, but rather 
shabby structure, with lengths of torn shade cloth flapping about where it was not 
properly fastened. No one had ever made any attempt to neaten it up – I don’t think 
they saw the point. But after Samuel’s first few visits to Silver Leaf he insisted that 
this change.  
 
As a result, on this particular day Lesego was very ingeniously “stitching” the lengths 
of shade cloth together. The cooperative had (of necessity) purchased a cheap variety 
of shade cloth, which came in lengths only a few metres wide, and thus the pieces had 
to be joined together to create a net big enough to fit over the planting space. Lesego 
was joining the strips together with 5cm cuttings of galvanized wire, woven into the 
shade net, and set about 15 centimetres apart. The result was a neat and finished line, 
that to my eye was almost invisible, and provided a strong bond between the lengths 
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of shade cloth. I was Lesego’s assistant in this job. He was quick to make me repeat 
my work when I had made the distances between the wire stitches uneven, or if I had 
not “stitched” them in completely straight, although to my mind one centimeter either 
way or a slightly skew piece of wire didn’t make any difference to the integrity of the 
structure. “Samuel”, said Lesego, “is very worried that the shade cloth doesn’t look 
like the ones at Silver Leaf Farm”. Silver Leaf had about 30 structures covered in 
shade cloth wherein they grew seedlings before they were planted out or harvested as 
micro herbs. As a large commercial grower they were able to purchase much wider, 
speciality shade cloth, which came in lengths the same width as their tunnels. They 
did not have to stitch lengths together. While Lesego and I were working Samuel 
came past to inspect, and grudgingly conceded that it was “OK, but not so nice as 
Silver Leaf”.  
 
The most interesting part of this incident for me was that there wasn’t really an 
“audience” for the redone shade cloth: it was unlikely to form the ‘set’ for any public 
performance of identity. On the location-side of the shade cloth area stood the water 
tanks and irrigation system, making it practically invisible to anyone walking past. On 
two sides it was completely blocked by the tunnels, and the path that went along the 
bottom of the garden was too far away to get a good view.  
 
During my early times at the garden the main gate was closed during working hours, 
but not locked. People who wanted to buy vegetables could wander in, as could the 
occasional visitor. The cooperative had a visitors’ book (which they asked me to sign 
on the first two occasions I was there, but looking through it I got the impression it 
was to record unusual or noteworthy visitors, rather than to keep a record of who 
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came in or out). Silver Leaf had a closed gate, with a security guard who wanted to 
know what your business on the farm was before he let you in. About 2 months after 
the first visit to Silver Leaf the cooperative started to lock the gate during working 
hours, and a sign was affixed to the container: “no visitors during working hours”. 
This further reduced the possibility that casual visitors could view the stitched shade 
netting.  
 
The result was that the effort in respect of remaking the shade cloth was almost 
entirely for the benefit of the members of the cooperative, and those provincial and 
NDA officials who made (very) occasional visits. I would argue that the function of 
this particular component of the “proper farm” mise-en-scène was specifically to build 
subjective plausibility around their characters in the minds of the community 
gardeners (particularly Samuel), by expanding their space of “proper farm” 
experience into their present present – their daily lives in the garden. The temporal 
gap between the original shade cloth structure and the seedling tunnels at Silver Leaf 
was being narrowed.   
 
I would assert that this desire to be a particular kind of farmer (modern and “proper”) 
is also the reason for the general antipathy that I encountered towards agro-ecological 
methods of farming, something that has been noted by other researchers (Kelly and 
Metelerkamp, 2015), although the reasons for this are contested. When I talked about 
organic farming at Motse I was greeted with a marked lack of enthusiasm. The 
cooperative members were particularly unimpressed to hear about chemical-free 
farming: they sprayed a large amount of pesticides and fungicides at regular intervals 
in the tomato tunnels, and maintained that this was how it was done on a “real” farm. 
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This was their experience as well. Those members of the Motse Co-op who had 
worked on large commercial enterprises in the past had no doubt about what “proper” 
farming looked like.  
 
For a brief period they had a training officer/mentor (the short-lived Sundi who 
replaced Ernest under the NDA agreement with NTC) who also talked about the 
general move towards organic farming. Although she constantly made the (not 
entirely true) point that “big” farmers were starting to farm like this (no doubt in an 
attempt to make it a more acceptable option through the apparent endorsement of 
“proper” farmers), she found little enthusiasm among her Motse audience. This 
attitude towards organic farming is mirrored to a large extent in official policy. 
Although the national and provincial departments of agriculture includes references to 
organic agriculture in their policy documents, agro-ecological farming is generally 
proposed for smallholders, those who cannot afford to engage in the (preferred) 
industrial model42. The greatest focus of DAFF is promoting large-scale commercial 
farming that is firmly underpinned by modern technology and industrial farming 
methods. Those members of the Motse Co-op who had worked on big commercial 
farms knew the central role that a regular regime of spraying various chemicals took 
in these operations – none of those farms was embracing anything even remotely 
resembling agro-ecology.  
 
This reality of how a modern farm operates may also be the reason why many projects 
that aim to establish former farm workers (who presumably have experience as 
farmers) as smallholder farmers – where methods of necessity much more closely                                                         
42 South Africa is one of the world’s largest growers – as a percentage of total crops – of genetically 
modified maize and soya 
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resemble agro-ecological farming – tend to fail: this isn’t what these people know as 
“farming”. When your job consists almost entirely of mixing up various chemicaIs 
and driving across the lands applying them, you are hardly equipped with the 
knowledge that you need to successfully run a small-scale mixed farm. But in the eyes 
of development practitioners, working on one type of farm automatically qualifies 
you to run another type. I would suggest that this chemical utopia is something that is 
clearly aspired to by people like the Motse Co-op members – a method of farming 
that is about as far removed from the “stuck in the past” subsistence agriculture of the 
bantustans as it is possible to be.  
 
Samuel and the other Motse members were very strongly focused on having a 
separate packhouse for the cooperative, where they could wash and pack produce 
before delivery. Under their existing system they picked tomatoes once or twice a 
week and then packed them into boxes in and just outside the container that they used 
as an office. The system seemed to me to work just fine – yes it meant that the office 
was overrun with tomatoes twice a week, but it wasn’t used for much else apart from 
a weekly meeting and the occasional bit of record keeping by Mpho. The tomatoes 
were not washed before they were packed, just given a quick wipe with a cloth. The 
spinach, however, needed to be washed before it was packed into bunches: the 
spinach from the outside garden was often extremely dirty, especially after hard rain 
had splashed and pushed mud up over the plants. The washing was done outside the 
office, around the garden’s tap. Once again, this seemed to me to be a perfectly 
acceptable arrangement, although it was raining on one or two occasions when we 
were washing and tying spinach, which was a little unpleasant.  
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In my opinion, therefore, the cooperative didn’t really “need” (in strict economic 
utility terms) a special packhouse badly enough to warrant the diversion of a portion 
of their very limited pool of resources. Ernest, the original NTC mentor, agreed with 
this view in one of my conversations with him: “Why do they want these things?” he 
asked. He said that they (the Motse members) wanted things that they did not need, 
and he was trying to explain this to them, albeit with not much success – they were 
firmly fixed on having a packhouse. The cooperative didn’t have the funds for a 
packhouse in their NDA allocation; they would have to find the money somewhere 
else. They engaged in a constant effort to get the money from various provincial and 
local government officials. Almost every week Samuel or Lesego would talk about 
their apparent progress (or lack thereof) in finding someone to pay for a packhouse.   
 
The dreamed-of packhouse (a brick structure of about 40m2 with running water and 
electricity) would cost about as much as an extra tunnel (in which they could plant 
900 tomato plants and earn about R15,000 in a season) and I queried Samuel as to 
why they didn’t rather want one of those instead of a packhouse. He was adamant – 
all the proper farms he had seen had a packhouse, and so they needed one as well. 
“How can we give our customers a good service if we are working like this?” Samuel 
asked me, waving around at the tomato-filled office. The others nodded their 
agreement. It was clearly an important milestone in the cooperative’s progress 
towards being a proper farm. More importantly, I would argue, their insistence on a 
packhouse, in the face of opposition that they should be more “rational” about how 
they allocated their limited monetary resources, did not indicate any ignorance on 
their part about the materialistic trade-off that they were making. Indeed, the Motse 
Co-op members were conscious of every cent that was spent, and some of the most 
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heated discussions that I observed were around the allocation of relatively small 
amounts of money: whether to spend R100 or R150 on the expenses of a marketing 
trip for Kabelo would be hotly debated for an hour or more. No one could accuse 
them of not carefully considering exactly how they spent their hard-earned cash. But 
their desire to be particular persons was much more important than this: having a 
packhouse was a key milestone in their “becoming” different persons.  
 
I also observed a similar pattern of the “irrational” allocation of scarce resources with 
respect to a bakkie. As should be clear from the description of the Motse Co-op and 
their daily activities, they were greatly hampered by the lack of their own transport. If 
they had a bakkie not only would they be able to do more selling trips to the 
surrounding settlements and places like the Spar at a lower cost, they would also be 
able to collect many of the supplies that were currently delivered, thereby saving 
themselves that extra fee. The members spoke often of their desire to have a bakkie. 
The NDA grant contained a line item for the purchase of such a vehicle, but it was 
only contained in the third tranche (disbursement) of funding, and so they had to wait. 
Near the end of my time in the garden that third tranche was finally paid into the 
cooperative’s bank account and the longed-for bakkie could now be purchased. 
Samuel and the others spent a long time deciding what make and model would be 
best, and once they had decided those things, shopped around to find the best price. 
Finally the bakkie was purchased (and housed overnight at the local nearby police 
station to keep it safe.)  
 
As discussed previously, the Motse Co-op was keen to expand into additional 
business ventures, in this case firewood (which they would cut, bag and sell to their 
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neighbours – there was no electricity in Motse) and door-to-door-delivery of paraffin, 
to the same people for the same reason. (They were already in the firewood business 
to a small degree, but had to pay someone to transport the cut wood back to the 
garden where they would chop it into smaller pieces and bag it.) This planned 
branching out into different activities was annoying for the provincial extension 
officer, who took it to mean that they were not “serious” about their main activity of 
farming.  But instead it was a reflection of the reality of the Motse members’ (and 
their neighbours’) lives, where all economic activities held an element of vulnerability 
and precariousness – you could lose your job tomorrow, the farming business could 
collapse next month. Kabelo said to me that it was necessary to do more than one 
thing in case something went wrong, then you have something to fall back on.  
 
In any event, once the new bakkie arrived I simply assumed they would use it for their 
firewood and paraffin businesses. After all, they did not need to use it every day for 
the farming activities, and there was little to no chance that the NDA officials would 
know what they were using it for (since they hardly ever came anywhere near the 
project, and when they did, it was with plenty of notice). I am not even certain that 
their using it for another purpose would have been a problem in terms of the NDA 
grant, since none of the members ever suggested this.  
 
I arrived at the garden one day to find Samuel and Lesego standing around a relatively 
old bakkie talking to someone (who turned out to be the bakkie’s now-previous 
owner). “What do you think of this bakkie?” Samuel asked me. At first I thought he 
was asking in general terms, and so I made some positive comment. “We have bought 
it”, Samuel said. I was confused: what about the new bakkie, I asked, did you not buy 
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it after all, was there a problem? No, said Samuel, we have that bakkie (it was parked 
at the police station), but we want to use this one for the firewood and the paraffin. 
Surely you do not need two bakkies, I said, why don’t you just use one for everything 
and use the money for something else the cooperative needed? This, it turned out, was 
not a possibility. The “beautiful” new bakkie was not to be used on the rutted location 
roads, or battered around with heavy bags of firewood, or to have paraffin slopped 
over it. That new bakkie was an important symbol of the Motse Co-op’s success as 
farmers, an indication that they were well on their way to becoming “proper” farmers. 
Using it for another purpose – even though that would have made much better 
financial “sense” – would have greatly undermined its place in the mise-en-scène of a 
proper farm. Once again, I had been mistaken into thinking that the only purpose of 
the new bakkie was utilitarian. Of course it was extremely useful to the cooperative, 
and all the members saw it in that light, but this was not its only purpose, nor the only 
function that it fulfilled in their desire to be persons of a particular kind.  
 
On this journey – from who they had been, via who they were now, to who they 
wanted to be - spending time and effort on things as “unimportant” as shade cloth is 
actually critical. The Motse members did not believe that they could “become” 
different people without the “right” mise-en-scène in place. In this belief they were 
reflecting Ricoeur’s (1991b) assertion that temporal coherence was central to identity. 
In line with that thinking, I would hypothesise that the creation of a particular mise-
en-scène allowed its components to be incorporated into the gardeners’ space of 
experience, increasing the temporal coherence of their performances of identity. 
Creating in the garden some recognizable (to the members) version of a mise-en-
scène of a proper farm (such as the Silver Leaf seedling tunnels) reduced the temporal 
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distance between who they were and who they aspired to be.  Any accusations of 
“irrationality” or “ignorance” leveled at the community gardeners in respect of their 
insistence on having (or trying to get) objects that do not seem either particularly 
necessary or constituting the “best” use of their scarce resources would be confusing 
the material with materialism, overlooking the possibility that the desire to acquire 
certain material items should be understood as meaning making, not acquisitiveness 
(Wallendorf and Arnold, 1988).  
 
7.3. Gardens and kitchens: the public and private spaces of identity 
Growing one’s own vegetables was clearly an activity that was associated with traits 
of personhood (i.e. extreme poverty) that most people in both Motse and Tshimo 
seemed very keen to avoid (including someone like Jacob from Tshimo who was a 
member of a garden). But here was another apparent paradox: I had already noted that 
being employed as a gardener in someone else’s garden was viewed more positively 
than food gardening for oneself. But within Motse and Tshimo not all forms of 
homestead (i.e. around one’s house) gardening seemed to attracted the stigma of 
extreme poverty that Jacob seemed so keen to avoid. Instead, it became clear to me 
that there was a range of things that homestead gardening could say about who a 
person was, some positive and some negative.  
 
In Motse (the apparent paradox of homestead gardening was more noticeable here 
than in Tshimo, mostly I would argue because the residents of the former had been 
there much longer), almost all of the informal dwellings around where the cooperative 
was located had an ornamental garden of some sort. This usually included one or two 
fruit trees (mostly peaches), a patch of neat lawn and some ornamental bushes and 
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flowering plants, including irises and even rose bushes. This suggested to me that 
there was no negative connotation associated with the activity of gardening (since I 
could safely assume that none of these residents were employing someone else to tend 
to their gardens), and many of the residents clearly spent time and efforts on their 
gardens, illustrated in neatly edged beds and trimmed grass. They even made the 
effort to fetch water (from the communal tap some distance away, but free) for parts 
of their gardens when it was particularly dry. However, I did not see one vegetable 
patch, or even one vegetable plant in any of these gardens. I asked one of the 
neighbours of the cooperative – Wilemina – why she did not grow any vegetables 
(she had volunteered to me the information that she was “not working right now” and 
I often saw her at home, so she would have had the opportunity to do so). “Oh”, she 
said, “we do that at home in Limpopo43, not here”. She was adamant that she 
purchased her food – she did not grow it, although she also complained that she was 
very short of money because she had a “stingy” boyfriend.  
 
There was thus a clear difference in the minds of the residents of Motse between the 
activity of ornamental gardening and the activity of food growing, although to an 
outsider (such as myself) the two appeared identical. The former I would propose, is 
focused on creating the image of a typical South African suburban house – 
surrounded by lawn, flowers and trees – not on growing food. It seems, therefore, that 
it is not the activity of gardening that is important for determining what kind of person 
you are, but rather its perceived purpose – what kind of person engages in what kind 
of activity. Each of these types of gardening was, in fact, a completely different mise-
en-scène, implying that a completely different performance of identity was taking                                                         
43 A predominantly rural province in the north of South Africa, running in part alongside the border 
with Zimbabwe.  
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place. Tending your flower patch or watering your peach tree is a mise-en-scène 
associated with a houseproud person living in a permanent home, it gives your 
informal dwelling the trappings of a fixed, suburban home. These latter homes are, I 
would argue, deeply aspirational, and the purpose of the ornamental garden in the 
location is to reduce the temporal distance between experience, present and hoped-for 
future. In contrast, making your garden into a vegetable patch not only marks you out 
as too poor to buy your own food, but possibly also as having just arrived from some 
deep rural area and not yet acclimatized to urban life, a person “stuck in the past”. 
This assessment would be in line with Wilemina’s comments that homestead gardens 
are something that is done in Limpopo, not Gauteng.  
 
Another important and related observation to be made here – and one that seems 
completely to have escaped the attention of those who design and implement food 
security policies and programmes based on own production of food – is the 
importance of whether or not a performance of identity is public or private, and the 
ability of the actors to control that. Gardening in an informal settlement, where the 
houses are close together and the fences low and relatively insubstantial, is essentially 
a compulsory public performance: there is no way to hide from your neighbours the 
details of what you are doing in your garden, even though your garden is, technically 
speaking, a private space. The reality of life in an informal settlement (very different 
to a household living behind 3 metre high walls in middle-class suburbia) essentially 
makes your garden a public space in some very specific ways. Every time you engage 
in an activity in your garden you have an audience, whether you want to or not, and 
this, I would assert, is a critical factor behind the careful choice of which character is 
visible in each gardening performance, and the accompanying mise-en-scène that is 
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constructed – flowers instead of vegetables, lawns instead of rows of spinach plants. I 
did not think it was a coincidence that I saw a different pattern in a smaller and newer 
informal settlement  (Koedoevlei) that I visited once on a selling trip with the Motse 
members. After the sales were completed I joined Kabelo and Bontle (the two 
designated for this particular trip) in the home of Bontle’s cousin for some tea. Bontle 
showed me two very large hubbard squash that her cousin had given her, grown in his 
own garden. He had a high fence around his garden, made of closely stacked tree 
branches, through which no one could see, with a small gate. He may have had the 
fence in order to prevent theft from his garden (theft is a big problem for home 
gardeners in these settlements), or he may have had the garden because he had the 
fence.   
 
In contrast to the enforced public nature of many performances of gardening, eating is 
generally a private affair, with most meals being consumed inside your house, well 
away from the eyes of the neighbours. Everybody can see your garden and what you 
are doing in it, but no one can see your dinner plate or what is on it – your kitchen and 
your meals are usually a completely private mise-en-scène. It should therefore not be 
so surprising that what happens in the kitchen is less important than what happens in 
the garden. That is, eating and nutrition can, and often are, seen as different activities 
from the provision of food, and deemed to be much less important in performances of 
identity. During the course of this research I delivered a series of lectures on a public 
management course at the University of the Witwatersrand Business School to a 
group of parliamentarians and members of provincial legislatures. In one of the 
sessions we discussed some aspects of this issue; the importance of being perceived as 
a particular kind of person in even in the poorest communities, and the corresponding 
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impact on decision-making, with particular respect to food. Many of the class 
participants agreed with this point – that how you are perceived by others is 
important, no matter how poor you are. One person volunteered her own experience: 
she and her siblings had grown up very poor with a single parent mother in an 
informal settlement. There was seldom much to eat at home, and most meals were 
made up of nothing but maize meal. But her mother had told them that they did not 
have to let their poverty make them ashamed or limit their potential, telling them 
“remember that no one can see what you eat at home; no one can see that you only 
have pap44 and water. When you go outside no one can see that.” They learnt at an 
early age the difference between private and public performance; how to accept the 
inevitability of the former, while still exercising your agency to control the latter.  
 
Interpreting the difference between eating food and growing your own food as the 
difference between private and public performances of identity recasts the apparent 
paradox of food insecure households not growing their own food in a very different 
light.  For mainstream economists and development policy makers there is no 
distinction between food as nutritional input and food as determinant of identity. In 
these conceptualisations there is thus no distinction between growing the food and 
eating it, the one is simply a means to an end. In the eyes of the food insecure 
themselves, however, these are completely different and separate activities, with very 
different implications for the kinds of persons they are.  
 
                                                        
44 Cooked maize meal 
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7.4. Movable mise-en-scène: metaphors and creativity in meaning-making 
In additional to the immovable components of mise-en-scènes created in the gardens, 
movable components often provided the crucial “finishing touch” to the credibility of 
a particular character, and thus the plausibility of the entire performance. In these 
carefully constructed and managed performances of identity, even very small changes 
in the type of object used in the performance could imply considerably different 
things about the characters in the performance. In addition, the “performance” 
meaning associated with these objects was generally very different from their utility 
value in terms of giving “plausibility” to a particular character. Considerable creative 
energy was expended by many of the gardeners on getting the “right” object to match 
a particular character. Once again, I was struck by how very small differences in 
items – at first invisible to my eyes – could imply very different things about a 
particular performance. I also observed that movable objects served to complete a 
particular mise-en-scène, whether that was actual or imagined. The less credible the 
rest of the components of the mise-en-scène (such as the unwelcome reality of the 
garden at Tshimo for Jacob) the harder that movable objects had to “work” in the 
effort to present a plausible performance 
 
The “use” of objects in the crafting and presentation of identity performances that I 
observed included both the actual presence of an object in the performance, and an 
allusion or reference to a non-present object – the “objectification” discussed by 
Shankar (2006). Sometimes the objectification referred to a completely imagined 
mise-en-scène, existing only in the mind of the actor. For example, when Jacob told 
his family that the vegetables which he brought home had been purchased from the 
cooperative, by means of that small deception he created a larger mise-en-scène – a 
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successful money-making enterprise that paid him an income – that did not actually 
exist. He needed it, however, in order to support his particular characterization. It is 
key to a plausible performance that non-present and imagined objects are made both 
“real” and likely to be associated with that particular character, in the view of the 
audience.  
 
I have drawn parallels between the role of objects in identity performances and a 
theory of metaphor in language, as have a number of anthropologists working in the 
area of material culture. However, in this respect, my view of the material culture 
associated with performance identity differs somewhat from that of Tilley (2002) who 
asserts that the metaphorical meaning resides in the object. Although Tilley 
acknowledges the importance of context in assigning and creating that meaning, this 
context is presented as relatively constant within a particular culture. That is, a 
particular artefact would tend to have the same metaphorical meaning in a particular 
culture, over time. The metaphorical use of objects that I observed was quite different 
– much more fluid and almost entirely context-driven, since the primary goal was to 
support the plausibility of a particular mise-en-scène. Once that mise-en-scène was no 
longer present, the metaphorical meaning of the object also disappeared, and it mostly 
returned to its utilitarian state. When the wheelbarrow was inside the garden it 
became simply a means of moving things around; outside it was a strong symbol of 
poverty and the low standing of the community garden (for Jacob). Similarly (as 
discussed below) overalls worn inside the garden were simply work clothes, but worn 
outside the garden said something very different; when the new bakkie was parked 
outside Motse it was a symbol of their “properness” as farmers, parked at the police 
station it was merely a bakkie.  
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I have thus utilized an approach towards the metaphorical use of objects that is based 
on Ricoeur’s theory of the metaphor (Ricoeur 1976), which asserts that even though 
the metaphorical “twist” lies in the word (which then has a meaning additional to its 
“dictionary” meaning), the metaphorical meaning lies in the sentence. That is, the 
metaphor only makes sense in the sentence. The word on its own does not have that 
metaphorical meaning. The analogy I have drawn is with the object and the 
performance: the object is the word, and the performance is the sentence. It is within 
the context of a particular performance that the object is given a particular 
metaphorical meaning. When that performance is concluded, the metaphorical 
meaning may disappear, and the object may resume its place as “stuff”. In different 
performances the same object may have very different metaphorical meanings, 
depending on the context within which the performance takes places and/or 
(importantly) who the audience is. Conceiving of objects in this way helped me to 
make sense of the initially confusing way in which the same objects seemed to be 
both important and unimportant, for the same person. Once I realized that they had 
different roles to play in different performances, and could identify and demarcate 
these different performances, apparently odd – even supposedly irrational – 
behaviours started to make sense. 
 
The second important component of Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor from the point of 
view of this analysis is his understanding of a metaphor as a semantic innovation, one 
that procedes from the creative imagination. In Tilley’s (2002) discussion of wala 
canoes, the metaphorical meaning associated with the canoes is a “cultural” meaning; 
it is something that comes from (is given by) and resides in, a particular culture. Thus 
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(even though Tilley acknowledges that the cultural meaning of the canoes is changing 
over time) the metaphor in this instance is given to individuals in the community; 
there is no semantic innovation by the individual. Thus, Ricoeur’s theory of metaphor 
applied in terms of the material component of a social performance implies a high 
degree of agency for the actor in a particular performance in terms of authorship: 
although there must be some kind of pre-existing convention (i.e. mimesis1) that 
makes the metaphor intelligible to the audience of the performance – implying that 
the semantic innovation is ultimately limited by cultural conventions in what it can 
say – a high degree of agency, in the form of creative imagination, is acknowledged in 
what the object may say.  
 
In many of these performances a set of overalls had (an unexpected) starring role, 
reinforcing the idea that the gardeners had to use every item at their disposal in the 
management of their identities. Overalls are the most common form of working 
clothes for people engaged in a wide variety of manual labour. The gardeners at both 
Motse and Tshimo had been given sets of dark blue overalls and gumboots as part of 
the initial start up package of goods from GDARD. At Motse I was given a set of 
overalls after about six weeks: Grace was clearly getting tired of watching me dirty 
my clothes at every visit (she often commented on it), and finally she went and got a 
set of overalls for me. They were made of a thin cotton and were not of a particulary 
good quality. The gardeners mostly wore a variation of the full set (trousers and a zip-
up long sleeved jacket). The older women (Sarah and Elizabeth in Tshimo, Rebecca 
and Grace at Motse) clearly preferred wearing a skirt to a pair of trousers, and of these 
four women I only ever saw Sarah wearing the trousers on two or three occasions.) 
The women normally wore the jacket, unless it was very hot, together with a skirt of 
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their own. The younger women and the men usually wore the trousers with a T-shirt 
(which is what I mostly wore as well). Bontle, as discussed below, was the general 
exception. Save for her, I seldom say anyone wearing the full set of overalls.  
 
There were all sorts of other overalls around me every day. The CWP workers had 
bright orange overalls, with the CWP logo prominently displayed. Most of the CWP 
workers I saw (including the women) wore the full set all the time. The temporary 
workers from GDARD had particularly smart dark green overalls of a good quality, 
also with a prominent logo. They also wore their overalls all the time that they were 
working. Most of the farmworkers in the area also dressed in overalls and gumboots 
(the combination is a clear sign that you are likely to be a farm labourer of some 
kind), usually with the name of the farm embroidered on the back of the jacket. To 
my initial view these were just overalls, indistinguishable working clothes, worn for 
convenience and to save “civvy” clothes from dirt and wear and tear. I was quite 
wrong.  
 
The first indication I had that overalls in fact said very different things about different 
characters occurred when, very early on in the fieldwork, I went with Kabelo to 
deliver some boxes of tomatoes to the Spar in Rooidal. After making the delivery 
Kabelo asked me to take him to the GDARD offices in town: He had put together 
about 10 packets of tomatoes and wanted to sell them in their offices, mostly with the 
intention of demonstrating what good tomatoes the cooperative was producing rather 
than with earning money, although he did say (making a good point) that “they should 
support our business”. The GDARD office was located in a low-rise office block in 
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the centre of town. I waited in the lobby while Kabelo went upstairs to do the sales. 
He was dressed in his full set of overalls and gumboots.  
 
Kabelo eventually reappeared back downstairs with a women from GDARD, with 
whom I had a brief chat before she went off to a meeting. Kabelo says that she told 
him that he was correctly dressed “for this kind of work.” He said that he agreed, that 
there is no use in smart clothes when you are a farmer. It was only at that point that I 
start to realize that in fact Kabelo probably felt self-conscious dressed in his overalls 
and boots when we came into town, but now had his farmer “performance” vindicated 
by someone who recognized and approved of the character.  
 
Jacob in Tshimo had a more complex relationship with his work clothes, which 
reflected his conflicted relationship with the garden itself. Jacob never came to work, 
or left, wearing his overalls, nor in fact did I ever see him take them home. They 
remained in the container, to be put on when he arrived, and left behind when he went 
home. Of all the gardeners in both gardens he was the only one who did this. He 
always came to work in casual civvy clothes. I would often see him walking across 
the open veld to the garden in the company of either CWP workers or GDARD 
workers (who were all working at the school where the garden was located). I knew 
who these people were working for because they were wearing their overalls. At one 
point there were almost 20 CWP and GDARD people working at the school and I 
never saw any one of them arrive or leave without being dressed in their overalls, 
even at the height of summer. So why didn’t Jacob wear his?  
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I attempted to ask the question once or twice, but he was evasive and clearly wanted 
to avoid the issue, and so I drew my own conclusions. It seemed to me that the 
overalls sent very clear signals about the kind of person you were, by signaling both 
whether or not you were employed, and what kind of job you had. Wearing an overall 
while walking somewhere at 8 in the morning on a weekday indicated that you were 
on your way to work, a desirable image in a community with very high 
unemployment rates. A CWP or GDARD overall said that you had a “proper” job 
with a regular (albeit small) monthly income. In contrast, a cheap blue overall with no 
logo said that you were a participant in a food gardening project – not a desirable 
person to be. By walking to work in civvies Jacob avoided being characterized as a 
food gardener by casual observers. His very casual regular outfit – bermuda shorts 
and sandals – probably signaled that he was unemployed, rather than on his way to, 
say, an office job, but this characterization was preferable to being seen by the wider 
community as a food gardener. By not taking his overalls home he avoided additional 
censure from his family, possibly managing to convince them that he worked as some 
kind of supervisor at the garden.  
 
Bontle at Motse always made a point of being very smartly dressed in her overalls. 
For her there was only pride in being associated with the garden and she wanted to be 
seen as a member of what she termed “a project”. She also (and unusually) professed 
a great preference for being self-employed in the garden, over having a job. She spoke 
to me about the indignities that surrounded the reality of the precarious employment 
opportunities that were mostly available to the residents of Motse, the humiliation of 
having to ask – “to beg” – people to give you work; the vulnerability of being 
employed – one day you could have a job, and the next the company could close 
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down or not need you anymore. You never knew from one month to the next whether 
you would still have a job. In comparison, she says, the project is “permanent”, and 
that outweighs the temporary benefits of a higher salary. “Here”, she says, “you can 
see your future.” 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DUMELANG!45  
DEVELOPMENT AS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
“All stories have a curious and even dangerous power. They are manifestations of 
truth - yours and mine.” 
(Vera Nazarian – Dreams of the Compass Rose) 
 
8.1. Introduction: plurivocity, power and narrative 
This thesis has described the multiple ways in which two groups of community 
gardeners exercise their agency through their creative imaginations to remake (or 
attempt to remake) themselves into the particular kinds of persons that they aspire to 
be. These aspirational persons differ considerably from those implied by the a priori 
assumptions about the “objects of development” contained in mainstream 
development discourse (Crush, 1995, p9). I have attempted to illustrate that many of 
the disappointing outcomes of food security initiatives in South Africa, and 
particularly own production of food as a mitigating strategy, may be traced directly 
back to a disconnect between these assumed realities of development discourse and 
the lived reality of the target beneficiaries, as suggested by Oliver de Sardan (2005). 
The question I wish to return to in this concluding chapter is that posed by Ruysenaar 
(2012), who asks why, if community garden projects (and, I would add, most own 
food production initiatives) have such high failure rates, do they continue to be 
advocated as a solution to food insecurity in South Africa?  
                                                         
45 Polite form of greeting in Tswana (the home language of most of the community gardeners), literally 
- “I see you”.  
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The resources expended in this regard are considerable: in just one province alone 
(Gauteng) the 2012/2013 annual report (GDARD, 2013, p54) indicated that the 
responsible department had established 11,004 homestead food gardens, 57 
community food gardens, and 144 school food gardens during that financial year, a 
significant increase in all categories from the previous year (and they did not indicate 
how many were still in existence from the previous year). The Gauteng 20 Year Food 
Security Plan (GDARD, 2011) estimates that in the 2012/13 financial year the 
Province had spent almost R49446 million on food security initiatives (GDARD, ibid, 
p29).   
 
In attempting an answer to this question – why own production has become so well-
entrenched as a policy response despite its clear lack of success - I have also 
considered what alternatives might be possible; how we might go about re-making 
how we think about food security in particular and “development” in general, and 
therefore about how we might re-imagine these to reflect the lived realities of the 
community gardeners.   
 
Power is a central theme in this thesis, dealing as it does with contestations of identity 
– the struggle to be a particular kind of person; most specifically, a different kind of 
person than those presupposed (and thus effectively imposed) by mainstream 
development policy. These characterisations – such as the grateful hungry poor or the 
want something for nothing poor described in previous chapters – are, I would argue, 
entrenched in mainstream development through its discourses and how these portray 
(effectively characterise) the poor and the food insecure. As discussed in this thesis, 
                                                        
46 $51.2million at the average exchange rate for 2013 
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most of the mainstream development literature in South Africa dealing with own 
production food security initiatives and the high failure rate thereof (which most of 
the research in this area is ready to acknowledge) tends to focus on technical issues 
(such as the skills of the gardeners, their access to infrastructure, etc). It thus, using 
the terms of De Sousa Santos (2004), is quite clear in what it makes visible as the 
reasons for the failure of such initiatives and what it makes “absent”. Most 
pertinently, what it makes absent is the right of the poor and hungry to opt out of 
these initiatives, by the effective designation of such responses as “irrational”. When 
development ‘experts’ like Baipethi and Jacobs (2009) maintain that “there is 
consensus that appropriate technologies requiring low inputs would significantly 
improve the take-up of subsistence production” (p22), then it is clear that those who 
refuse to do so are either ignorant or irrational, or both. 
 
Ruysenaar (2012) attempts to interrogate his own question by asking why the 
underlying policy behind community gardens (i.e. that own production is a viable 
response to food insecurity) seems so robust, while the actual programmes are not: 
“Why is it that the ‘pro-poor’ development rationale has become so .….. entirely 
mismatched with the reality in which these programmes are implemented?” 
(Ruysenaar, ibid, p26), but he does not really answer his own question, save to say 
that part of the answer may lie in “examining the way in which policy ideas are 
socially produced” (Ruysenaar, ibid). Instead much of his focus is on the way in 
which the (given) policies are implemented, thus reverting in part to the orthodox 
technical discussion.  
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Following this line of thought from Ruysenaar – the way in which policy ideas are 
socially produced - has lead me to Jonathan Crush’s (1995) assertion that the 
“discourse of development” (Crush, ibid, p3, emphasis in original) is worthy of our 
attention, rather than just the technical issues emphasised in the South African food 
security literature. Crush argues that a focus on dicourse very possibly holds the key 
to the apparent paradox that while ‘development’ and development projects so often 
fail, the ideas of mainstream development “not only persist but seem continuously to 
be expanding (their) reach and scope” (ibid, p4).  That is, Crush is asking a general 
version of Ruysenaar’s particular question and, therefore, I would propose that we 
could start to get some way towards answering that latter question through the 
interrogation of food security policy as discourse, and how its hegemony is 
maintained in and through that discourse. It is the discourses (narratives) of 
development, I would argue, that are at the heart of the power relations that so 
effectively limit what kinds of persons the poor in South Africa may or may not be, 
rather than the details of the implementation of policies based on that discourse 
(which I would consider to be a secondary factor). It is the narratives of poverty and 
development replicated in official documents, the popular press and in everyday 
conversation that effectively have characterized the poor and the hungry as particular 
types of persons. Development projects like community gardens are simply the 
logical extension of those narratives, but derive their authority (and thus their 
longevity as development “solutions”) because of those narratives.  
 
Policymakers (and the general public) have a strong preference for simple 
explanations (Pottier, 1999), and, I would propose, for simple solutions to complex or 
uncomfortable questions. It is exactly these preferred simple solutions that underpin 
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the narratives of community gardens: people do not have enough food, so they grow 
their own = problem solved. In this way, I would argue, a collective problem (poor 
nutrition and hunger) are effortlessly transformed into an individual one, with 
corresponding implications for where solutions should be found, and where blame 
should be allocated when these fail.  
 
Considering development as discourse, and thus “the power of development” (Crush, 
1995) as something based on discourse (a form of narrative) dovetails with Ricoeur’s 
proposal that personal identity is essentially a narrative identity (Ricoeur, 1991). It is 
through the stories that people tell that “(they) come to imagine and know themselves” 
(Kearney, 1996, p182, emphasis in original). When those narratives portray particular 
people in a particular (lesser) way, those people come to believe – to “know” 
themselves – as lesser persons. This is the essential point about subjugation, and thus 
liberation, made by Steve Biko, that, in order to be “free” black South Africans had to 
liberate their minds through “an inward looking process” (Biko, 1978, p29). 
 
If we accept that our identities, our notions of who we “are”, are fundamentally 
narrative (Ricouer, 1991b) then there is a clear relationship between the narratives of 
development and the contestation of identity. Conceptualising identity as a narrative 
identity effectively conceptualizes the struggle over identity as a struggle over 
authorship, since the very idea of a “narrative” presupposes an author. Thus the 
struggle to be a particular kind of person is manifested as opposition to a particular 
imposed narrative identity and the efforts to rewrite some of one’s own narrative; to 
appropriate a part of its authorship. The issue then is the origin of these “knowing-
who-I-am stories” – who is granted (and allowed to retain) authorship of the stories 
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that define how we know who we “are”? In the case of the community gardeners, the 
imposed narrative identities are those of mainstream development, based on very 
clear ideas of who has expertise and knowledge, and who, therefore, is best 
“qualified” to author these narratives (most assuredly not the gardeners themselves). 
“The texts of development have always been avowedly strategic and tactical – 
promoting, licensing and justifying certain interventions and practices, delegitimising 
and excluding others.” (Crush, 1995, p5).  
 
In South Africa considerable authorship power is allocated to mainstream economics, 
which accords a central role to the inevitable “logic of the market”. This thinking, in 
turn, is inextricably linked to the deeply entrenched idea that the economy and society 
are separate (Polanyi, 2001 [1944]) and thus that there is (unfortunately, but 
inevitably) no place for what we might call “morality” in economic policy making. 
The hungry are thereby effectively reduced to an unfortunate, but inevitable collateral 
damage of a fundamentally superior system – the market economy. Gibson (2011) 
amongst others, provides a compelling account of the ruling African National 
Congress’s almost seamless shift from a proposed “populist” economic agenda 
(clearly based on ‘moral’ imperatives around notions of redistributive justice) to a 
fundamentally neo-liberal one after 1994, which neatly incorporates this economic-
social divide, and renders notions of morality superfluous to the logic of the market.  
 
South Africa’s food system is characterized by a high concentration of formal food 
retailers (the top four retailers control around 60% of the total market) and also a very 
high concentration of food processors (Van der Heijden and Vink, 2013). Food 
retailing and processing in South Africa is a highly profitable business – the combined 
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2013 financial year trading profits of the four largest food retailers and the largest 
food processor amounted to some R10.7 billion (just over $1 billion).47 However, 
when the opening lines of the Gauteng Province’s 20 Year Food Security Plan 
(GDARD, 2011) are the following – “Food insecurity is caused by inadequate access 
to enough food (due to inadequate household production, insufficient income and 
weak purchasing power)” (GDARD, ibid, p2) – it is made quite clear where the 
“fault” lies. It is the hungry themselves who must carry a large portion of the 
responsibility for their hunger, since they have not produced enough to feed 
themselves. The income of the hungry is only “insufficient” and their purchasing 
power only “weak” in comparison to the retail price of food, but nowhere in this 
policy document is this issue explored. Not one of the six components of this Gauteng 
food security strategy includes an examination of the way in which South Africa’s 
dominant food system contributes to food insecurity, through a steady widening of the 
farm gate – retail price of food, and the corresponding increase in corporate profits 
(Van Der Heijden and Vink, 2013). In this manner, the interests of the few (corporate 
shareholders) come to be presented as the inevitable reality for everyone and a 
particular hegemonic order is granted legitimacy (Tapscott, 1995, after Giddens 
1979).  
 
In a similar vein, the same Gauteng 20 Year Food Security Plan contains a 
component referred to as Nutrition training for beneficiaries (GDARD, 2011, p48), 
once again implying that the reasons for poor nutrition lie primarily with the 
ignorance of the hungry themselves, rather than with the realities of the over-arching                                                         
47 Shoprite, Pick n Pay, Spar, Woolworths and Tiger Brands. Each of these companies has a different 
financial year-end, and thus the figures do not represent the 2013 calendar year. In addition, all of the 
retailers sell non-food items in addition to food, but only one specifically reports food sales. Data 
collated from annual reports.  
  254 
food system in which they find themselves. (That is, poor nutrition is an individual 
problem requiring an individual solution, rather than a collective one.) This current 
thinking around where the “blame” for poor nutrition lies (and South Africa does in 
fact have much higher levels of malnutrition and under-nutrition than its national 
income data would suggest – Altman et al, 2009) mirrors in many ways how the 
malnutrition of black children in apartheid South Africa was blamed on the “cultural” 
ignorance of blacks, rather than the poverty created by the policy of apartheid itself 
(Wylie, 2001). Wylie (ibid) recounts the following anecdote told her by a white South 
African woman in 1979: “We are trying to teach them (i.e. black South Africans) to 
eat brown bread, but they insist on white” (pxi).   These sentiments – the burden of 
having to correct the behaviour of those less knowledgeable on the subject of nutrition 
- don’t seem very far from those expressed by GDARD’s food security plan. The fact 
that the “black” persons in the former anecdote have been replaced by the “poor” in 
the official policy document some 30 years later has not really changed either the 
underlying sentiment, or its targets.  
 
8.2. Producing invisibility 
“Without cash in a market society, you’re free to do nothing, to have very little and to 
die young. In other words, under capitalism, money is the right to have rights.” 
(Patel, 2009, pp 112 – 113, emphasis in original) 
 
The power of development narratives to render certain things invisible and certain 
other things visible (and thus to confer existence itself) is the basis of De Sousa 
Santos’ (2004) opposition to the hegemony of mainstream development. He describes 
how certain kinds of persons, and certain kinds of existence are “actively produced as 
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non-existent” (ibid, p239), and thus as legitimate objects for the “fix” of development. 
In the case of the community gardeners, what has been “actively produced as non-
existent” is a full acknowledgement (i.e. legitimization) of the kinds of persons the 
gardeners are, and the kinds of person that they wish to be. When food security 
officials describe the abandonment of community gardens by the beneficiaries as 
evidence of their “lack of commitment to hard work” what they are effectively doing 
is producing as non-existent the gardeners’ desire to be considered as equal persons. 
When development theorists suggest that the poor should be happy to have the 
“opportunity” to grow their own food, they are effectively substituting for that desire 
a very basic kind of materialism, and therefore effectively making the poor into 
persons not of their own making. In this way, the poor really do become “those who 
have their reality officially defined for them by others” (Wiley, 2001, p4).  
 
The dominant discourses of food security in South Africa have effectively erased the 
possibility that the gardeners may in fact be perfectly rational in their actions, by 
creating an “absence of personhood” and substituting it with what may be referred to 
as “the presence of the material”. That is, these narratives encourage us to think of the 
poor and the hungry only in material terms – such as how much food they have, and 
the nutritional quality thereof – rather than in personhood terms. It is the power of 
these narratives to render certain persons “absent” or somehow “less”, by reducing 
them to no more than the sum of their material attributes (or shortcomings), that, I 
would argue, effectively negates the ability of the community gardeners to achieve 
Biko’s ideal (1978) that liberation is analogous to “complete freedom of self-
determination” (p21).  
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Thus when Jacob and his fellow gardeners at Tshimo leave produce to rot in the 
garden rather than take it home and face the ridicule of family and neighbours, or 
when the Motse Co-op insists on allocating their limited resources to the purchase of 
a second bakkie, mainstream development cannot interpret what the action means to 
the actors themselves. In the language of Bardhan and Ray (2006), this mainstream 
discourse is unable to interpret why people do not do something in any way relevant 
to those people’s own interpretation of their own actions, precisely because this 
discourse has effectively made those interpretations invisible, and thus unavailable.  
 
The presented reasons (in mainstream South African development narratives – such as 
the Gauteng 20 Year Food Security Plan) for why certain households are food 
insecure in the first place reflects a clear set of power relations. By simply ignoring 
the dominant food system in South Africa (which generates enormous profits for large 
corporate food processing and retailing companies through high food prices) the 
mainstream discourse has effectively excluded it as a possible contributor to hunger 
and poor nutrition, and thus as a legitimate target in order to address these issues. 
The fact of high corporate profits generated from the sale of food in a country where 
around 80% of all households cannot afford to purchase a nutritionally balanced 
basket of food (Jacobs, 2009) is not judged as morally reprehensible, but rather as 
“given”. That, after all, is “the way in which the market works.”  
 
By deflecting attention onto the shortcomings of the hungry themselves (they 
“choose” not to grow their own food – because of their laziness or their ignorance - 
and thus solve their “own” problem), the beneficiaries of this exploitative food system 
are able to justify its existence, and its growth. It therefore becomes “true” that food 
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insecure households could solve their own problems with nothing more than a little 
effort and a little external support, and those who “choose” not to do so somehow 
deserve the results. As Wiley (2001, p3) puts it – “It is not enough to enjoy these 
riches; people must be seen to deserve them. Conversely, social suffering must be 
satisfactorily explained.” She was describing grand apartheid in South Africa, but the 
analysis is just as easily applied to food security policy in contemporary South Africa.  
 
Through the discourse of mainstream development, the poor appear to have been 
“integrated” into an economic system on exactly the same basis that Biko (1978) 
objected to in terms of racial integration: “If by integration you understand…. an 
assimilation of blacks into an already established set of norms and codes of behaviour 
set up and maintained by whites then YES I am against it.” (Biko, ibid, p24, emphasis 
in original).  Biko’s claim that “liberal” anti-apartheid organisations were 
perpetuating a black sense of inferiority by creating a situation where “whites (are) 
doing all the talking and blacks the listening” (ibid, p20) very neatly reflects current 
mainstream development practice, where designated “experts” (like the provincial 
extension officers or the mentors from NTC) do all the talking, and people like the 
gardeners at Motse and Tshimo do all the listening. As Wiley (2001) puts it, “the 
experts were never the hungry themselves” (p4). One of the “definitive” studies on 
food security in South Africa is Altman et al (2009), together with its underlying 
reports. As far as I am able to assess, this study did not at any point consider the 
hungry themselves, save as data sets extracted from national statistics, and certainly 
never solicited a hungry person’s point of view.  
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I have purposely drawn analogies between the power relations implied in the 
discourses of mainstream development in post-apartheid South Africa and the 
discourses of apartheid itself, echoing the views of Chris Tapscott (Tapscott, 1995). 
These, in turn, reflect Ferguson’s (1990) points of view about the political goals of 
apparently ‘apolitical’ development. In many subtle and important ways, the 
community gardeners are as effectively trapped by the characterisations of the poor in 
post-apartheid South Africa as their parents and grandparents were by those 
characterisations of “blackness” implied and imposed by the apartheid state. In certain 
instances they are subject to an even greater denial of their desire to be equal persons 
by current mainstream development narratives based on the assumption that the 
failure of projects is usually the fault of the beneficiaries; their “lesser personhood” is 
underscored by the fact that, despite all the “benefits” that they now have by virtue of 
their “freedom” in the new South Africa, they have still failed. 
 
Diana Wylie, in her study of apartheid food and nutrition policy (Wylie, 2001) has 
emphasized how the justification for apartheid within the ruling White community 
was “refined” from a crude biological form of racism to a more sophisticated “cultural 
racism” (p2). She makes the very relevant point (ibid) that this cultural racism (i.e. 
that there were certain fundamental “cultural” differences among the various races 
that translated into different abilities to advance in economic terms) provided the 
basis on which Whites were able to justify their relative wealth and privilege, and thus 
prevented their having to examine too closely (or at all) other explanations, like 
power. Like Tapscott (1995), she also draws parallels between this South African 
discourse of cultural differences and the general tone of international development 
discourse.  
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I would agree wholeheartedly with Tapscott (ibid) that the “sphere of influence (of the 
discourse of development) is more extensive and its impact on South African society 
has been more far-reaching than that of any conventional academic discipline” 
(Tapscott, ibid, p171). Its main function, he asserts, has been to legitimize the 
apartheid policies of separate development by, mostly very successfully, depicting 
black South Africans as “underdeveloped”, thus neatly substituting a more ‘palatable’ 
definition of inferiority than those based on biology, while still achieving the same 
goals – denial of black South Africans’ right to be persons in full. In addition, this 
language of “underdevelopment” made it clear who should be the “developer” and 
who should be the “developee”; who, in the words of this thesis, would get to be the 
author of narratives of development by virtue of their more “advanced” state of being.  
 
It is now mainstream economics (through development policies) that legitimizes a 
particular set of power relations in contemporary South Africa, by means of a very 
similar set of assumptions about who has the right to script these narratives.  It is via 
these enduring assumptions that the “expertise” of people like Ernest from NTC was 
firmly established at the Motse garden, despite the daily evidence that the gardeners 
were in fact much more knowledgeable than he was on many key issues. This 
knowledge on the part of the gardeners was rendered invisible by those narratives, 
which thus very effectively set the limits to what kinds of persons the gardeners 
“could” aspire to be.  
 
It is clear that the community gardeners are considered “inferior” by almost all 
development officials by virtue of their poverty, which poverty is often assumed to be 
analogous with “ignorance”. They are made, by virtue of their material circumstances, 
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into Biko’s “perpetual under-16s” (Biko, 1978, p21). Those in positions of power vis-
à-vis the gardeners, which power is determined in large part by how the discourses of 
development portray the expert and the ignorant, thus feel completely justified in 
referring to the gardeners as lazy or ignorant or “not wanting to work hard”. And 
some of the gardeners, by and large, accept this as the correct order of things. Sarah 
and Elizabeth – struggling with the infrastructure in their garden – genuinely did not 
believe that the kind of persons that they were had the “right” to demand anything at 
all from the persons that the provincial extension officers were. It is testimony to the 
success of mainstream development narratives in South Africa that Sarah and 
Elizabeth could not imagine themselves equal persons with that provincial official, no 
matter how much “freedom” they may have had on paper.  
 
Like Tapscott (1995), Manzo (1995) also draws parallels between apartheid and 
development in arguing that “development (in South Africa) established continuities 
with both colonialism and apartheid” (Manzo, ibid, p226). She draws conclusions 
about the role of modernity in maintaining racial stereotypes via the discourse of 
mainstream development, something echoed by Gibson (2011), and visible 
everywhere in South Africa. Gauteng has as its logo “the smart province”, while 
Joburg (its largest metropolitan municipality) aspires to be “a world class African 
City”. It is not hard to see that there is little (if any) conceptual space in these world 
class, smart places for people like Sarah and Elizabeth. It is through these narratives 
of progress, I would propose, that Sarah and Elizabeth are rendered almost invisible 
and largely irrelevant, despite their “freedom”. Their “backwardness” in 2013 denies 
them access to this shiny new world as surely as their blackness would have done 30 
years previously.  
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The drive to modernity in South Africa – under the guise of “development” - 
continues to displace poor people like the community gardeners. In this thesis I 
described how the gardeners had traveled to one of the informal markets that spring 
up each month in the surrounding communities on social grant days. These are the 
days on which the recipients of South Africa’s various social grants receive their 
payments at a particular pay point, and so have cash to spend in a particular location 
(around the pay point). These market days provide opportunities for many small 
informal traders to access a large group of customers, and it provides the major source 
of income for many of them.  
 
In 2012 the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) announced a new social 
security grant “smart card”. This new system allows the monthly grant to be 
automatically uploaded onto the beneficiaries’ cards, thereby effectively removing the 
need for beneficiaries to congregate in one place each month to receive their grant. 
The new card can also be used as a debit card within formal retail outlets, and cash 
withdrawals using the new card at a formal retail outlet are free, while a fee is charged 
at a bank automatic teller machine.  
 
According to the Minister of Social Development (in her September 2013 speech at 
the inauguration of the Advisory Committee on the future of payment grants in South 
Africa) “(t)he previous antiquated system indicated that beneficiaries were able to 
receive their grants only on specific dates and at specific pay-points”. That this 
“antiquated system” provided income-generation opportunities for many of South 
Africa’s poor does not seem to have been considered at all. The reality is that this new 
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(modern) social grant payment system will greatly undermine the critical mass of 
customers in one place at one time that created the incentive for the informal markets, 
and thus probably cause them to disappear.  Another avenue for the poor to generate 
livelihoods will be closed by “progress”.  
 
Where then is the space for that freedom promised to people like Elizabeth and 
Sarah? As Gibson (2011) points out, the racially-based discrimination of apartheid 
has been replaced by the poverty-based discrimination of the new South Africa, and 
the victims are more or less exactly the same. This is the great “irony” pointed out by 
Tapscott (1995, p186), - “ that traditional opposition forces in South Africa are 
themselves appropriating the language and idioms of ‘development’ for their own 
ends.” That appropriation, some 20 years later, is complete. The community gardeners 
will testify to that.  
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8.3. I write what I like48. Freedom, authorship and moving beyond development  
 
“Economic democracy means nothing if not trusting the people to identify and 
express their own interests.” 
Hart and Sharp (2014, pviii) 
 
“The tide of history only advances when people make themselves fully visible.”  
Anderson Cooper 
 
The “post-development” literature has grown out of a general disenchantment with 
the widespread failure of mainstream development. In contrast, however, to more 
orthodox critiques of development (which have tended to focus on the technical 
details of particular approaches and project designs), post-development criticizes the 
very concept of “development” and its assumptions of “superior and inferior 
knowledge” (Gibson-Graham, 2005, p5), and calls for alternatives to development 
itself (Escobar, 1995).  
 
As Ricoeur referred to the “surplus of meaning” that remains after the completion of 
an objective analysis like structuralism (Ricoeur, 1976), and before interpretation of 
“meaning-in-the-world”, so Gibson-Graham (2005) refer to the “surplus possibilities” 
that are revealed when a “sociology of emergences” is applied to a poor community, 
in response to De Sousa Santos’ sociology of absences produced by mainstream 
development (Gibson-Graham, ibid, p8). Gibson-Graham’s conceptualization of a 
new “community economics” is based on De Sousa Santos’ (2004) call to “enlarge 
                                                        
48 Biko (1978) 
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the field of credible experience” through the creation of a “post-development 
discourse” as just such a means to achieving that enlargement (Gibson-Graham, ibid, 
p6). As I proposed in Chapter Two, we may draw parallels between De Sousa Santos’ 
(and thus with Gibson-Graham’s) ideas about what may constitute a viable “post-
development” as being premised on a particular notion of narrative identity.  
 
Although none of these writers used this term in this context, Gibson-Graham utilised 
what they called a ‘language project’ as a central part of their community economics 
research in the Philippines. This involved community members articulating in their 
own words what their community had, rather than focusing, in the language of 
development, on what it didn’t. This latter “analysis of lack” resulted in a list of 
things that needed to be fixed by the experts of development; the former highlighted 
the ways in which the community itself could construct an inclusive “community 
economy”.  The research highlighted the “discomfort and uncertainty” that 
community members experienced during this process (Gibson-Graham 2005, p20), 
which process I would describe as analogous to authoring an alternative narrative. In 
this alternative narrative the community members had to assume different characters 
from the normal ‘ignorant poor’ chracterisations imposed on them by the mainstream 
narratives, and thus could be said to be struggling with achieving plausibility of their 
performances against this background.  
 
Manzo (1995) has argued that the black consciousness articulated by Steve Biko and 
his contemporaries in South Africa provides a viable alternative to the power relations 
implied by “development”.  The black consciousness movement measured progress in 
terms of the ability of black South Africans to achieve liberation on their own terms, 
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rather than on the terms of Whites. It encouraged blacks to recognize their inherent 
value, and not to define that value in the terms of others. Black consciousness, in the 
words of this thesis, may thus be said to make very particular claims about who is 
“entitled” to author narratives of progress.  
 
In line with the arguments of Gibson (2011) and Manzo (1995) and drawing on 
Gibson-Graham (2005), I would suggest one way of conceptualising post-
development, based on the following porposals that I have made in this thesis:  
1. That what people really want is not material wealth per se, but to be 
recognized as equal persons of a particular (subjectively defined) kind, i.e. that 
the contestation for “freedom” is primarily a contestation around personhood, 
not material wealth;  
2. That identity is fundamentally narrative, and that contestations of identity may 
thus be conceptualized as contestations of authorship; and  
3. That it is through its discourses (narratives) that mainstream development 
achieves it hegemony, most particularly through what it makes visible and 
invisible, relevant and irrelevant, inevitable and impossible. As I have argued 
in this thesis, it is power and power relations that are key to determining what 
kinds of performances from whom are deemed more or less plausible by 
particular audiences.  
 
Thus, I would propose that one kind of post-development thinking might begin with 
thinking about the issue of authorship – whose experience is considered “credible” 
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enough to make them a plausible author of an alternative “narrative of change”49? Put 
another way, how do we make alternative narratives of personhood – such as those of 
the community gardeners or those of the Jagna community described in Gibson-
Graham (2005) – plausible, on both an objective and subjective basis, and thus 
“visible”? As I have argued in this thesis, there is a vital temporal element to 
performance plausibility: we have to believe that who a person is now and who she 
aspires to be is linked in some plausible way to who she was before. The great power 
of the discourse of development, I would argue, is in its ability to set limits to both the 
space of experience and the horizon of expectation (Koselleck, 2004) of the poor, and 
thus to effectively render implausible a wide range of meaningful action in the 
present.  
 
Biko (1978) states categorically that one of the critical issues in achieving the 
“liberation of the self” is directing attention “to the past, to seek to rewrite the history 
of the black man and to produce in it the heroes who form the core of the African 
background” (p29). Biko appears to be arguing for an expansion in the space of black 
experience, in order to expand what can be plausibly imagined as meaningful action 
in the present. In the case of the community gardeners, this expanded experience 
might focus on the fact that black farmers, rather than white farmers, were the most 
important suppliers of food to many frontier towns in rural South Africa at the dawn 
of the twentieth century. Their displacement by white farmers reflected the results of 
racist politics  - forced land removals and job segregation – rather than any inherent 
inabilities due to their “blackness”, the assumption made by Samuel when referring to 
the failed land reform beneficiaries at Portion Four.                                                          
49 I would also suggest that “change” might be a better choice of word than “development”, implying 
as it does merely some kind of difference between then and now, now and then, without making any 
presumptions about the superiority of any of these.  
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However, I would argue that while a rewriting and a rereading of history may be a 
necessary precursor to the development of new narratives of change (i.e. a genuine 
post-development) it is probably not sufficient: as Ricoeur (1984) points out, history 
and fiction are not so easily distinguished, and what we would consider “history” is 
never a series of empirically verifiable facts. We constantly remake our personal 
history – our “space of experience” (Koselleck 2004, p256) in light of our changing 
expectations. It is not, I would assert, the production of a particular version of history 
that impacts on whether or not a particular performance of identity is plausible or not, 
but the way in which that version is generally understood. For example, the 
documented fact of successful black farmers 100 years ago may be interpreted as 
meaning that black people have latent potential to be good farmers; or it might be 
interpreted to mean that black farmers were only any good in the days prior to the 
modernization of agriculture; that they are in fact inherently “backwards” and not as 
modern as their white contemporaries. Progress has marched on and they have been 
left behind. It is only one of these interpretations that has the power to fundamentally 
alter the performances of identity that are considered to be “available” to the 
community gardeners in the present. If this interpretation is not commonly held, then 
we will simply have created another version of Oliver de Sardan’s (2005) described 
disconnect between the assumed reality of development practitioners and the lived 
reality of the poor.  And, I would argue, it is much more likely that mainstream 
economics (and thus development) would assign the latter (“backwards”) explanation 
to this particular set of historical events.  
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This brings us back to Ricoeur’s mimesis1 – the prefiguration that is necessary before 
emplotment (i.e. the crafting of a narrative) can take place.  It is in prefiguration that 
the power of authorship is established or denied, since prefiguration determines to a 
considerable extent the plausibility, and thus the “acceptability”, of both the plot and 
its author. Mimesis1 is the “pre-understanding” (Moore, 1990, p103) that is necessary 
before emplotment can take place. Developing a plot for a performance that will be 
intelligible both to ourselves and others “presupposes a familiarity” (Ricoeur, 1984, 
p55) with a range of actions, cultural conventions, actors, likely consequences, 
causality, and so on. Mimesis1 thus informs the “intelligibility” of the plot and is what 
should ensure that the performance will be interpreted by the audience in one 
particular way rather than another, by situating the plot in a pre-existing meaning 
structure that is common to narrator and audience.  
 
It is through the gaze of mimesis1 that one version of history is deemed more “true” 
than another; it is through the gaze of mimesis1 that a particular performance of 
identity is judged plausible; and it is through the gaze of mimesis1 that the 
possibilities for the future are imagined. In short, it is mimesis1 that grants visibility 
and invisibility to persons, power and possibility. And it is the power to define the 
mimesis1 of poverty and hunger that we have handed effectively over to the 
“experts”, through our acceptance of the division of the social and the economic.  
 
It is thus, I would argue, in recrafting mimesis1 that we should focus our efforts to 
make visible what has been made invisible by the hegemonic narratives that divide 
the social and the economic. A new mimesis1 requires that we expand “the world ….. 
of credible experience” (De Sousa Santos, 2004, p239). Recrafting mimesis1 requires 
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that we critically rethink the way in which we have effectively handed over the 
authorship of narratives of personhood to mainstream economics; how we have 
created a situation where (to paraphrase Biko) the well-fed are doing all the talking 
and the hungry are doing all the listening. Constructing a new mimesis1 for 
interpreting food security and hunger requires not that we accord legitimacy in the 
narratives of poverty and hunger to the accounts of those who are living these 
realities, but that we cede them authorship. 
 
If we acknowledge in this manner that economic and development policies are 
constructed in a social context, and that the role for morality in these policies is in fact 
to be negotiated, and not given, then the real question to be asked is not why don’t 
hungry households grow their own food, but rather how did South Africa become a 
place where the poor have to choose between their dignity and their stomachs?  
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ENDINGS 
Bontle, at Motse, had always been the person most overtly proud of the garden, most 
proud of what the cooperative had achieved, and most convinced that the Motse 
gardeners were lucky and blessed because of their hard work and commitment. I think 
I could safely say that she was my favourite person to work alongside at the garden. I 
was very surprised to discover, then, on one of my very last visits to the Motse garden 
that she had left the group. “She has left us, she had gone to take a job”, Samuel said, 
and both he and Lesego were obviously very disappointed. I phoned Bontle: What’s 
going on I asked? Have you really left the project? Why? She was in tears – you know 
how much that project means to me Tracy, you know how much I love it. Why? I 
asked.  
 
The reasons – as I should have expected – were complex, and had nothing to do with 
the monetary attractions of her new job: Bontle had always been Samuel’s champion 
in the project – she always defended him if the others complained about him, and she 
was quick to talk quietly to him aside from the others if she wanted to make a point, 
rather than in front of everyone. I was told that Bontle and Samuel had been an item 
in high school, about 6 or so years ago. Samuel was married now, but it wasn’t hard 
to see that Bontle was still very fond of him. But she seemed content with her role as 
his confidant and supporter. This, it turned out, was what had changed, certainly from 
Bontle’s point of view. She told me that Samuel wouldn’t listen to her any more, that 
he no longer wanted her advice. Instead, the decisions were being made by Samuel, 
Lesego and Kabelo. She was particularly upset about their insistence on buying a 
second bakkie, instead of investing the money directly back into the garden.  
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No one will listen to me, she said. Bontle felt herself ignored, pushed aside in her 
beloved garden; and instead of becoming that lesser person she believed she was 
being made into, she walked away.   
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